Document created: November 1996
Discussion
It is vital to regain a fully integrated air mobility system. Research suggests the best way to regain a seamless system should focus on fixing the problems that the divided air mobility system now experiences: the ability to communicate, coordinate, cooperate, and orchestrate, a singly operated system that uniformly and efficiently serves the customer, in both peace and war.
Achieving the effect of a singly operated air mobility system is the desired outcome. However, there are many ways of achieving that effect. The simplest way to create seamlessness would be to place all air mobility assets under a single command, and provide a common-user "outsourced" logistics mobility system to the warfighting CINCs. That is not the best answer. There are reasons that have been highlighted which the warfighting CINCs rightfully need control of all their theater assets, and their own theater distribution system. Theater command of theater assets makes sense, and keeps responsiveness and a combat warfighting focus.
It is important to emphasize that theater in this context is the overseas geographic theaters, the bonafide "warfighters." USACOM does not currently fall under this definition. The recommendation that follows keys on that important distinction. Therefore, constructing an interface between the strategic, centrally controlled system and the individual theaters is vital to create the effect of seamlessness, while providing the theater controlled system to the warfighting CINCs.
Peacetime air mobility requires a much less intense effort to coordinate between the commands that operate mobility. Nevertheless, peacetime efforts should always be posturing the forces to better carry out contingency and wartime capabilities.
Standardizing the differences between the commands who operate air mobility, and standardizing the differences between peacetime and contingency operations is the best way to integrate the separate air mobility systems. This means that creating peacetime structures that are different in scope and function, than the structure used for contingencies does not make sense. As described, the theater peacetime command and control system can and should look a lot more like it is doctrinally designed to look like for contingencies.
As discussed, the C-17 provides the capability to operate between strategic and theater roles. It is a logical argument that under the two MRC strategy, however, the C-17 will be pressed into a primary strategic role. However, many theater contingencies will be able to get much useful airlift from the C-17. Thus, an effective command relationship to exploit the capabilities of the C-17 and other future multi-role airlift aircraft systems, within the theater airlift effort, is vital for the future.
Theater air mobility's two mission focus is a critical issue. The CAF focuses on the combat delivery of theater airlift's air operations force component, while functional air mobility folks advocate theater airlift is an integral part of the air logistics process. Both aspects are important. In essence, the bulk of the theater airlift mission is "point a to point b" air distribution, but the smaller percentage of combat delivery missions carries at least as much, if not more, critical value.
The priorities of the most important elements to reconnect the air mobility system need to be established. The priorities should differentiate "must do" versus "should help" in deciding the best method for organizing air mobility forces. The priorities should also differentiate the amount of change required to keep costs down and minimize disruption to the current air mobility system. Thus, the listed priorities are intended to be "these are the minimums that need to be changed" from the current command structure of air mobility forces in order to best integrate the air mobility system.
The current air mobility system does bring advantages that are valued by the warfighting CINC, which is command of all the assets that live in the theater and participate in the theater's fight. Integration of the current system is achievable under the current structure if the following can occur. First, enhance the effective interface of the people and their equipment who command and control the divided airlift system. This will ensure the command, control, communication, coordination, and cooperation between the commands that operate mobility forces at all echelons provides the effect of a single, unified effort. Second, as the advocate and manager of the US defense transportation network, USTRANSCOM should be used by the theater commands who operate air mobility forces as the "go to source" for mobility expertise. Also, USTRANSCOM should seek to standardize processes and equipment to better improve the integration between the strategic and theater air mobility systems.
The solutions to fix the air mobility system are dependent on how dramatic a change USAF leadership is willing to tackle. The recommendations presented are in the same format as discussed in the preceding chapter: Recommendation for improving air mobility options with and without changing mobility force structure.
Recommendations: Priority of Needed Force Changes
Priority #1: Place CONUS airlift forces under the COCOM of USTRANSCOM. This would entail shifting COCOM of ACC assigned theater airlift forces from USACOM to USTRANSCOM. USACOM is currently a contested combatant command, with limited need to command theater airlift forces. This is a must do item. As will be discussed in priority #2, AMC is the logical USAF "owner and operator" of CONUS based airlift, but this first priority is the important first step in integrating the airlift system. Reasons why are listed:
1.) Consolidates CONUS based airlift providers under a single combatant commander, for airlift forces (vice 50 COCOM theater assets to USTRANSCOM and the remainder to USACOM).
2.) Provides USTRANSCOM direct control of critical air mobility support forces (both active duty and ARC) which would need to be transferred from USACOM in any case at the onset of a contingency.
3.) Retains theater airlift's combat focus which has been enhanced while theater airlift has been under the management of ACC.
4.) Allows unity of command, for CONUS based forces, without "patch-changing" the USAF MAJCOM operators of airlift forces. This change would save restructuring of forces (and potentially basing) of CONUS based airlift forces. It would allow for the most significant restructure of airlift force with the least amount of actual change of line and staff forces to accomplish the mission.
5.) Removes a "disconnect" that USTRANSCOM would be provided 50 CONUS C-130s and support for contingency use while the rest remained under USACOM. This parcels CONUS theater airlift, which as discussed, degrades the effect of that portion of the mobility system.
6.) The other geographic CINCs retain control of their theater forces, which allows them control they desire, while giving them "one stop shop" for airlift augmentation.
7.) Gives USTRANSCOM a better opportunity to focus on improving the interface of the other seams in the air mobility process, by removing the CONUS forces seams.
8.) The ACC/USACOM relationship would be preserved. Although USACOM has COCOM of ACC forces, the primary focus of ACC is that of a force provider to other CINCs. However, ACC already force provides to several other CINCs. There is a point where ACC would be "serving too many masters" by providing forces for too many CINCs.
Discussion: ACC is an air component of USACOM and provides forces to USACOM for combatant command. ACC however, also provides forces to other combatant commands such as USCENTCOM, USSOUTHCOM, etc.--arguably a primary purpose of ACC is that of a force provider. However, operating within USACOM's AOR is USTRANSCOM. USCENTCOM has to go to other CINCs for obtaining theater airlift forces. USTRANSCOM could provide USACOM theater airlift forces in much the same manner if needed to resolve a conflict within USACOM's theater. By having a single manager of CONUS airlift, there is a single source to the non-CONUS theaters to turn to for airlift augmentation.
An issue which would need to be determined between AMC and ACC is the control of theater airlift forces for operational missions. Would AMC's TACC still provide for the command and control as now accomplished, or would an "honest brokering" be better accomplished by USTRANSCOM's MCC? The ultimate decision for that would need to be determined by USCINCTRANS.
Priority #2: Return all ACC theater controlled airlift forces to AMC. This option entails shifting ownership of all ACC theater airlift assets to AMC, while leaving the Pacific and European theater airlift controlled by those MAJCOMs. There is significant value to achieving this return. However, compared to placing COCOM of CONUS based forces with USTRANSCOM, this would be a "second step." Such a transfer would be costlier to accomplish than Priority #1, because of potential for shifting of assets, rebasing, etc. However, the reason the CONUS theater airlift forces were sent to ACC to begin with was to provide USACOM combatant command of theater airlift, along with other combat air forces. Today, USACOM does not appear to need COCOM of those forces. Logically, one versus two air components under USTRANSCOM balances the joint force structure of that command. Because COCOM of CONUS based airlift forces returning to AMC would return to USTRANSCOM, Priority #1 reasons #1, #2, #5, # 6, and #7 would also apply in support of Priority #2. This option makes the most sense, but costs more than the first priority.
1.) Consolidating all CONUS lift under the ownership and control of AMC would aid integration of the air mobility system, and importantly propose a more efficient way of operating the CONUS based air mobility system. As discussed, operating multiple air mobility systems does increase overlap and duplication of effort--AMC owned and controlled airlift systems, at least for CONUS based forces reduces those attributes. The command and control of all CONUS based airlift would be accomplished through AMC's TACC. There would be only one USAF MAJCOM versus the two USAF MAJCOMs in Priority #1 to coordinate for USTRANSCOM's operational requirements.
2.) Strategic and theater air mobility interface can be improved by this transfer by having a CONUS based airlift force that can provide a total lift augmentation package for the theater combatant commands. This provides overseas theater CINCs single management for lift support (same effect as discussed in Priority #1). The change would standardize AMC control of CONUS air mobility assets, while PACAF and USAFE have a small percentage of both tanker and theater airlift under direct control. Most importantly, USTRANSCOM and AMC both gain control of the air mobility support assets such as the active duty and ARC ALCEs and support personnel and equipment to improve efficiency and effectively utilize of those vital functions.
3.) AMC would remain the single air component of USTRANSCOM, eliminating the need to revise the unified to component command relationship as would occur under Priority #1.
4.) AMC would need to incorporate the doctrine and training developments of combat delivery developed while CONUS based theater airlift resided under ACC.
Recommendations: Priority of Changes For Improving Strategic to Theater Air Mobility Integration.
The proposals from the previous chapter all suggest ways to improve the command, control, coordination, and communication interface between theater and strategic mobility systems. If an unlimited budget were available to implement all of the proposals discussed in that chapter, the author would recommend that all be implemented. Unfortunately, the USAF budget is limited, and hard choices have to be made. Dollars should be spent in improving air mobility operations where it would have the greatest impact. Therefore the following rank order of the proposals would be recommended:
Priority #1: Standardize the peacetime structure of the theater air mobility efforts to reflect contingency doctrine structure. Consolidate the airlift planning, forces tasking, and command and control within the theaters. That organization should be the ALCC.
Priority # 2: Expand the AMC theater assigned Air Mobility Support Group Commander's role to directly coordinate the strategic to theater air mobility flow: This proposal would institutionalize a senior AMC commander and small support staff at the mobility hubs that directly coordinate the strategic to theater air mobility flow. This would be a permanently assigned senior officer and a small support staff, who can provide oversight of the AMC mission and can be the TACC's direct agent to coordinate with consolidated the theater air mobility planning and control system (such as the ALCC).
Consideration should also be given to the actual physical location where the AMSG actually resides. In Europe, the AMSG is collocated with the theater air mobility hub and assigned theater airlift forces. That location gives better opportunity for the AMSG and AME to better integrate because both work at the same installation. The Pacific on the other hand, has the AMSG located at Hickam AFB Hawaii, thousands of miles away from the theater airlift transshipment points and theater airlift forces at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska and Yokota AB, Japan. It makes more sense, to operate AMSG and AME efforts where direct contact can be made with theater airlift forces, and standardize between the theaters.
Priority #3: Change the DIRMOBFOR to a COMMOBFOR, and position a combined theater ALCC and strategic AME (the CALCC) under the direction of the COMMOBFOR. One benefit of this proposal is that it should be able to be accomplished "cost free"--it only requires a realignment of command authority for contingency operations.
Change the doctrinal definition of the DIRMOBFOR to a COMMOBFOR with a OPCON reporting chain to the JFACC and give that commander OPCON of theater mobility forces and TACON from the TACC of deploying strategic air mobility forces.
As discussed, place both the elements of contingency airlift planning, the ALCC and the AME in one planning cell, a combined ALCC (or CALCC), and place under the COMMOBFOR. OPCON from the JFACC for theater airlift and TACON from the TACC to the deployed strategic air mobility forces would be exercised by the COMMOBFOR and the CALCC to task and execute contingency airlift operations. At least some of the manning for this contingency structure can come from the assigned theater "peacetime" ALCC and the AMSG AME. The remainder would deploy from CONUS and or theater provided forces.
The primary benefit from this reorganization is there is definite single controlling authority in the theater for air mobility operations, working for the JFACC and integrating with AMC to the degree of flexibility needed by AMC to execute support for the two MRC scenario.
Priority #4: Provide greater AMC support at the theater hubs. As discussed, the proposal is focused in a staff up of personnel to the AMSS who reside at the theater airlift hubs. The overall mobility operation would be improved by manning the hub AMSS with personnel to assist in the transfer of cargo and assets between strategic and theater mobility missions. Additional AMC aerial porters resident in theater would reduce the commitment of sending personnel TDY as frequently from the CONUS Air Mobility Operations Groups to help robust the fixed enroute site for surge operations. The plus up of AMC personnel at the theater air mobility hub places more mobility expertise where it is critically needed.
Priority #5: Increase the mobility expertise in the theater commands that operate mobility assets. The Air Mobility Warfare Center should investigate how to get more mobility expertise out to the system where it is needed. For example, an air mobility expert program that is a sister program (of more operational scope, and no AFIT involvement) to the ASAM program for NCOs could help cultivate a larger corps of mobility expertise. Graduates of such a program could be incorporated both in AMC Air Mobility Operations and Support Groups (AMOGs and AMSGs), as well as theater planning and command organizations (such as the ALCC).
Priority #6: Continue to enhance mobility and deployment operations. Lessons learned from operational mobility deployments focused on problems encountered between inter-command coordination and interface should be a primary goal of mobility and deployment exercises. Deployment of forces often gets "assumed away" in joint exercises (Murin, 1996). Inter-command doctrine exercises would be a superb way of testing the proposed command and control arrangement of a COMMOBFOR and CALCC discussed in this project.
Conclusion
In the real world, decisions are influenced by a myriad of peripheral issues which detract from focusing on ideal solutions. Fixing the air mobility system takes the courage for leadership to do the right thing, despite the influence of non-core issues. Adhering to military principles, such as standardizing operations, and clear lines of authority, are fundamental concerns to improving mobility efforts.
The summary need of today's system is as follows. Align CONUS forces under one combatant commander, consolidate contingency staff and planning processes, establish an appropriate subordinate air mobility commander to the contingency air forces commander, and organize peacetime structures and processes to mirror contingency structures and processes.
It is the authors sincere hope that the issues raised in this research effort help to clarify what is needed to fix the air mobility system so that it operates and serves the customers more effectively and efficiently. The ability to rapidly move personnel and equipment from the CONUS base through to a forward confrontational point effectively is a key facet of our national security strategy. An air mobility system which can accomplish that mission seamlessly as possible is a critical element of that strategy.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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