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Document created: 16
December 99
Air & Space Power
Journal - Chronicles Online Journal
MAJ Roy C. Sevalia, USA
LTC David C. Sims, USA
It is imperative that we strike fast, deep and often to dictate our will upon the enemy. We must own the enemy decision cycle by attacking him through the depth of the battlefield with all available joint and coalition fires. Deep fires is the collective and coordinated use of indirect fire, armed aircraft, and other lethal and non-lethal means in support of the commander’s battle plan that give us the competitive edge to dominate the air, land and sea.
Introduction
Synchronization is of primary importance in attaining success in joint fire operations. These operations extend throughout the theater and vertically into space. Joint fires are lethal and non-lethal weapons effects from any service component in coordinated actions toward a joint objective. The synergistic result is overwhelming combat power applied at the decisive point in a manner consistent with the Commander-In-Chief or Joint Force Commander (CINC/JFC) priorities and concept of operations. Synchronization of joint fires requires the integration of the simultaneous activities of intelligence, air operations, ground operations, maritime operations, and logistics in time and space to achieve the CINC/JFC goals and objectives.
This article describes the processes and procedures for the planning, synchronization, deconfliction, and execution of joint fires in the United States Central Command area of responsibility (USCENTCOM AOR) by the Coalition/Joint Task Force-Kuwait (C/JTF-KU) forward deployed in support of USCINCCENT.
Concept of Fires
USCENTCOM service components and coalition partners conduct supporting operations, not independent campaigns, through detailed synchronization of joint fires. Joint fires strive to disrupt, divert, delay, and destroy enemy air, sea, and land forces capabilities before they can be used effectively against friendly forces. Fires are not limited only to strikes against fielded enemy units, but they encompass a broad spectrum of targets that attacks all of the enemy's centers of gravity such as: the enemy’s leadership; infrastructure and key production components (transportation, energy, command control communications computers and intelligence (C4I), nuclear biological and chemical (NBC, also known as weapons of mass destruction or WMD), theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) war-making industries and non-lethal methods targeted at the population. Effective joint fires produce effects beyond the proportion of effort expended in execution. Joint fires are long term efforts that have both immediate and long term effects on the enemy's capability and will to prosecute the war.
Command Relationships
Commander-in-Chief of Central Command (CINCCENT) will normally be the Joint Force Commander (JFC) for operations which involve United States Army Forces Central Command (USARCENT). In theater level operations, the CINCCENT typically establishes functional component commanders. Under most circumstances, the Commander of USARCENT is designated as the Coalition/Joint Force Land Component Commander (C/JFLCC) within the CENTCOM AOR. JFLCC responsibilities include employment of land forces (Marine and coalition forces) in theater, organization for combat, priority of the main effort, designation of Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs), boundaries, and a phased ground scheme of maneuver to support the campaign or operation. However, CINCCENT, as Joint Force Commander (JFC) retains approval authority for joint force employment, orders and graphical control measures to ensure unity of effort and an effectively synchronized the integration of combat assets.
Battlespace Framework
A battlespace framework helps commanders relate their forces to one another and to the enemy in time, space, resources, and purpose. Proper relationships allow for simultaneous operations, maximum use of resources, and rapid massing of effects against the enemy.
COMC/JTF-KU, in his role as C/JFLCC, employs a battlefield framework that establishes operational responsibility for commanders and provides a way to visualize how they will employ their forces against the enemy. This is especially critical for the deep battle. The primary tool COMC/JTF-KU uses to establish the deep operations battlefield framework is the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL).
COMC/JTF-KU organizes the battlefield in such a manner as to provide sufficient time and space for the major subordinate commands (MSCs) to conduct their own fight. This, in effect, provides the MSC commander the freedom of action to bring the maximum resources to bear against the enemy. Delineation of responsibilities is intended to focus unit areas of responsibility and is based on METT-T. Delineation does not prevent a unit from nominating a target that is not within its area of focus for inclusion in the Joint Integrated Priority Target List (JIPTL) and Air Tasking Order (ATO). COMC/JTF-KU will delineate targeting responsibilities using one or a combination of the following methods. The methods used within the CENTCOM AOR include:
Battlefield Geometry. COMC/JTF-KU may use a control measure, such as the FSCL, to delineate responsibilities. The MSCs target short of the control measure, while C/JTF-KU targets beyond the control measure. The MSC would conduct deep operations from the FLOT out to the FSCL with its organic attack systems, but may nominate targets beyond the FSCL for attack with air interdiction assets. The C/JTF-KU deep operations responsibility falls between the FSCL and the forward boundary of the Joint Operations Area (JOA), but may nominate targets outside the JOA through the ATO planning process.
Enemy Forces. COMC/JTF-KU may designate enemy formations as the targeting responsibilities of particular MSCs. This may be used in conjunction with geographical or event limits or triggers. For example, X Corps is responsible for the 1st OPFOR Army south of the Running River.
Time. COMC/JTF-KU may designate time frames as the responsibility of MSCs. For example, the MSC plans and fights those forces that will impact on the Corps 24-72 hours out. C/JTF-KU plans and fights those forces whose effect is 72 hours and greater.
Joint Fires Synchronization
CINCCENT normally designates COMC/JTF-KU (C/JFLCC) as the supported commander for surface operations in the area between the LCC Rear Boundary and the LCC Forward Boundary. As the supported commander, he has coordinating authority and the responsibility to resolve conflicts and elevate unresolved conflicts on issues pertaining to activities within the LCC area of operations in accordance with the CINC's priorities and intent. COMC/JTF-KU synchronizes ground maneuver, fires, and interdiction by identifying target priorities, effects, and timing of fires within his AO. With regard to joint fires, COMC/JTF-KU will accomplish the following through the Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC):
DOCC Mission
The mission of the DOCC is to apply operational fires (lethal and non-lethal) in accordance with the Commander’s guidance to create the conditions for success on the battlefield. The DOCC is chartered with three tasks to achieve the Commander’s intent: (1) Facilitate maneuver in depth by suppressing the enemy’s deep strike systems, disrupt the enemy’s operational maneuver and tempo, and create exploitable gaps in enemy positions; (2) Isolate the battlefield by interdicting enemy military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces; (3) Destroy critical enemy functions and facilities that eliminate or substantially degrade enemy operational capabilities.
DOCC Organization
The G3 is COMUSARCENT’s executive agent for Deep Operations. All other ARCENT staff sections are responsible for coordinating Deep Operations actions with the G3. Within the G3 is the Deep Operations Division which comprises the DOCC. The DOCC coordinates targeting guidance and objectives, develops a candidate target list for integration with the air tasking order (ATO) and monitors ATO execution and fire support coordination measures. The DOCC is divided into five branches: Deep Operations Branch consist of Plans, Target Development and Operations [OPS] sections; Electronic Warfare (EW) Branch; Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Branch; PSYOP Branch; and the Fire Support Element (FSE).
Deep Operations Branch (Operational Fires Branch)
Plans Section. The DOCC Plans Sections has the responsibility for the planning portion of the deliberate targeting process. This section begins the targeting process through its participation in the future plans (96 hours and beyond) and future operations (24-96 hours) Operational Planning Groups (OPG). This staff synchronization initiates the decide phase of decide, detect, deliver and assess (D3A) during the planning process. In conjunction with the G2/G3 planners, the DOCC Plans Section conducts high value target (HVT) and high payoff target (HPT) analysis and develops the draft targeting guidance and objectives. The Plans Section continues refinement of the recommended objectives and conducts detailed staff planning during its daily Target Guidance Working Group (TGWG). Additionally, the TGWG considers future FSCL placement and other FSCMs as needed.
The Plans Section presents the results of this battle staff synchronization to the Deputy Commanding General (DCG) during the Daily Targeting Board (DTB). The DTB provides an opportunity for the DCG, staff and components to synchronize and de-conflict operational fires. The DTB is the forum used by ARCENT to obtain approval of the 72-hour targeting guidance and objectives and receive additional guidance for the 96-hour planning period. The DTB also provides the subordinate MSCs specific guidance and direction for joint fires and targeting. Additionally, the DTB prepares the DCG for the CENTCOM Joint Coordination Board (JCB). This ensures that the DCG has visibility on the CINC’s concept of joint fires, ensuring joint synchronization from the LCC perspective. The DTB presentation is tied in detail to the ATO cycle, the estimated enemy and friendly situations, the concept of fires and the recommended targeting guidance and objectives.
Before the 72 hour targeting guidance is presented, the DOCC Chief reviews the current combat assessment (Figure 1) against standing targeting objectives. This sets the stage for the 72 hour targeting concept and recommended guidance and objectives. The Staff Weather Officer (SWO) displays the effects of weather on friendly and enemy actions for the future ATO periods. This presentation focuses on joint fires resources and specific weathers effects within the ATO period. The following diagram (Figure 2) is an example of the SWO’s input to the DTB:
Figure 1 |
Figure 2 |
The G2 and G3 Planners lead the main portion of the DTB with the estimated enemy and friendly situation, 72 hours out. The brief includes estimated enemy courses of action and planned friendly force arrays. Additionally, any planned fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) are presented in relationship to time and battlefield geometry. Most importantly, this includes the anticipated location of the FSCL and any possible movements or shifts during the ATO period.
Once the baseline information is presented, the details of the targeting effort are displayed through a concept of fires paragraph and identification of targeting objectives (Figure 3) synchronized with the enemy situation and friendly concept of operations.
 Figure 3 |
 Figure 4 |
The targeting guidance and objectives are finally captured in a single slide known as the Battlespace Shaping Matrix (BSM). This product becomes the source tool for the remainder of the targeting effort to include execution. The BSM (Figure 4) articulates the targeting objectives in priority, the target sets in support of each objective, and the associated High Payoff Targets (HPTs) for each target set. The BSM also provides Time Sensitive Target (TST) priorities and attack guidance as well as Kill Box priorities beyond the FSCL.
The final check and balance of staff synchronization regarding competition for limited resources occurs when the Collection Manager (CM) displays the collection asset programming slides. These slides demonstrate the nesting of collection systems and to the targeting objectives and the coverage provided during the ATO period. Upon approval of the targeting guidance, the Plans Section disseminates the LCC targeting guidance to the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) Plans Section to ensure that the LCC Commander’s guidance and intent are accurately represented at the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC). This occurs during the daily Joint, Guidance and Apportionment Targeting (JGAT) meeting within the AOC.
Target Development Section (TDS). The Target Development Section is the focal point for deep operations target nominations. Upon receipt of the approved Commander's targeting guidance, TDS coordinates with subordinate land component units for joint fires target nominations and develops a consolidated Candidate Target List (CTL) upon receipt of MSC target nominations. The CTL includes all of the Coalition/Joint Force Land Component Commander's nominations to the Coalition/Joint Forces Air Component Commander for integration with the ATO. TDS reviews each target nomination and history to ensure every target meets the Commander’s targeting guidance. Individual targets are plotted using the Global Command and Control System Army (GCCS-A) to avoid duplication.
Digital communications are the primary means for subordinate units to submit target nominations to the DOCC. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is a multi-service (Army and USMC) system which provides automated command, control and communications for fire support operations. The AFATDS is the principal means by which Army Corps and the USMC pass target nominations to the DOCC. This system also has limited interface capability with other systems, such as the Contingency Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS). CTAPS contains several modules that assist with the targeting process. The primary module utilized for target nomination within the CENTCOM AOR is the Rapid Application of Air Power (RAAP). RAAP is a target development tool, which supports targeting through a variety of functions. This module receives externally generated intelligence data, assists the operator in target nomination and validation, provides access to local target, threat, and order of battle databases, and integrates high level knowledge of enemy operations and intelligence with current and historical data. The DOCC utilizes RAAP to collect and prioritize target nominations and to create the CTL. Currently RAAP works within the CTAPS common operating environment, but the newer versions will be capable of operating in a "stand-alone" configuration, outside the CTAPS environment.
After TDS consolidates and prioritizes the proposed CTL, it is reviewed by Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) representative within the DOCC. The SJA representative is responsible for conducting Rules of Engagement and Law-of-War legal review and analysis of all targets nominated on the CTL. The SJA representative uses TARCHECK, a DOS based program which provides a list of key facilities (collateral) within a two (2) to four (4) kilometer radius of the nominated target, to assist in the legal review. With this information, the SJA representative makes recommendations to the DOCC Chief as to whether striking a nominated target may run afoul of the Law-of-War and standing Rules of Engagement (ROE). If there is a great potential for collateral damage and the target maintains its military necessity, a recommendation to use precision guided munitions or another method of enagement to mitigate effects may be included on the CTL for that specific target request.
Finally, the TDS briefs the DOCC Chief during the CTL Review Board for approval of the CTL prior to forwarding it to the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD). The BCD is the LCC representative at the Air Operation Center (AOC) who advocates to the C/JFACC the CTL for inclusion in the ATO. This review board highlights each target category related to targeting objectives and verbally and graphically summarizes the consolidated CTL.
Operations Section. The Operations Section (OPS) is responsible for battle management within the DOCC for ATOs which are 48 and 24 hours out from execution. This includes monitoring the development of the ATO, other planned deep operations, and coordinating the complementary actions required to support the LCC guidance and intent. The routine functions and actions performed by the OPS section are synchronizing current operations with future operations. The OPS Section recommends changes to approved targeting guidance for the next 24-48 hours, as well as changes to planned FSCMs based on unanticipated enemy actions effecting friendly force operations. The section reviews the incoming ATO against the CTL submitted by TDS using the non-supported and supported lists received from the C/JFACC. Targets not resourced are recommended for inclusion on a later ATO. Other functions performed include: (1) Prepare Air Interdiction (AI) divert list based on targeting guidance changes (24-48 hour time period); (2) Integrate Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Attack Operations with deep battle operations; (3) Receive and parse the Air Tasking Order (ATO) / conduct ATO hand over briefing with the FSE; (4) Receive feedback from the BCD on LCC AI nominations submitted to the C/JFACC; (5) Assess the Commander’s guidance and objectives through the Combat Assessment Board; (6) Develop operational fires FRAGOs.
The OPS Section manages a variety of systems to accomplish its assorted tasks. The DOCC must integrate into the CENTCOM joint-targeting cycle, which requires the capability to communicate and interface on a multi-echelon, multi-service level. To meet this requirement, the DOCC currently maintains and operates several targeting systems and related applications. AFATDS is used to build and pass battlefield geometry, enter fire support coordination measures and monitor subordinate unit status. The CTAPS is used to receive and parse the ATO and any other AOC products such as the Air Control Order (ACO). Targets which were submitted by the MSCs that made the ATO are then transmitted using AFATDS. Finally, the Global Command and Control System Army (GCCS-A) is used to receive the Common Operating Picture (COP) to monitor the current friendly and enemy situations.
Fire Support Element (FSE)
The FSE serves as the current operations section within the DOCC. It is located in the Operations and Intelligence (O&I) Section where it can fully interface with the G2, G3, other staff sections and agencies. This positioning provides the FSE the capability to advise the Battle Captain on the proper and effective use of operational fires resources. Target management is the most important function performed by the FSE. This is the process of monitoring the execution of the current ATO and other planned deep attack missions.
The FSE monitors the execution of LCC targets for each ATO cycle by reviewing air mission results through both mission reports (MISREPS) and pilot reports (PIREPS) on CTAPS. Additionally, the FSE uses the AFATDS to monitor indirect fire activity.
Based on the current situation, and with the Battle Captain’s approval, the FSE coordinates "diverts" (re-directing airborne aircraft from striking one target to striking another higher priority target), and "re-roles" (changing the mission (CAS, AI, etc) of airborne aircraft to attack a new set of targets). These actions are coordinated through the BCD Operations cell to the C/JFACC for approval. In-line with these actions, the FSE also serves as the adjudicator of CAS allocations for subordinate ground forces which involves shifting assets as necessary to support the different MSC fights.
Attack of Time Sensitive Targets (TSTs) is a FSE function. The FSE is responsible for establishing quick-fire links via digital means (AFATDS) and voice (MSE). These links are connected to various sensors and shooters in theater such as Army Air Missile Defense Command, MSC Force Field Artillery (FFA) Headquarters, and the BCD. Attack of TSTs is solely driven by the asset that can service it in the most expedient manner, usually aircraft or ATACMS.
The FSE recommends Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs) to facilitate the effective use of fires in support of the LCC during execution. The Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) is the predominant control measure recommended by the FSE. The FSE, in close coordination with the Battle Captain, monitors the positioning of the FSCL to ensure its placement facilitates the current fight. If changes are deemed necessary, they must be identified a minimum of six hours prior to allow for thorough dissemination to all units operating in the theater. This control measure serves as the line of coordination for engagement of targets in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The MSCs generally target short of the FSCL, while the ARCENT DOCC focuses on targets beyond in an effort to shape the battlefield for future operations. During the offense, the FSCL is generally placed further forward of the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) to facilitate rapid advance of ground forces with minimal coordination. In the defense, the FSCL is generally placed closer to the FLOT to allow the C/JFACC maximum opportunity to employ air power with minimal coordination.
Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Branch
The C2W branch coordinates and manages the Information Operations (IO) function. The C2W branch integrates all aspects of IO (Physical Destruction, OPSEC, EW, Deception, PSYOP, PAO, and CA) into a comprehensive plan for the Commander. Establishing priorities and planning the execution of IO between joint and Army organizations, the C2W branch provides input to the CTL for lethal and non-lethal targeting through a comprehensive nodal analysis. Finally, the branch represents the LCC at the CINC’s IO board or convenes an IO working group (IOWG) for the LCC if designated as JTF.
In addition to ARCENT personnel, the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) provides augmentation to the C2W branch. The Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (J2C2W) and Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) may also augment the C2W branch when Third Army functions as a JTF.
Electronic Warfare (EW) Branch.
The EW branch is the G3 proponent for planning, coordinating and integrating EW operations with other combat disciplines using non-lethal fires. EW is an element of Information Operations (IO) and works to ensure maximum synergy in support of the overall IO effort. The G3 Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) is a member of the Third U.S. Army Information Operations Working Group (IOWG).
When Third U.S. Army/ARCENT performs its role as a C/JTF, a Joint Force Commander’s Electronic Warfare Staff (JCEWS) is formed to coordinate EW activities within the staff and with components. The JCEWS reviews EW target nominations and ensure frequency deconfliction.
Primary responsibilities of the EW branch include: (1) Coordinate among EW, intelligence and operations agencies to determine whether expected advantages of EW operations outweigh potential losses of intelligence capabilities; (2) Assess friendly and enemy effects of EW activity on operations; (3) Recommend and develop EW targets for inclusion into the ARFOR CTL; (4) Coordinate inputs for the Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) and assess situations requiring frequency deconfliction; and (5) Chair daily JCEWS meetings.
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Branch
The PSYOP branch serves as the G3 proponent for planning, coordinating, assessing, and deconflicting PSYOP activities in support of operations. The primary responsibilities of the PSYOP branch include: (1) Plan and coordinate PSYOP activities among military and governmental intelligence and operations agencies; (2) Assess friendly and enemy effects of PSYOP activity on operations; (3) Recommend and develop PSYOP targets for inclusion into the ARFOR CTL; and (4) Deconflict PSYOP activities with other lethal and non-lethal disciplines. The PSYOP branch also serves as a standing member of the OPG and the IOWG as well as other internal and external coordination boards.
Conclusion
The success of the Third U.S Army / USARCENT Commander’s battle plan depends heavily on the ability to plan, coordinate and execute deep operations using joint and coalition fires. To maximize effectiveness, it is imperative to understand the capabilities that each U.S. Service and coalition nation brings to the fight because effective deep operations demand the proper application of these assets. In order to ensure success, it is vital that the Land Component Commander’s guidance and intent is clearly understood by everyone from the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) down to the executor. The DOCC is the agency responsible for understanding these concepts and applying the appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures for employing deep fires in support of the Commander’s targeting objectives for us to be successful on tomorrow’s battlefield.
Contributors
MAJ Roy C. Sevalia is a commissioned Field Artillery Officer assigned as a Deep Operations Plans Officer with the Third United States Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia. He has deployed on several contingency operations in Southwest Asia (Operations Desert Thunder and Fox). His previous assignments include Commander of Charlie Battery, 1st Battalion 6th Field Artillery in the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) Bamberg, Germany with a tour of duty in Bosnia. He served as Platoon Leader, Targeting Officer and Company Fire Support Officer in 4th Battalion, 1st Field Artillery in the 5th Infantry Division Fort Polk, Louisiana. He’s a graduate of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
LTC David C. Sims was commissioned as an Armor Officer in 1975. He has served in CONUS, Germany and Kuwait. Previous assignments include commander, A Troop 3-12 Cav, S-3, 1-36 Infantry, S-3, 1st Bde, 3ID, XO, 3-64 Armor, Instructor and Deputy Director, Center for Army Tactics, CGSC and Chief, Deep Operations Division, G-3, Third U.S. Army. He is currently Chief, Overseas Deployment Training, First U.S. Army, Fort Gillem, GA.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
This article has undergone security and policy content review and has been approved for public release IAW AFI 35-101.
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