Published: 1 December 2003
Air & Space Power Journal - Winter 2003

U.S. War Plans: 1938–1945 edited by Steven T. Ross. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. (http:// www.rienner.com), 1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, Colorado 80301, 2002, 400 pages, $89.95 (hardcover).

U.S. War Plans: 1938–1945, edited by Steven T. Ross, a Naval War College professor, is part of a larger body of work. He previously published a six-volume study, American War Plans, 1919–1950, the first five volumes of which are actually a compilation of photocopies of US war planning from 1919 to 1941 (the sixth volume is Ross’s own history of post–World War II planning to 1950 rather than photocopies of war plans). Whereas the first five volumes shed light on US war planning from 1919 to 1941 at the strategic level, this most recent addition—which is also a “documentary sourcebook” (p. 371)—primarily focuses on the wartime plans to accomplish national objectives through “theater army group and army level operations” (p. 3). Unlike the earlier books, however, the plans reproduced here are not photocopies but transcriptions—and therefore are much easier to read.

Part 1—essentially a foundation for parts 2 and 3, both of which form the heart of the book—is a review of key prewar plans and documents at the strategic level. It contains 1938’s “Study of Joint Action in the Event of Violation of Monroe Doctrine by Fascist Powers”; Rainbow no. 1 (14 October 1939); Rainbow no. 4 (14 August 1940); and Rainbow no. 5 (revised 19 November 1941), the war plan that served as a basis for American action during the war. Part 1 also includes the results of discussions and planning sessions between the United States and Great Britain—the United States–British Staff Conversation Report, ABC-1 (27 March 1941)—as well as the document that set equipment and mobilization requirements for the American war effort: the Victory Program of 11 September 1941. Following part 1’s emphasis on strategic planning, the remaining two parts deal with the actual theater-level war plans to carry out national objectives. Part 2 covers the war in North Africa and Europe, and part 3 deals with the war against Japan. These plans include such documents as Operation Neptune (20 May 1944) for the assault against German-held Europe and Operation Musketeer II (28 September 1944) for the invasion of Luzon.

Ross does historians a valuable service by putting these operational plans in one slim volume. However, given the nature of documentary sourcebooks, these plans lack the complex context in which they developed and evolved. Although Ross includes a short introduction (one to six paragraphs) for each plan, it is not sufficient to convey the background of the final plans, including such factors as logistics, coalition dynamics, personalities, and so forth. Although the book is clearly designed to appeal to students of World War II who are already familiar with this context, those who require more than the book’s short introduction to each plan would profit from consulting Ross’s own excellent analysis of American planning and execution during World War II: American War Plans, 1941–1945: The Test of Battle (Frank Cass, 1997). This book fills in many of the contextual factors that surrounded American war planning prior to and during World War II.

A second issue the reader must keep in mind—one that has become an increasingly common and unwelcome refrain in many reviews—is the price of the book. At a hefty $89.95, the volume is clearly targeted at libraries, not the individual reader—an unfortunate circumstance since the book is an important reference that would benefit all World War II historians.

Although it lacks the broad context of the plans and is encumbered by a substantial price tag, this book is extremely valuable, not only for World War II historians but also for people who wish to understand the evolution of joint and coalition warfare in the twentieth century. As the United States wages its campaign against terrorists throughout the world, it is enlightening and instructive to read the plans for a global war of an earlier day. Steven T. Ross’s U.S. War Plans: 1938–1945 allows us to do so.

Dr. Kevin C. Holzimmer
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.