Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949 edited by Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt. M. E. Sharpe, Inc. (http://www.mesharpe.com), 80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, New York 10504, 2003, 344 pages, $69.95 (hardcover), $26.95 (softcover).
Because the downfall of Taiwan was imminent, why didn’t that country slip to the People’s Republic of China (PRC, mainland China) in 1950, as predicted by the CIA’s intelligence and analysis? Chinese Warfighting answers that question and others concerning the operational history of the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The book bridges the gap in PLA literature between the founding of the PRC and current PLA modernization efforts. Whereas contemporary Chinese military studies focus on technology, this work offers eight distinct themes: operational planning; command and control; the linkage between fighting and politics; operational design, combat tactics, and performance; technological issues and doctrinal flexibility; the role of Mao Tse-tung; operational scale and typology of fighting; and deterrence.
An anthology of essays written by a diverse group of authors, Chinese Warfighting is designed as a road map for operational histories of the PLA’s major combat campaigns. It contains the proceedings of a two-day conference in June 1999 convened by the Center for Naval Analyses (CAN) Corporation’s Asian Security Studies Center, whose goal was to “explore the operational history of the Chinese PLA since 1949.” Contributors include prominent academicians from mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States, some of whom have served in the PLA and US military.
The authors are quick to point out the unique difficulties experienced during China’s wartime decision making. After the creation of the PRC, friction emerged between Mao and his field commanders. The latter, successful and accustomed to operating autonomously during the civil war, chafed under his extremely involved leadership style. This situation played a role in every conflict subsequent to this formative period.
Due in part to Mao’s heavy-handedness, China has historically demonstrated a tendency towards the primacy of politics over military considerations when it acts on the world stage. This theme emerges in every conflict sketched in the book: Korean (1950–53), Taiwanese (1949–present), Sino-Indian (1962), Sino-Soviet (1969), and Sino-Vietnamese (1979). Moreover, China’s policy makers have willingly absorbed heavy losses in order to attain political goals. Although the PLA experienced appalling casualties during the Korean War, China considers the outcome a victory because the United States remained beyond the 38th parallel. But, to a limited degree, reliance on mass has given way to modern technological ingenuity.
China recognizes a need to modernize, but its domestic politics have limited such aspirations. In the past, for example, Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution greatly hindered the country’s modernization and economic development. Following the first Gulf War, China’s worst nightmares came true as American bombers delivered laser-guided munitions with deadly, pinpoint accuracy. The event sent chills through the PRC’s politico-military community and became the catalyst for a new wave of creative thought within the military establishment. Overall, Chinese Warfighting is fair in its presentation of causal factors and assignment of responsibility for China’s operational military legacy.
The editors organize chapters both chronologically and thematically, thus allowing readers great flexibility in selection. The introductory chapter, which establishes a frame of reference, is particularly useful to readers who may find themselves drifting in the essays’ abundant details. Maps help readers conceptualize theaters of operations, and the bibliography includes prominent works in both English and Chinese. The contributors’ use of recently declassified primary source documents and memoirs sheds light on the early experiences of the PLA.
No primer on contemporary Chinese military strategy, Chinese Warfighting is not for the recreational reader. But individuals who wish to add depth to their study of China and who seek to decipher the formative historical experiences responsible for China’s drive towards transformation will find it worthwhile. Varied in its sources, viewpoints, and conclusions, and ripe with detail that presents a fresh look at “how we got from there to here,” Chinese Warfighting gives us some indication of what we can expect from the PLA in the future.
2d Lt Daniel L. Magruder Jr., USAF
Hurlburt Field, Florida
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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