Document created: 1 March 06
Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2006

The Politics of Air Power: From Confrontation to Cooperation in Army Aviation Civil-Military Relations by Rondall R. Rice. University of Nebraska Press (http://www.nebraskapress.unl.edu), 1111 Lincoln Mall, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-0630, 2004, 384 pages, $49.95 (hardcover).

Rondall Rice, a US Air Force officer and history professor at the Air Force Academy, offers his readers an important study that should be on the bookshelf of every military historian of the interwar period. Through no fault of his own, though, Rice probably will not attract the audience he merits.

In a study of civil-military relations in the area of aviation, Rice challenges the idea that Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell, assistant chief of the Air Service, was the only major figure who questioned the policies of a series of presidential administrations. Rice argues that “early aviation reformers made alliances with politicians and worked with civilian business in order to advance aviation, gain additional roles and missions for the air arm, . . . and increase funding” (p. xiii). These efforts directly challenged civil authority in the making of defense policy.

Airplanes enthralled Americans, but the phrase “never again” summarized public feelings about foreign affairs and the nation’s involvement in World War I. The second sentiment proved more powerful than the first. Administration after administration had no intention of increasing military appropriations and incurring the wrath of voters. Frustrated, Mitchell lashed out at what he saw as out-of-date thinking in the Navy and War Departments on how to use the military’s limited funding. Calm came to the War Department after Mitchell’s conviction when Maj Gen Mason Patrick, the moderate chief of the Air Service, established his authority. Some radicals continued to agitate for independence, using governmental resources for political lobbying. Henry H. Arnold, the future five-star general, ran afoul of Patrick quickly for such actions, barely avoiding court-martial.

The rogue image of the Army Air Corps returned when Maj Gen Benjamin Foulois misled Congress and Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt. The general quickly agreed to have the Army Air Corps take responsibility for airmail deliveries without conducting a proper study of the mission. A number of deaths resulted, and Foulois was less than candid in his congressional testimony on the matter. Congress also became concerned when the Air Corps evaded legal requirements to use competitive bids for the purchase of new airplanes. Order returned when Oscar Westover and then Arnold succeeded Foulois. Ironically, Arnold found himself injected into a number of political controversies in the early 1940s that pitted isolationists against the preparedness movement. These controversies nearly brought about another period of confrontation when Roosevelt thought about removing the air general for failing to support administration policy.

One finds a number of noticeable blemishes—“weaknesses” is too strong a word—in this account. Most of these problems appear to be the fault of the University of Nebraska Press—the most significant being the cost. At $49.95 few individuals, even friends and family, will buy this book. This price and the lack of photos make it clear that the press is selling primarily to libraries. A number of items in the notes aren’t included in the bibliography—newspapers, to cite a noticeable example. This absence appears to be the product of the press’s style. Copyediting leaves something to be desired. One encounters a number of sentences with faulty syntax (e.g., “A staff memo called the an experimental bomber ‘distinctly a plane of aggression’ ” [p. 141]). Although such mistakes are fairly minor, the point is that the publisher should have employed a good copy editor. These comments aside, this book is a worthy read and deserves a larger audience than it will likely receive.

Dr. Nicholas Evan Sarantakes
Maxwell AFB, Alabama


Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.


Book Reviews | Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor