Document created: 1 June 03
Published: Air & Space Power Journal -Winter 2005

Third Reich Victorious: Alternate Decisions of World War II edited by Peter G. Tsouras. Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal Limited (http:// www.greenhillbooks.com), Park House, 1 Russell Gardens, London NW11 9NN, 2002, 256 pages, $34.95.

At times, we ask ourselves "what if?" as we explore alternatives and ponder what could have been. Undoubtedly, luck- good or bad- played as great a role as skill in the outcome of significant events during World War II. In high school during the summer, my friends and I would play historical simulation games that ended with Germany- or even the Soviet Union- winning major battles in World War II. Third Reich Victorious takes this stratagem a step further, exploring possible historical outcomes that may have yielded a German victory in key turning points of the war. Tsouras does an excellent job of presenting the difficult topic of alternative courses of action by calling upon several historians and authors to create new scenarios of what might have been. Some readers will consider the contributors’ assumptions stretches of the imagination while others will admit that the outcome was simply a stroke of luck- a fortunate roll of the dice for the victor.

Included in this exploration are lessons to learn about the use of combat power, such as the importance of capitalizing on the principles of mass, economy of force, timing, and tempo. Two scenarios are of particular interest to airpower historians and aficionados. The first is an interesting reading of the alternate history of the Battle of Britain, whereby the Luftwaffe leadership identifies key elements and centers of Britain’s air defenses and focuses on eliminating them before conducting the next phase of the air campaign. As we’ve seen in the most recent US air campaigns waged in Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, the attainment of air superiority- and, ultimately, air supremacy- depends upon controlling or denying the enemy’s ability to maintain or contest the airspace. The fact that the Germans failed to do this in the real Battle of Britain enabled the Royal Air Force to experience its finest hour. But what if the Germans had actually created a solid battle plan and stuck to it? This scenario suggests one possible result.

Another alternative examines the Allied bomber offensive. Starting the historical review in 1943, the scenario explores many variables that actually plagued this offensive- namely, flak and enemy fighters, both of which took a surprisingly heavy toll on US and British bombers. Several times, the Allies were ready to throw in the towel over massive losses on specific raids or segments of a campaign. Similarly, the Germans were ready to give up on their means of countering the bombers. In the (real) end, the Allies triumphed because of decisions and gambles that paid off. But in this scenario, US and British air leadership sticks doggedly to doctrine and tends more often than not either to ignore or belatedly employ advice and advances that would benefit bomber survivability.

Alternate histories aren’t for everyone. The authors of these scenarios had to establish some initial, albeit historically rooted, conditions in order to arrive at their conclusions. Some of their assumptions are leaps of faith, random events that didn’t come to pass, or in a few cases actual plans or ideas that never saw the light of day. In some instances, these scenarios cause readers to marvel at just how close Germany came to winning a key event in World War II. Although we might not agree with either the assumptions or the outcomes, in most cases the scenarios contain important lessons that we would do well to keep in mind. Indeed, Third Reich Victorious has a way of making readers pause to ask themselves, "What if history had gone this way?"

Maj Paul G. Niesen, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.