Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of
USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions by Alan J. Vick et al. RAND (http://www.rand.org/publications/index.html),
1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138, 2006, 204
pages, $25.00 (softcover). Available free from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG509.pdf.
The short title of this RAND monograph gives the impression that its authors
will enlighten readers as to characteristics of the newest generation of
counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare and details of airpower’s role in this novel environment—certainly a topic of great interest to military-aviation scholars,
given recent operations. Despite providing a concise recap of COIN’s political
and military characteristics, the work describes timeless principles—not novel
ones. Although the study does (lightly) treat various applications of COIN
airpower, it expends much effort somewhat narrowly promoting the expansion of
the Air Force’s elite foreign air-advisory unit as the most cost-effective means
of combating budding insurgencies of the future.
The pseudobeguiling title aside, the work has only a few faults and much to offer the reader concerning COIN. The authors spend a majority of their time clearly defining and categorizing insurgencies, detailing COIN principles, and discussing grand strategic options for COIN. They advocate a “new” strategy of “precautionary” COIN—very limited military intervention at the earliest stages—as the most cost-effective means of combating insurgency (p. 70). Even though the study does not eliminate the potential necessity for “remedial” COIN, whereby the host government requires direct outside assistance to put down an insurgency, it focuses primarily on changes needed to enhance the Air Force’s capabilities to execute a robust, precautionary COIN strategy.
The authors introduce an Iraq-style situation, a so-called constabulary COIN, as a third option but take it no further than a concept in which an occupying power has removed the existing government and now must fight an insurgency while generating a legitimate replacement. This particular topic raised a hopeful eyebrow. Sadly, however, the authors avoid an opportunity to explore needed changes in airpower applicable to today’s major challenges by tersely noting that “the occupying state should take what steps it can to limit the scale of the insurgency beforehand” (p. 72).
A case study on El Salvador’s insurgency and an examination of considerations in the development of COIN capabilities highlight important issues for US military planners: that smaller footprints and closer contact are often preferable, that the host nation must win the political as well as military battle, that military restraint is a virtue, and that airpower offers important capabilities. The remainder of the work theoretically and methodologically details how the Air Force can affect an early insurgency best through institutional and bureaucratic initiatives and the growth of air advisers, using the 6th Special Operations Squadron as a model.
In sum, I was impressed by the discussion of military power’s application to insurgency but deflated to discover that the prescription for airpower amounted to speeches, new Air Staff offices, courses in developmental education, and an order-of-magnitude increase for the 6th Special Operations Squadron. Granted, increased operational air-advisory capability constitutes a valid recommendation for precautionary COIN, but the study omits discussion of relevant airpower options in all types of counterinsurgencies. If “the optimal force mixes for warfare against regular [i.e., conventional] and irregular [i.e., COIN] adversaries differ even more today” (p. 60), then shouldn’t the Air Force also consider developing a small but talented “model” COIN air force to strafe enemy insurgent positions instead of relying on fourth-generation (soon fifth-generation) fighters costing $75 million (according to the Defense Department’s Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, February 2006)? Where are the examinations of tough force-structure choices? Must US forces capable of flying, employing, and instructing from third-generation attack platforms be limited to select special operators? Unfortunately, Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era stops short of addressing these options. I would read this monograph again for the excellent exposition of not-so-new COIN principles but look elsewhere for novel, innovative, and broadly applicable airpower solutions.
Maj Paul A. Hibbard, USAF
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
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