Published: 1 December 2008
Air & Space Power Journal - Winter 2008

Battling Tradition: Robert F. McDermott and Shaping the U.S. Air Force Academy by Paul T. Ringenbach. Imprint Publications (http://www.imprint-chicago.com), 230 East Ohio Street, Suite 300, Chicago, Illinois 60611, 2006, 333 pages, $24.95 (softcover). 

When the Air Force Academy was first conceived after World War II, senior Airmen, many of them West Point graduates, modeled the new school on their alma mater. This resulted in an Air Force Academy that copied the curriculum, honor code, fourth-class disciplinary system, and even military-training regimen from West Point—not a bad idea. The honor code and disciplinary system served as solid foundations upon which to base a new military academy. The curriculum was another matter.

Archaic and out of touch with modern military requirements and educational practices, the West Point curriculum offered no electives, and all cadets, regardless of prior college experience, had to take the specified courses. There were no academic majors. Furthermore, mathematics and science dominated the curriculum, with only a small portion allotted to the humanities and social sciences. This did not represent a suitable plan for developing forward-looking Air Force officers. Fortunately, help was on the way.

Lt Col Robert McDermott became dean in 1956 after serving two years as vice-dean. “McD,” who had new and radically different ideas, wanted an all-military faculty. To establish academic credibility, however, he worked the Air Force personnel system to ensure it supplied him with officers who already had a master’s degree. He also began sending dozens of officers off to school to obtain graduate degrees so they could later join the faculty. To gain further credibility, he pushed to have the academy officially accredited before graduation of the first class in 1959—an unheard-of goal that the school nonetheless met.

As for the curriculum itself, McDermott inaugurated an “enrichment program” that allowed incoming students to validate courses they had already taken at a civilian university. He directed the academic departments to offer electives and then restructured the curriculum to deemphasize math and sciences while boosting humanities and social sciences. This in turn allowed cadets to choose an academic major—anything from aeronautics to history. McDermott’s ultimate goal called for the academy to offer an accredited master’s degree.

In these efforts, he encountered resistance. Some of it came from other agencies at the academy, but, more significantly, West Point, Annapolis, and the Coast Guard Academy implacably opposed him, fearing being overshadowed by such far-reaching reforms. They lobbied their supporters in civilian academe, the press, and Congress to oppose such “radicalism.” McDermott swept all of them aside. He achieved almost all he hoped for although he had to settle for a “cooperative” master’s program that saw the academy offering accredited graduate-level courses for selected cadets who, upon graduation, would then complete their master’s degree in six to nine months at participating civilian universities. It was a measure of McDermott’s success that within a few years, the other academies had initiated such changes themselves.

In other areas, however, McDermott proved less successful. Although the author notes that the dean decried what he saw as an overemphasis on intercollegiate athletics, the seeds for future problems were sown early on. The football team’s success—going undefeated and earning a trip to the Cotton Bowl in the very first year it had a four-year program—raised some eyebrows. In 1965 a cheating scandal at the academy saw 105 cadets expelled, nearly 42 percent of them athletes and 28 percent from the football team. Two years later, another scandal hit, with an additional 46 cadets thrown out—nearly a third of them athletes as well.

Critics identified the problem as an overemphasis on academics, charging that McDermott’s changes went too far by pushing cadets into impossible time-management binds as they attempted to make passing grades in increasingly advanced and diverse courses. For his part, McDermott argued precisely the opposite: that an overemphasis on athletics, especially a football program that aspired to play nationally ranked opponents on a regular basis, was the culprit.

Surprisingly—and I don’t think Ringenbach explores this issue deeply enough—McDermott and his faculty escaped from these scandals largely unscathed, despite the fact that both occurred in their domain. Instead, the superintendent, commandant, and athletic director soon left under clouds. McDermott retired in 1968 after 25 years of service and then went on to even greater success as president of the United Services Automobile Association.

Overall, Battling Tradition is a thoroughly researched and insightful look at a driven man who left an indelible stamp not only on the Air Force Academy but also on the other service academies. Although this biography will appeal mostly to academy graduates, there are important lessons here for all officers, regardless of service, concerning military education, discipline, and the dynamics of change in a military organization.

Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired
West Chicago, Illinois

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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