Fighting the Breakout: The German Army in Normandy from COBRA to the Falaise Gap by Rudolf Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff et al., edited by David C. Isby. Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal Limited (http://www.greenhillbooks. com), Park House, 1 Russell Gardens, London NW11 9NN, 2004, 256 pages, $34.95 (hardcover).
Fighting the Breakout is one of five edited works (so far) from Greenhill Books that consist of intelligence reports written by senior German officers at the end of World War II for US Army Military Intelligence. This particular volume is the third one from the German perspective on the fighting in France after the D-day landings. The first, Fighting the Invasion, covers German preparations and reactions to the Allied landings on 6 June 1944, and the second, Fighting in Normandy, presents the German perspective on the fighting from D-day to the battle for Villers-Bocage. Fighting the Breakout records the actions of the German Seventh Army and Fifth Panzer Army from the American breakout at Saint-Lô on 25 July through the encirclement and near destruction of German forces in Normandy at the Falaise Gap, 20–21 August.
The reports, written from memory and without the aid of Ultra messages or notes, provide a firsthand look at the fighting that occurred during this period. Frequently, the authors supplement their memories with references to unit war diaries (Kriegstagbuch). Although the reports contain errors in spellings, place-names, and dates, the editor points out that “when compared with the German memoirs of the 1950s and 1960s that were translated into English—works which shaped the overall view of the war for many years . . . these documents are no worse, and may be better” (p. 9). The majority of the reports were written by Rudolf Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff (a colonel at that time), chief of staff of the German Seventh Army (and an anti-Hitler conspirator), and his superior, Gen Paul Hausser, commander of Seventh Army.
The reports offer great insight into the outstanding fighting qualities of the German soldier. Despite complete Allied control of the air and the Allies’ seemingly never-ending supply of men, ammunition, and equipment, German troops in Normandy continued to fight well. The reports repeatedly demonstrate senior German commanders’ valiant attempts to stem the Allied onslaught by moving divisions, regiments, and battle groups (Kampfgruppen) around the battlefield to replace units decimated by the fighting. The German army lost 60,000 men, either killed or taken prisoner, and most of their equipment in the Falaise Gap, but about 20,000 escaped the trap to fight again. Despite the tough and often desperate fighting in Normandy, the German retreat did not turn into a rout.
The reports also regularly point out the bad, often out-of-step orders from the German Armed Forces Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht [OKW]) and from Hitler himself. Specifically, their orders to the German commanders in Normandy to spurn retreat and attempt a counterbreakthrough to Avranches—as the Americans fought their way south and then east, and as the British broke out from Caen—significantly contributed to the encirclement of the German forces and to the great losses of men and equipment at Falaise. The reports also demonstrate that, although German field commanders in Normandy knew firsthand what was happening, they did little to prevent the coming catastrophe other than complain to their seniors.
Readers will also appreciate the editor’s introduction to the book as well as his introductions to each part. The latter provides excellent commentary on the origins of the reports, their contribution to the vast literature on World War II, and the value of the book as a whole. The chapter introductions give us brief overviews of the fighting during the periods covered in each chapter, thus facilitating better understanding of the events related in the intelligence reports.
My only significant criticism concerns the photographs and maps, the former mainly of American troops in combat, with only a few of German soldiers in Normandy. Since the book is written from the German perspective, one would expect the editor to use more images of the Germans and fewer of the Americans. The plentiful maps, drawn in various scales and presented in shades of gray, are too indistinct to be of much use to the average reader. I often had great difficulty locating places on most of them.
Dr. Robert B. Kane
Montgomery, Alabama
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
Book Reviews | Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor