Air & Space Power Journal - Chronicles Online Journal
by Lt Col John M. Fawcett, Jr., USAF My maternal grandfather was a blacksmith and farrier. My fraternal grandfather
was a farmer in the days when the ability to handle a team of horses was an essential part
of the job. Because they both understood the interactive ballet of balancing the strengths
and weaknesses of a team, my grandfathers would understand the competing interests of the
continuing debate surrounding the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). My
grandfathers would also understand the importance of harnessing the disparate views of the
services into a serviceable team that can get the job done. In order to pull the four horses of the air arms of the US military together, the Air
Force, in conjunction with the other services, has developed a JFACC Team concept to train
team members from all services. Before presenting the proposal, a review of the doctrinal
requirements of the JFACC is in order, with a focus on the processes involved. Definitions tend to be crucial in joint doctrine discussions and the JFACC is no
exception. Joint Pub 1-02, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
terms, has the following to say about the JFACC: The joint force air component commander derives his authority from the joint force
commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct
coordination among his subordinate commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure
unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The joint force commander
will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air
component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander
(normally these would include but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation
and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint
force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other service component
commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force
commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas.1 The authority of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to designate a JFACC is outlined in
Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAFF), in the section dealing with the
organization of joint forces. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, further
elaborates on the concept of a JFC organizing by functional components. "Functional
componency can be appropriate when forces from two or more Services operate in the same
dimension or medium".2 Functional components are
depicted as, but not limited to, a Joint Force Land Component Commander, Joint Force Air
Component Commander, and Joint Force Maritime Component Commander. (see figure 1) The JFC
also determines the supported and supporting relationships between his subordinate
commanders. As addressed in Joint Pub 0-2, "Unless limited by the establishing
directive, the commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise
general direction of the supporting effort".3 The
general direction referred to encompasses, the designation of target or objectives,
timing, duration of supporting action, and instructions necessary for coordination and
efficiency.4 The supporting commander has the responsibility
to ascertain the needs of the supported commander and take such action to fulfill them as
is within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other
assigned tasks.5 The final foray into definitions involves Joint Pub 3-56.1, the Proposed Pub of 14 July
1994, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. As listed in that document, the
specific JFACC responsibilities normally include:
Of course 3-56.1 goes on to elaborate on procedures, but the focus here will be on the
basics of the JFACC's roles and missions. Definitions are, after all, merely an attempt to
codify a concept for a mutually understood frame of reference. Unfortunately, each service
has managed to interpret the definitions and joint guidance in a myriad of ways. Without
flailing at the nuance of the various services' views on JFACC, the processes are fairly
straightforward. The JFACC must be able to translate the concept of operations of the JFC into terms
relevant to air power. While the JFC evolves the operational view of the theater, the
JFACC translates this view from an air perspective as the supported commander, the
supporting commander, or as either depending upon the phase of operations. The JFACC must develop a Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) through a process that takes
into account the various components' concept of operations/scheme of maneuver and how they
support the JFC's campaign. It is only by developing a comprehensive concept of his own
that the JFACC can reflect the intent of the JFC and coordinate with the other
component/functional commanders in their role of supported or supporting commander. The
JAOP is the broad concept of how air power will be used to control, shape, or destroy the
enemy and/or the battlefield. The JFACC must approve the JAOP and, in turn, gain approval
of the JAOP from the JFC. Once the JAOP is approved, the air tasking cycle can proceed to the development,
execution, and assessment of the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The JFACC must be able to
produce, transmit, and execute an ATO, to include modification to meet the demands of the
changing campaign and pierce the fog of war. Specifics on how the air components of some of the theaters have developed these
concepts can be found in the following publications:
The intent of this article is not to belabor the specifics of the CINCdoms or the joint
definitions, but rather to focus on processes that win through in the concepts of all the
CINCs. The JFACC himself is the primary air advisor to the JFC. In this position, the JFACC
has a number of responsibilities. First, he must be able to interpret the JFC's concept of
operations into air terms. Whether the JFC envisions the JFACC as a supported or
supporting commander, the JFACC must share the JFC's vision of how to achieve the goals as
specified by the National Command Authority (NCA). This may be an easy task, or it may
require dealing with concepts so vague as to be ephemeral. The JFACC has to have the
confidence to be able to face the JFC at four o'clock in the morning - when no one has
slept for forty-eight hours, its raining, the command center leaks, the coffee is cold -
and tell him he is wrong about how he intends to engage his air. The JFACC has to be able
to convince the JFC that there is a viable alternative that meshes with the other
component commander's scheme of maneuver, or barring that, execute the boss's decision,
and do all that without violating the JFC's trust or even hinting at disrespect. If the
JFACC can capture his commander's intent, he must then be able to articulate it for his
subordinates. All the discussion of targeting, targeting boards, apportionment, and
whatever other neat phrases have been invented, come down to the JFC sharing his vision
with the JFACC and the JFACC translating that vision into air power. The JFACC must also
work with the JFC to clearly define the boundaries that each of the subordinate commanders
will work within. This is mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available
(METT-T) dependent. Mere assignment of supporting and supported roles will not answer all
the questions. The JFC must define how he wants coordination measures to be used and how
he will use and interpret individual service doctrine. Some weapons may appear in the ATO
for coordination, while for others the ATO will provide direction. It is the
responsibility of the JFC to thrash through these issues with his component commanders. Now that there is direction, what next? The JFACC needs a staff component that will
take the vision of the JFC and the JFACC and develop it into a comprehensive air war, the
previously discussed JAOP. This doesn't mean laying out every sortie, but, rather
establishing the operational design of an air portion of the campaign plan. The JFACC's
tasking from the JFC and the coordination with the other subordinate commanders will
provide the guidance for developing the plan. This is operational art in its purest sense.
There are a lot of ways to take apart a region or country with air power, but there are
usually very few ways that support all the interrelated goals of the NCA, before, during,
and after hostilities, and tie into the other component commanders' and the JFC's vision.
The staff must focus on the key roles of planning and coordination. For examples, the
original Instant Thunder plan during the recent hostilities in South West Asia and AWPD-1
prepared before World War II, are good illustrations of JFACC as supported commander. So much for the lofty thinking; now someone has to do some real work. That someone is
the JFACC's operational center. The currently popular joint phrase is the Joint Air
Operations Center (JAOC). The ATO is built and executed in the JAOC. In the CINC pubs
cited above, the taskings of the JAOC are often broken down into Combat Plans and Combat
Operations. Those divisions are as good as any as long as someone builds the ATO and
someone executes it. These processes are not done in an aircraft operator created vacuum.
The JAOC must incorporate all aspects of modern combat from logistics to intel, in order
to choreograph the aerial ballet and make it meaningful. Are we out of missiles? Is that
tank dead or not? Do we have positive indications of ballistic missile launches? Are the
tankers able to make the turn times? Did we just saturate the SATCOM links? These are just
a few of the questions that the JAOC team will be wrestling with. Throw in the Army's
Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE), the Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE),
Air Force liaison, Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE), a space team, an Air
Mobility Element (AME) and, perhaps, the rescue center and you have a very busy place
afloat or ashore. To tie everything together requires a command and control communications system.
Information must be gathered and consolidated into a form useful to the ATO process. Once
the ATO is built, it must be transmitted in a timely fashion to all the execution nodes on
the communications network. These execution nodes are, as a minimum, the flying wings,
ashore and afloat, that will carry out the missions. The ATO must also be transmitted to
the air defense network and to the airspace managers. Execution of the ATO is part of the
never ending cycle controlled by the JFACC and directed in support of the campaign plan.
Shortfalls in the development, transmission, and execution of the ATO, discovered during
the Gulf War, resulted in the development and fielding of the Contingency Theater
Automated Planning System (CTAPS). Execution of a three thousand line ATO over a couple of
telephones is not possible. Tremendous amounts of data must be moved in order to realize
the real value added of air power. CTAPS is an open architecture, UNIX based operating system that hosts a number of
software modules that manipulate data bases. Not all the modules are DOD approved
standards, but those designated for ATO interoperability are. Think of CTAPS as a Wide
Area Network. The network hosts a number of software packages used to support the
customer. On the computer this article is being typed on there are modules for word
processing, data base management, spreadsheets, and briefings, to name a few. The computer
is also a node on the local area network. CTAPS, its nodes and modules function in much
the same way. A Tiger Team assembled at Air Combat Command (ACC) headquarters in March of 1994 and
developed the diagram shown in figure 2 to address training the JFACC Team. After
identifying the processes presented above, the assembled customers agreed that the
business of executing air power is a team effort led by the JFACC, supported by a staff
and an operations center and tied together by CTAPS. With the review of the definitions, the focus on the JFACC processes, and the
visualization ot the JFACC team, the next step was to provide a comprehensive and
coordinated training program that clearly linked each level of the JFACC Team. Air Force XOOC, otherwise known as Checkmate, has developed a flag officer course to
address the education needs of the JFACC. This course is the JFACC Theater Air Strategy
Symposium and focuses on strategic and operational level employment of air power,
culminating in a planning exercise. From the XOOC background paper of 5 April 94 the
course objectives are as follows:
The course validation of this proposal was run in Washington in July for selected one
star and one star select officers. The course will be offered twice a year at Air
University at Maxwell AFB for a multi-service group of one star level officers. Course
length is projected at one week. Joint air operations planners attend the Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course (JDACC) at
Air University. This two week course focuses on the air portion of the campaign plan. The
planning process addresses the supported and supporting role of air power. Representatives
from all services present doctrinal issues that affect the air war. All services in this
case are not just the different colored uniforms of the four main services, but also the
areas of space, transportation, and special operations. JDACC has published an Air
Campaign Planning Handbook that is used to present a logical flow to the development of an
air plan that parallels the planning process of the JFC and resembles the Air Operations
Plan Format Appendix A of the proposed JCS Pub 3-56.1. JDACC is currently open to students
from the joint community. There has been no comprehensive school for the JAOC personnel that included in depth
CTAPS training. The Battle Staff Course at the Air Ground Operations School (AGOS) at
Hurlburt Field attempted to address this training shortfall by incorporating some CTAPS
modules, but this, by no means, covered the entire spectrum of CTAPS capability. Various
contractor and Air Force mobile training teams were also used to provide a "fire
brigade" training approach as the various air operations centers, from all services,
started clamoring for training. To provide for the JAOC training as well as a formal training environment for CTAPS
system administrators, ACC undertook a review of customer requirements that resulted in an
approach that addressed both needs. The Battle Staff Course at AGOS has been redesigned
and now incorporates CTAPS training, doctrinal issues orientation, and an exercise that
steps through the complete ATO generation and execution processes in a seventeen day
course. The Joint Air Operations Staff Course (JAOSC) will provide the educational
baseline for anyone going to an air operations center. All services will be represented in
each course with the goal of having each class resemble the makeup of a JAOC as much as
possible. Obviously, this will be heavily colored in Air Force blue as the course starts,
to provide a fast response to the training requirement. But, AGOS anticipates working
closely with all services to rapidly move JAOSC towards greater shades of purple. In addition to the JAOSC, Hurlburt Field will be the home of a new CTAPS System
Administrator Course. CTAPS system administrator training will occur through a two phase
program. Phase one will be two weeks of basic training on UNIX and associated data base
languages for all communications and computer personnel associated with the CTAPS. The
second phase is a third week that will provide the senior NCOs and officers, who will
design and maintain the system architecture, with the knowledge essential to maintaining
the connectivity that is the essence of what CTAPS brings to the fight. A related course will also be offered by AGOS. The CTAPS Operator and Technician Course
(COTC) will be offered six times a year for those personnel assigned to ASOCs, WOCs, CRSs,
and their equivalents, and take four days. COTC will also be available through Mobile
Training Teams (MTT) for exercise support. A menu of training modules can be tailored to
the customer's needs. For example, assume the USS Theodore Roosevelt battle group is
preparing for deployment and, as part of the work up, the CARGRU commander determines he
has a need for JAOC training. The group trainers can contact AGOS for a summary of
training modules, select the ones appropriate to the battle group, and arrange for MTT
support at the battle group's headquarters. In this case, the full four days of course
offerings may not be necessary, modules equating to two days of training may suffice. This
approach addresses the constant training demands for exercise and deployment support that
would not be available through the formal courses. Although, clearly, it will be essential
to have a cadre of fully trained personnel in every JAOC, COTC provides for rapid training
of augmentees. AGOS will also provide a CTAPS module for the JFACC Theater Air Strategy Symposium. The
module will be a tutorial available for either DOS or UNIX systems that will walk flag
officers through a basic overview of the system. This systematic approach to the JFACC Team training will be implemented over the next
six months with validation courses for JAOSC starting in October of 1994 and for CTAPS
System Administrators in January of 1995. The COTC training modules were used in the
prepartion phase of the 8 AF Blue Flag in September 1994. The general officer course has
been approved by HQ USAF and will start in the Spring of 1995 at Maxwell AFB. With the overview of definitions, processes, and customer needs, we have established a
rational approach to providing joint training for the joint air war. The value added that
airpower brings to war is its flexibility and ability to respond across the breadth and
depth of the battlefield. A JFACC provides the unity of command that gives the JFC a
responsive tool. It would appear that this has a logic that defies contradiction.
Unfortunately, logic does not always hold sway in the joint world. My grandfathers would
also remind us that in any effort involving strong wills, it is essential to maintain
control and keep the team focussed on the objective.&127; Notes 1 Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, 197. 2 Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, II-17. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid, II-10. 5 Ibid, II-11. Disclaimer The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the
author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air
University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government,
Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University. This article has undergone security and policy content review and has been
approved for public release IAW AFI 35-101. Home Page | Feedback? Email
the EditorThe JFACC Team