One Challenge of Force Development

The United States Air Force is in the midst of revolutionary changes to career development, functional management, and professional military education. Beginning with Gen John Jumper’s announcement in a November 2002 CSAF Sight Picture, and continuing with the publication of AFDD 1-1,¹ these changes will affect officers, enlisted, civilians and reserves; but the most significant changes appear to be focused on officers and their careers.² Change comes primarily because the Air Force wants to better match institutional requirements to personnel development, including the need to instill core values and deeply develop core competencies. In addition, the Air Expeditionary Force posture significantly alters career environments, creates new pressures on military member’s time, and not surprisingly has highlighted the requirement to balance specialization with more broadly oriented leadership.

The Force Development (FD) construct is big, and is stimulating a range of questions from officers. It extends across education, training, and experience or career progression of all our personnel. This article focuses on the impact FD has on officer Developmental Education (DE)—education designed by Developmental Teams comprised of two components, military education and select advanced academic degree programs. Some of the most immediate, and enduring, changes FD is prompting are in the intermediate officer DE, or IDE.

These changes to IDE are giving rise to curiosity and questions. People are excited when the CSAF talks about eradicating “square-filling master degree programs that do little to make you better at your job.”³ They can be curious when they hear “pilots will not require an advanced degree in order to be competitive for promotion to lieutenant colonel.”⁴ And they are personally involved when they hear the description of Developmental Teams who will address both assignment and education opportunities for every officer, and—working with the officer and his commander—make distinct choices on both to meet the specific needs of the Air Force.⁵

The Air Force is “up front” and is answering these questions as best it can. “Spread the Word” briefings went out in Fall 2003, as directed by the CSAF in his October 2003 Sight Picture. Two different “Frequently Asked Questions” lists have been published, covering at least twenty-four different aspects of the program.⁶ Most recently, AFDD 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, was published describing the fundamental tenets and processes of the FD construct. All of these directly or indirectly addressed how FD is affecting IDE, but to fully understand the value of FD to both developmental education and the Air Force, it is worth considering where its effects fit in the evolution of PME and how much it really changes. As a former squadron commander and currently a professor in Air University, the author has heard mid-career professionals discuss FD and ask questions about its impact in the USAF. Many can be answered by going to the sources such as AFDD1-1, but there are three common questions worthy of further exploration:

An Evolution in PME Doctrine

To answer the first question, one needs to appreciate how PME has evolved over the years. The Western concept of professional education for the military extends back to the late 18^th century, but begins for the US in the early 19^th. PME developed across the years in successive waves, influenced primarily by events—wars and conflicts—but also by changes in society and technology. The first pattern described here is in PME models: the doctrine for PME, or why PME is important and the major goals it is supposed to pursue. Understanding PME models will tell us how new FD really is. A second PME pattern, described later, is in themes: the methods and subjects of PME across the years. That pattern will help us understand what was “broken” in PME.

PME in the United States has evolved through three stages or models up to today. The initial establishment of PME can be called the Thayer model, named after Sylvanus Thayer. He was sent by the US Army in 1815 to investigate European methods of military training and education. His particular interest in French military schools led to the establishment of a formal, disciplined, and truly military program at West Point, in addition to a beginning conception of US PME doctrine as preparation for a military career.⁷

The second model for PME occurred over a period of years, from the aftermath of the Civil War through the Spanish-American War. It is best called the Root model, after Secretary of War Elihu Root and the significant actions he instituted in 1898. Root capitalized on and further developed ideas brought to the US by Emory Upton in 1875, after his own investigation at the behest of Gen Sherman of the Prussian military system. Upton addressed the shortcomings in officer capabilities that industrialized Civil War had highlighted. He re-instituted Army specialized schools—at the time, artillery, later infantry & cavalry—and the Navy followed his lead by later establishing a Torpedo School. Elihu Root participated in these schools, and extended the concept to address shortcomings in military leadership that the Spanish-American war uncovered. He strengthened functional education by re-emphasizing specialized schools and adding mid and top level education for leadership through a Command and General Staff College and Army War College. In addition, Upton and Root’s ideas for developing an officer throughout his career in abilities and leadership—a progressive military education system—constitutes a second model for PME and a new basis for PME doctrine.⁸

Models for PME Doctrine

Thayer

preparation for military career

Root

functional specialization leadership and command art progressive throughout career

Gerow

military decision-making generalists, incl. liberal arts and international affairs

pyramidal structure (tactical, operational, strategic) with selection at each PME stage

The third model of PME occurred after World War II with the implementation of recommendations from the Gerow Board of 1945, chaired by Lt Gen Leonard Gerow, who commanded V Corps and Fourteenth Army in the war. The Gerow model reorients PME doctrine to the progressive production of military decision-makers and leaders, officers who understand joint employment of forces and national mobilization characteristic of World War II. That war also highlighted the greater sphere of grand strategy and the need for leaders who are generalists capable of dealing with complex relationships. While the Root model had emphasized progressive PME—that an officer required different levels of education throughout his career—the Gerow model foresaw a pyramidal structure. That is, there are successively smaller, more selective groups of officers requiring this leadership preparation, rather than all officers needing the same development.⁹ Despite the many conflicts in the six decades since, and major political-military influences such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the Gerow conception of the fundamental purposes of PME is only today facing the possibility of change.

Is This Really New?

The Force Development construct does seem to encourage a new model of PME. The events of the post-Cold War world, particularly of the past five years with Operations Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, are a contributing impetus. But no less important for PME are the influences of information technology—network-centric warfare—and the Global War on Terror (GWOT).¹⁰Together, these factors are at the heart of Department of Defense transformation, and recent Defense Planning Guidance. PME is not untouched in transformation, and each of the services have been directed to consider how to change PME in light of an expeditionary force, dealing with new forms of warfare, and new technical demands on both leaders and functional specialists.

Although it is not presented in this manner in any AF documents and briefings, a careful review of the FD construct presents three new components to PME doctrine. The first is modularity: that military education should be grouped into packages of learning, freeing the system of either sequential or haphazard requirements for delivering PME to those who need it. The additional benefits of modularity are that learning can then be given in any order, and possibly in any combination—to include focused modules intended only for smaller groups of officers. In terms of transformation requirements, modularity allows the AF to present generic blocks to all who need it, and yet also provide focused blocks that are either more technical, such as Advanced Academic Degrees (AAD) or more functional specialties (space, information operations, acquisition), to selected groups who need that to develop new skills or deepen their specialization.

Modularity supports the second major PME component FD introduces, that of flexible timing. One of the greatest challenges of the US expeditionary force is that it is both smaller, generating more requirements on each individual, and more asynchronous with the calendars of the rest of America. Thus, USAF members face particular stresses in trying to get and complete PME in the midst of AEF rotations, off-summer change of assignments, and joint or staff time-on-station requirements. PME has long been held to standard education calendars, where almost all one-year PME schools run from August to June; this simply does not fit well with current demands. Flexible timing means that PME can be started at a variety of times, taken either all-at-once or in ‘chunks’, and fit into AEF rotations and off-cycle PCSs.

The third new component of PME most directly derived by FD is deliberate selection: determining not only what kind of developmental education is needed by each officer, but also what kind of follow-on assignment or career path is best supported by that choice. The individualization of developmental education is a twofold response to the requirements of this era. First, the USAF (referred to as “corporate interests” or the “institution” in some dialogues) takes on the responsibility of fine-tuning every officer’s career by matching a particular PME combination to upcoming assignments, distinct career development, and the institutional needs of the Air Force through the implementation of Developmental Teams. This benefits the Air Force with having the most appropriate officer, with the most appropriate education, in the right job and at the right time. Second, the individual does not suffer a “one-size-fits-all” approach to their own situation, and is not forced into education which does not impact their career or does not benefit their next assignment. Even more, they do not have to attempt to meet informal requirements for advanced degrees on their own, off-the-job, time in order to have fair treatment in the promotion system.

The three components of modularity, flexible timing, and deliberate selection change PME doctrine—now addressed as a broader concept of Developmental Education—in a fundamental way, and truly constitute a new model of PME. The Gerow model of PME included three primary factors: a joint education, producing generalist military leaders, through a pyramidal and selective process. The new model changes this PME doctrine to a process that emphasizes a joint education with specialized components, flexible enough to meet the timing of an expeditionary force, and less selective but more deliberate and therefore more applicable to the officer corps as a whole. To answer the question, this is new, and not just a reshuffle of classic PME doctrine.

Modularity	--PME packaging into non-sequential blocks --Design for functional and enduring competency topics
Flexible Timing	--Varied ‘start’ times to in-residence PME calendar --Use of modules for AAD, non-residence joint certification --More opportunities for officers
Deliberate Selection	--Assignment-to-PME matching for skills and experiences --Career tailoring through Developmental Teams

An Evolution in PME Subjects

A second pattern of PME growth tells us something about how “broken” the system may have been. A number of controversies and issues about PME curricula and teaching methods resurface time and again in the history of PME. While some events and experiences contributed to the evolution in PME purpose, another evolutionary theme for PME reforms has been in pedagogy—a ten-dollar word describing the methods and subjects of what is taught. Taken altogether, the events and experiences leading to evolution in PME pedagogy are different from those in doctrine, and the Force Development construct addresses several perpetual problems related to pedagogy.

The first rung in the evolution of PME curricula can also be attributed to the reforms of Sylvanus Thayer. Within the doctrinal assumption that PME is preparation for a military career there was also a specific idea that military education was specialized. In the case of West Point and army officers, this education was engineering focused; later, as steam propulsion entered the fleet, the Naval Academy also focused on engineering. Branch schools resurrected by Emory Upton and Elihu Root also favored specialization in artillery, cavalry, and other military functions. Throughout the 19^th century, the primary theme of military education was specialists over generalists, even to the point that liberal arts were not taught or were weakly represented.

The first real change to PME pedagogy came with the establishment of Army and Naval War Colleges and the turn of the century reforms of Elihu Root. In both of these senior officer schools, the idea of command as an art was made a centerpiece of PME. Curricula emphasized terminology, command communications, the movement of formations and units, and wargaming. A later refinement, particularly at the Naval War College through Admiral William S. Sims, was the introduction of campaign planning: thinking strategically at the operational level of war. In terms of PME pedagogy through the first World War, the war colleges created a triumvirate of crucial military education topics: 1) a continuing need for specialization in particular warfighting functions; 2) a growing need for generalists who understood the meaning of war, military terminology and campaign coordination of forces; and 3) a recognition of the requirement to teach military command and leadership, including the ability to think strategically.

The interwar years brought further expansion to the conceptual list of topics military officers needed. Prior to WW I, military leaders generally expected that their sphere of accountability only included military operations, and even more specifically, the responsibility for their service’s forces and functions. After that global war, both military and civilian leaders demanded that officers be more aware of national mobilization, logistics for industrialized military forces, and cooperation between service elements. Compared to the previous evolutionary step, PME pedagogy now emphasized generalists and command preparation more than specialization, and included a breadth of subjects from appreciating international affairs to defense planning and the execution of grand strategy rather than just campaign strategy.

World War II brought even greater demands to PME curricula and methods and constitutes a fourth wave of reforms. In the midst of numerous review commissions and boards following the second global war, there were strong recommendations for improving education in joint and combined warfare. This was not merely a change or addition to subjects at the schools, it was also a call for interservice student bodies, new joint schools, and even an informal (if not formal) demand that the most senior officers be graduates of these joint-strengthened institutions. The Army-Navy Staff College and National War College were but two products of this stage in PME pedagogy. All PME schools, but most significantly the senior schools, were beginning to suffer a new phenomenon of depth versus breadth: there were so many subjects required in PME that some leaders began to accuse schools of teaching “a mile wide and an inch deep.”¹¹

Thayer	--Military focus and specialization
Root/Luce	--Command & Staff Art Leadership generalists
Interwar	--National mobilization & logistics
Post WWII	--Joint/combined warfare Breadth > depth
Cold War	--Systems analysis & defense planning
Skelton	--Institutional Joint PME & acade mic rigor
Owens/Cebrowski	--Information Operations and network-centric warfare

Thus, by the middle of the Cold War PME pedagogy included four poles which pushed and pulled on curricula, faculty, and the structure of the US PME system. These poles of contention were specialists versus generalists, command art, joint/combined warfare, and breadth versus depth. Before the end of the 20^th century, three more major reforms would occur, each expanding upon the original four columns. In the mid-70’s, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt at the Naval War College was rapidly followed by other institutions in incorporating systems analysis and national security decision making as a key part of middle and senior PME. Then in the ‘80s, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the Skelton Panel reviews of military PME re-emphasized not only joint education, but also the need for rigor in PME process and more teaching of “timeless principles” of war and military history. Finally, in the post-Cold War world VADM’s William Owens and Arthur Cebrowski raised the notions of network-centric warfare, and along with others cited the need for more technical education in the areas of information technology and security.

What was broken, and how is it fixed?

The evolution in PME subjects points to the first thing that was broken in PME—attempting to teach too many things to everyone who was tapped for school. As a first step, FD is encouraging a brand new fix to the challenges of making specialists vs. generalists and teaching PME as command art. Modularity and flexible timing enable a system whereby PME can produce both specialists and generalists—the Gerow model pyramid is expanded to include more of the officer force. Deliberate selection—the use of Developmental Teams to manage combinations of developmental education and officer assignments—enables a system that can be provided to more than just command-oriented officers; this means PME can still develop the service’s future leaders, but now can also give more in-residence opportunities because some PME will also develop the service’s specialized experts.

To fully understand why this is important, we can read the original CSAF Sight Picture, where Gen Jumper states that:

Each of these dissatisfactions is related to the past evolution of PME. Limited in-residence slots are a fact not only because of cost, but also because doctrinally PME has been pyramidal—it applies to fewer officers the more senior they become—and pedagogically it focuses on command art—and the requirement for leaders is always less than the whole group. Limited advanced degree opportunities exist because the service has been historically unable to separate its general PME requirements from its specific needs for specialization. Meaning, the AF could not send officers to both improve their technical abilities with an advanced degree and build on their professional abilities by also attending in-residence PME; the time imposition on AF operations made getting both rare for all but a minority. Lastly, “square-filling master degree” requirements were informally imposed on the officer force because—in the absence of everyone getting in-residence PME—senior AF leaders still desired well-educated officers who could think, speak and write (a generalist emphasis), and therefore rewarded those with master’s degrees with increased promotion rates.

So far, this all sounds positive: FD impacts developmental education by making progress against the classic controversies of specialization and the need for education in the wide area of command art in tailoring the system to do both. But what about joint education and the breadth versus depth issue? In these two challenges of PME pedagogy, modularity and deliberate selection are implementing a distinctly new answer—particularly on the breadth vs. depth problem. Joint education is preserved and sustained in PME modules that will be “common core”—i.e., every officer’s PME will include the mandatory elements of joint military education.¹³ More strikingly, the breadth vs. depth issue seems to be decided in favor of “paired” depth, where the notion that a leader needs a little bit of everything is definitively denied.

“Pairing” is an important ‘fix’ for PME, and it deals with officers having both skill sets and experiences to provide a different kind of breadth in the profession of arms. [italics added to below quotes]

The authoritative guidance for FD from the CSAF, SECAF, and USAF/DP emphasizes that the old concept of “breadth”—where everyone is educated on as wide a list of topics as possible—is rejected in favor of a new concept. This new concept is created by giving officers a minimum of two skill sets with appropriate deep education (PME) and experience (tailored assignments through Developmental Team action). Breadth is now the ability to appreciate the “big picture” and interact with other, similarly experienced AF leaders who are not stove piped into single career areas. A balanced force is not created by making all leaders the same, but by making the pool of all officers appropriately mixed with people who have expertise in more than one AF competency.

Thus, the answer to our second question—what was broken, and how is it fixed—has several aspects (or broken parts). But all the parts are related to one obsolete idea: that all officers had to have a generic master’s degree (by informal requirement), and a too-broad curriculum in PME, because all we wanted to produce were generalists. There are a number of critiques that say instead that our old system ended up producing specialists—stovepiped into their career areas—with inadequately designed military education. Force Development’s impact on old PME is Developmental Education: eliminating cookie-cutter production, and instead insuring advanced degrees are targeted to benefit the force and the individual, and “broadening” officers by gaining a minimum of a second skill set.

Does the AAD Option Lock
Me Into a Different Career Track?

The AAD option for IDE fixes some real problems in our professional force. But, many officers selected for this option are asking whether it puts them on a different career track from their peers who go to ‘normal’ PME. It seems straightforward that linking PME and AAD opportunities for a portion of the officer force will allow a degree of specialization that the USAF has heretofore been unable to attain.¹⁹ It may also allow the USAF to more fully utilize the Air Force Institute of Technology, which for the past decade has been unable to operate at its full capacity in producing officers with graduate education in several fields.²⁰ But, even beyond these advantages, the linkage of PME and AAD can also serve to meet documented requirements for specialists in information-intensive fields²¹ and Airmen who have “sufficient capability and depth in foreign area expertise and language skills.”²² Since nearly all of the increased IDE opportunities for officers in FD come from the combined AAD/PME option,²³ the implication is that the USAF is meeting the call for an increase in a variety of specialists not by eliminating generalists (the “normal” PME or in-residence military colleges) but by “grafting on” specialist opportunities.

If the AAD option is linked to specialization, it creates at least the appearance that officers selected for it are on some sort of different path. For instance, Secretary Roche states:

But how can they not be mutually exclusive at some point? Are these officers not developed through different PME and assignment paths? Gen Jumper says that:

Both the SECAF and CSAF statements can actually be read to either promote career tracks (at some career point, an officer is either functional or command oriented) or describe a conception of leadership and command that has tailored education and experiences for particular positions. Although the FD construct intends to do the latter, at least three other official statements seem to imply that career tracks are a possible future direction:

While it may not be intentional, the appearance given by these and other statements is that, sometime near the mid-career or Intermediate Developmental Education (IDE) point, officers may choose or be directed by Developmental Teams towards tactical specialty (the rated officer who does not need an advanced degree to be competitive for promotion to O-5), technical specialty (those who wish to remain technical experts and receive the appropriate AAD), or leadership (a “resident-level” PME program that makes them competitive for command or program leadership.)²⁸ Even more, the examination of the promotion system and the idea of competitive categories could, on the face of it, provide a means for promotion competition within, rather than between, different career track pools—tactical, technical, and leadership.

The possibility of career tracks, however, is not currently a part of any of the options for PME an officer may have. Even though the new system could in theory support career tracks, IDE attendance of any kind still allows all officers command, technical and even tactical options in their future. The FD doctrine (AFDD 1-1), AFI 36-2640 vol.1, FAQs, and “Spread the Word” briefings reiterate the message that all types of IDE should be treated equally by promotion boards, and that they prepare an officer for future opportunities.

The bottom line answer for officers who wonder if the AAD option locks them into a different career track is “No.” Any IDE opportunity is of great benefit to the officer and to the AF, and the AAD/PME option builds a better warfighting institution by investing the AF with appropriately educated—and distributed—specialists. The AAD is the most obvious investment in specialties, but the fact is that even ‘normal’ PME at the service schools is also targeting some specialized education for the force. The new curriculum at ACSC, for instance, includes a module in which an officer learns about a new specialty—deliberately selected by their own Developmental Team—with the intent of future assignments in that area. Education With Industry (EWI) and many of the fellowship opportunities are also specialized PME—their graduates often go on to acquisition or allied staff and attaché positions. Those who are selected for the AAD option are being developed differently than their peers, but all share the same broad future opportunities.

Conclusion: Talking about IDE

The Force Development construct ambitiously changes USAF officer career management and progression, particularly in a number of distinct improvements over PME doctrine and pedagogy of the past. IDE appears to be well-designed to accomplish many of the tasks originally outlined by Gen Jumper in his initial Sight Picture on this subject in November 2002: eliminating square-filling master’s degrees, improving the opportunities for officers to both advance and be specialists, and moreover providing a new type of “breadth” in senior officers, leaders, and commanders. It can do this while providing more reasonable operational tempo in PME schedules and better-qualified officers in a world of GWOT, information technology, and network-centric warfare.

The challenge for leaders is to explain this part of FD (in addition to the whole) to our Airmen so that they understand the many things it will accomplish. This author could not fully answer three common questions about IDE prior to taking a closer look at the program and the history of PME. Now, we can all understand that:

1. Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, HQ Air Force Doctrine Center, 18 Feb 04, is the ‘bible’ of the USAF Force Development program. Many important details on implementation in the officer force can be found in AFI 36-2640, Total Force Development (Active Duty Officer), HQ USAF, 23 Jan 04. Both documents can be found at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil.

2. Force Development applies to the total force (officers, enlisted, civilian, guard/reserve). However, the enlisted and civilian components have far less extensive changes to career development (see CSAF Sight
Pictures of 28 Apr 03 for enlisted, and 2 May 03 for civilians) while the guard/reserve component is not yet published. In addition, the Officer FD construct currently has the greatest impact on mid-career education and assignments (see “Force Development FAQ”, 1 Dec 02, Q/A 8.)

3. Gen John Jumper, “Total Force Development,” CSAF Sight Picture, 6 Nov 02, paragraph 3.

5. Ibid, pp. 6-8; also Gen Jumper, “Officer Force Development—Spreading the Word,” CSAF Sight Picture, 7 Oct 03.

6. “Force Development FAQ,” USAF/DCSP, available on various USAF web sites including www.dp.hq.af.mil, dated 1 Dec 02 and 27 Dec 02 (supplemental version).

7. See Soldiers & Scholars: Military Education and National Policy by John Masland and Laurence Radway, Princeton University Press: Princeton NJ, 1957, p. 77; and Chapter 1 of Professional Military Education in the United States by William Simons, Greenwood Press: Westport, 2000.

8. Masland & Radway, p. 84; Simons, Chap. 1; and “PME: Its historical development and future challenges” by Lt Col Edwin Arnold, Jr., USAWC 1993 (MU-39080-83), p. 17.

9. Masland & Radway, pp. 100-110; Arnold, p. 21; and Professional Military Education for Air Force Officers: Comments & Criticisms by Richard Davis and Frank Donnini, Air University Press: Maxwell AFB, AL, 1991, pp. 2-3.

10. See Dr James Roche, “Reclaiming Education to Develop for the Future,” Checkpoints, Summer 2003, p. 14; “Total Force Development,” CSAF Sight Picture, 6 Nov 02; “Officer Force Development—Spreading the Word,” CSAF Sight Picture, 7 Oct 03; DAF Presentation to Committee on Armed Services by Lt Gen Richard Brown II, 11 Mar 03, p.7-8; and for similar signs of Army reaction, “Education Endures” by Jim Tice, Army Times 63:47, 16 Jun 03, p.14-15.

11. Theodore Crackel, “On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels,” The Public Interest 76, Summer 1984, pp. 24-25. It is worth noting that traditionally German and Russian staff colleges were much longer experiences than US or British, on the order of two to three years vice one year in duration.

13. Both of the official Dec 02 FAQ sheets touched on this topic. The 1 Dec FAQ, Q/A 10, states that “All officers who complete a developmental education program … will complete the JPME Phase I requirements through modular PME.” The 27 Dec 02 FAQ, Q/A 20, states that “Air University is working the details of the modular concept (to include JPME)…” A recent Maxwell AFB base paper article implies that Module 2 of three modules will address joint warfare and campaign planning, and that the distance education version will include joint operations in its 50 lessons. See Maj Mike Paoli, “ACSC revises curriculum, includes Force Development,” Maxwell/Gunter Dispatch 57:47, Wed 26 Nov 03.

16. Force Development Construct Brief, anonymous USAF/DP briefing, 29 Nov 02, slide/notes page 2 and 3.

18. Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force, “Reclaiming Education to Develop the Future,” Checkpoints, Summer 2003, p. 16.19. There is some debate on this point. The advanced degree programs for the AAD/PME combination apparently will only be 12 month programs (see “Force Development FAQ,” 27 Dec 02, Q/A 18 and 19) rather than the 15 to 24 month programs historically available at AFIT. Since even USAF Academy instructors are generally sent for 18 month master’s degrees, there is some concern over what kind of expertise or specialization is produced by a 12 month master’s degree, whether in science or liberal arts disciplines.

20. See “AFIT under the gun,” by Bruce Callendar, Air Force Magazine, Sept 2000, pp. 54-58.

21. See “Military Education for the New Age” by Lt Gen Ervin Rokke, Joint Force Quarterly Autumn 1995, pp 18-23; “Developing the Warrior-Scholar” by Maj’s Scott Efflandt and Brian Reed, Military Review 81:4, Jul-Aug 2001, pp. 82-89; Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress, CSIS Study Group on PME, chaired by Dick Cheney, March 1997; and “Focuse Graduate Education: an invisible but real competitive edge” by Dr Roland Kankey et al, Acquisition Review Quarterly 4:4, Fall 1997, pp. 367-382.

22. Lt Gen Richard Brown, USAF/DCSP, Presentation to the Committee on Armed Services, 11 Mar 2003, “Active and Reserve Military and Civilian Personnel,” p.9.

23. See the Force Development FAQ of 1 Dec 02, question 13; also see “ACSC revises curriculum, incorporates Force Development,” by Maj Mike Paoli, Maxwell/Gunter Dispatch 57:47, 26 Nov 03, which notes that the AF added 140 master’s degree opportunities (AFIT/NPS/JMIC) in 2003 and will add another 110 in 2004.

24. Dr. James G. Roche, “Reclaiming Education to Develop the Future,” p. 16.

28. In fact, three PME/career tracks very similar to these were proposed in one AF study by Richard Davis and Frank Donnini. See Professional Military Education for AF Officers: Comments and Criticisms, Air University Press: Maxwell AFB, AL, 1991, p. 101-102.

29. Dr. James Roche, “Reclaiming Education to Develop for the Future”, p. 16.

31. Force Development FAQ, 27 Dec 02, Q/A 21. The careful reader will note this FAQ is different from other statements, in that it now equates residence and non-residence programs, rather than in-residence PME versus AAD.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.