Document Created: 28 February 2007
Air & Space Power Journal-Winter 2007
Al enemigo primero lo descerebramos by Comodoro Miguel Angel Silva, Fuerza Aérea Argentina, retired. Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra Aérea (RESGA), Argentina, 2003, 168 pages. (Not sold commercially.)
Al enemigo primero lo descerebramos, a primer published by the Fuerza Aérea Argentina (Argentine air force), deals with command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Divided into two chapters and three appendices, it emphasizes how C4ISR concepts affect conventional warfare. Chapter 1, “First Analysis: The New Way of Waging War,” derives basic doctrinal concepts from a brief survey of past wars. Most of the discussion is serious, but one lighthearted passage quips, “When talking about information warfare, the image that comes to mind for most people is a teenager seated in front of a computer, holding a soda in his hand as the cheese from his hamburger drips on the keyboard” (p. 18). Chapter 2, “Second Analysis: Information to Degrade/Protect,” makes insightful comments about many topics, including the dangers of information overload (pp. 71–72). Written from the perspective of a country that possesses limited military resources, the study cautions against “trying to imitate the USA, which is a utopia for countries like ours” (p. 77). The appendices offer concise technical overviews of the radar, laser, infrared, and other types of sensors that operate in the electromagnetic spectrum.
The book is not about information warfare per se but systematically analyzes C4ISR concepts and technologies. Much of the book deliberately adopts a repetitive, didactic style to drive home precepts such as “Everything that transmits can be intercepted. Everything that can be intercepted can be degraded” (p. 49). Although a handy reference that examines its topic primarily from an air force perspective, it focuses more on the component parts of information systems than on the synergies that can result from integrating those systems as envisioned by network-centric warfare. The author also says little about how the Internet relates to information operations or about how one uses information systems against terrorists, organized criminals, or other nonstate threats. Readers seeking more in formation about the topics discussed will find neither footnotes nor a bibliography, but the glossary, index, and simple illustrations are helpful. However, the book’s very fine print will be hard for some people to read. Most of the information is factually accurate, but a few minor errors do intrude themselves. For example, the text states that the human eye can see only 64 colors (pp. 56 and 70); in reality, the number is in the millions. And the 1942 battle of Alam Halfa occurred in North Africa—not in a place that is now part of Israel, as the author asserts (p. 71).
This primer is useful in at least two different ways. First, it is designed as a textbook for military audiences such as war-college students in Spanish-speaking countries. Second, the appendices offer military readers who are not scientists or technicians an understandable explanation of the basic technical characteristics of typical C4ISR systems. The underlying scientific principles discussed have enduring value; nevertheless, C4ISR technology and operational methods evolve quickly. The book uses many historical examples to illustrate its points about the changing nature of warfare, but, although published in 2003, it does not refer to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or to subsequent events. Hopefully the Argentine air force will update the text in light of recent warfare experience.
Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
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