Carl A. Spaatz was the top American air commander of the Second World War, with both Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley rating him the best combat leader in the European theater. After the war he became the first chief of staff of the newly independent Air Force. There are two excellent biographies of this important airman, the first by David R. Mets at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, titled Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988). Mets relies heavily on the voluminous Spaatz papers in the Library of Congress, as well as dozens of interviews, but the general's personality remains somewhat elusive. Instead, we are provided a survey of American airpower's evolution through World War II, rather than an indepth look at the man who mastered the new air weapon.
Spaatz is portrayed as a "doer" and problem solver who achieved results. He was also an outstanding pilot who shot down three German aircraft in World War I (for which he won the Distinguished Service Cross) and flew aboard the Question Mark in 1929. When war broke out in 1939, Spaatz became the Air Corps's chief planner, then moved to England to command the Eighth Air Force in 1942, the Northwest African Air Force in 1943, and the US Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) in Europe in 1944. He was perhaps the only man totally trusted by Hap Arnold-while being held in similar high regard by Dwight Eisenhower. Although a very thorough piece of scholarship, Mets had trouble with his sponsors who insisted upon removing much material that was either "too personal" or insufficiently complimentary towards Spaatz and the USAF. The result is a somewhat impersonal portrait that also glosses some of the controversial issues in which Spaatz played such a major role.
Spaatz's other biographer is Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992). This is an outstanding effort. Unlike Mets, Davis did not write a fulllength biography, but concentrated on Spaatz's activities during World War II. The result is an extremely detailed, exhaustively researched, balanced, and quite readable account. Some of the issues examined in especially effective fashion include: the North African invasion and the difficulties experienced in command and control of air assets; Army FM 10020, Command and Employment of Air Power, the "magna carta" of airpower that proclaimed airpower was the equal of ground power; Spaatz's error in not recognizing the importance of longrange escort aircraft; the momentous Casablanca conference of January 1943 and its impact on air operations; the bombing assault on the island of Pantelleria that resulted in surrender without an invasion being necessary; the transfer of Ira Eaker to the Mediterranean and Doolittle's assumption of command at Eighth Air Force; the thorny command relationships among the senior Allied leaders prior to the Normandy invasion; the controversy surrounding the rail and oil plans in early 1944; and the use of strategic bombers in a tactical role during the campaign in France. Also included are excellent maps, organizational charts, and statistical appendices.
In addition, Davis provides a particularly good discussion of the attack on Dresden in February 1945. This has always been a contentious issue because of the number of lives lost, the lateness of the war, and the cultural significance of the city. Davis concludes the city was a legitimate military target, the AAF did attempt to precisely bomb the city's marshaling yards, and that if opprobrium attaches to anyone, it should be Winston Churchill who specifically asked that east German cities be bombed to create refugees and spread havoc. Interestingly, although claiming Dresden was an unfortunate victim of circumstance, Davis argues such was not the case for Berlin. He maintains Spaatz placed the German capital in a different category, ordering attacks on "city center" and employing the maximum number of incendiary bombs. As a result, the USSTAF's attacks on Berlin were largely indistinguishable from the area attacks of Bomber Command.
Overall, Davis provides much detail and excellent insight into how Spaatz led and managed the American air effort in Europe and how he increased the magnitude of air attacks and made it both efficient and effective at destroying its assigned targets. If there is a shortcoming, it is Davis's inability to explain clearly how Spaatz and his staff selected targets, what specific effect they were trying to achieve (collapse of morale, revolt, decrease in production, loss of fighting spirit at the front, etc.), and how they measured success. Davis argues strenuously that oil was the key target and Spaatz was correct in singling it out, but he provides no cogent logic or analysis to support this contention. Nonetheless, this is an outstanding book-perhaps the best, though partial, biography of an airman written to date. It sets a high standard by which other biographies should be measured.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
Return: American Airpower Biography
Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor