Document created: 21 February 01
Published Aerospace Power Journal - Spring  2001

The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941 edited by Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets. University of Nebraska Press (http://www.nebraskapress.unl. edu), 233 North 8th Street, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-0255, 2000, 247 pages, $50.00.

From the end of World War I to the beginning of World War II, France, Germany, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States made large-scale changes in varying degrees to their military thought and application. Political, social, environmental, economic, and technological advancement and uncertainty shaped the means of waging war during the interwar years. In The Challenge of Change, contributing authors examine each country’s military institutions and the evolution of its doctrine and technological modernization.

Based on three papers presented at the Society for Military History conference in 1994, the chapters on France, Germany, and Britain provide interesting reading on the military mind-sets of those countries prior to the outbreak of hostilities in World War II. The chapter on the French military is a comical look at the stereotypical French hubris which led that country to believe that its military could handle any matter at hand. The sad fact is that the French believed it. The little-known fact is that France came out of World War I with the largest and best-equipped army in the world. To add to this advantage, the French military believed that efficient nationwide mobilization, in addition to massive defensive firepower, would halt any formidable offense against the homeland. If an enemy’s assault faltered, the mobilization could mount a counteroffensive and deliver the knockout blow. Now we know the reason for the Maginot Line. True, it helped defend the border against Germany. During the German sweep around the Maginot Line, France believed that its nationwide mobilization of troops would be large and decisive enough to stop an attack through Belgium. Nevertheless, France fell in 1940.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter is the one that relates Germany’s rise from defeat in World War I to its powerful display of military might in the early years of World War II. Besides the incorporation of blitzkrieg warfare into doctrine, the most dramatic German reform took effect in the officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) education system. Officer candidates had to complete a university education, basic training, additional NCO courses, and combat-branch service before they became officers. Some members of the general staff were encouraged to obtain civilian engineering degrees, while others were sent overseas to observe new weaponry in foreign exercises. In addition to education, joint operational doctrine came to fruition. Combined air and land operations became the keystone to German combat effectiveness. Mobile forces became mechanized, and Poland was the first country to witness Germany’s military reformation in 1939.

While Germany proceeded to use the tank as an integral part of offensive operations, Great Britain tended to think more in terms of mechanized forces instead of armored forces. Britain dealt with a massive downsizing of its armed forces, a large war debt, and a popular pacifist movement. Britain’s economy and isolated geography, as well as its navy and air forces, became the keys to defense during another world war. Once Hitler took the Sudetenland, Britain realized it was committed to the protection of the Continent and implemented peacetime conscription. The inexperience and lack of training of these new army forces would have a devastating impact on Britain in the first few years of the war.

Obviously, the Russian interwar reformation began with politics. The new communist government dealt with raising an army based on political theory and loyalty in its doctrine. This was especially true of the officer corps. Military thinkers conceived of a more strategic and operational doctrine for defense of the homeland. The idea of a protracted war of attrition took effect as military history combined with current military problems to come up with new strategies. Once Stalin came to power, the Soviets turned to mass-producing weapons of war to improve on their doctrine of modernization and mechanization. But the Soviets delivered far less than expected, and Stalin’s purging of the officer corps certainly never helped morale or the continuity of experienced leaders. At least Mother Nature provided a good defense for Russia by lending a helping hand in winter.

The United States had difficulty during the interwar years. Having to deal with a "back to normalcy" campaign, budget battles, and the Great Depression took its toll on the military. America’s focus turned inward, yet its military continued to plan for the next war. Armored warfare and airpower theory were incorporated into doctrine. After the United States declared war, the depression ended, industries mobilized, and the country’s greatest generation began its ascent into history. This chapter does a superb job covering the times of America’s military, emphasizing the role of aviation in its military transformation.

The Challenge of Change is a good study of the reformation of five major countries’ armed forces. Each chapter is well researched, featuring a wealth of information and enlightening facts on where five major countries stood from the Treaty of Versailles to the beginning of World War II. Historians, military professionals, and even politicians would be wise to study what happened during this tumultuous time in history. I highly recommend this book to anyone who wants to know how politicians, military reductions, and defense budgets can fuel—or douse—a nation’s ability to wage war. Sound familiar?

Capt Barry H. Crane, USAF
Shaw AFB, South Carolina


Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.


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