Document created: 1 September 06
Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2006

Tail-End Charlies: The Last Battles of the Bomber War, 1944–45 by John Nichol and Tony Rennell. Penguin: Allen Lane (http://www.penguin.co.uk), 80 Strand, London, WC2R ORL, 2005, 496 pages, $42.00 (hardcover).

Every now and then, a military history arguably sets new standards for research, readability, and significant historical contributions. A number of books written about the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) against Germany during World War II have generated far too many ill-conceived conclusions, misguided blame, and poor statistical analysis of the efforts by the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) and US Army Air Forces’ (USAAF) Bomber Commands. In a successful attempt to raise the bar, authors John Nichol and Tony Rennell have written a book that answers many nagging questions and dispels numerous incorrect assumptions. Most important, the authors aim the spotlight on the most significant aspect of the bomber war: the men who flew the missions against Germany and into the teeth of Hermann Göring’s Luftwaffe.

In RAF Bomber Command’s parlance, the term tail-end Charlie designated the man who occupied the loneliest of positions in the tail of the bomber. Fighting intense cold, sleep, and the ever-present fear of German night fighters, the rear-turret gunners were among the bravest men on any bomber crew. In American vernacular, tail-end Charlie denoted the aircraft in the dangerously vulnerable rear position of the formation. Regardless of one’s perspective, the meaning remained the same: this position invoked fear. The book Tail-End Charlies takes an extraordinary look into the last half of the bomber war. Weaving historical operations with comments and views from the men who flew these missions, the authors paint a clear and terrifying picture of what bomber crews endured during this part of the war.

Both authors bring unique talents to their task. John Nichol, an RAF flight lieutenant who became a prisoner of war after his Tornado was shot down during the first Gulf War, wrote several books, including Tornado Down and The Last Escape, upon returning from Iraq. He has also written five novels. Tony Rennell authored The Last Days of Glory: The Death of Queen Victoria and several other books. They effectively blend their writing styles to produce a work that is both historically indispensable and enjoyable to read.

Any worthwhile study of the CBO, in particular one that emphasizes RAF Bomber Command, must focus, at least in part, on Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris—the command’s indomitable leader from February 1942 until the end of the war. Armed with his unbending vision of what he believed to be the proper prosecution of the bomber war, Harris has been vilified—to some degree unfairly—as the sole architect of the destruction of German cities. Although a man who indeed held sway within Bomber Command and who proved unwilling to submit his authority to the destruction of what he called “panacea” targets, he has become the undying symbol for the conduct of the command. Nichol and Rennell offer perhaps one of the most balanced and evenhanded assessments of Harris that I have read although I believe they could have better supported their positions by including many of the bombing directives handed down to Harris throughout the war. These documents demonstrate that although Harris often did ignore directives and orders, he usually complied with them.

In another volatile debate, the authors accurately broach the issue of the Dresden firebombing. The word Dresden, which conjures up images of Allied murder and terror bombing, has come to symbolize all that was “wrong” with the CBO. In light of unsubstantiated claims of hundreds of thousands of people killed, those who condemn the CBO have adopted “Remember Dresden” as their ballyhooed battle cry. Although official German reports after the bombing list the actual number of dead at 18,375, with each subsequent telling of the horror of Dresden, those numbers seem to swell. I believe that Nichol and Rennell successfully demonstrate that Dresden was indeed a legitimate target on that Fasching night, 14 February 1945. Despite Harris’s flippant and callous comment that “Dresden was a mass of munitions works, an intact government centre, and a key transportation point to the east. It is now none of these things,” its legitimacy as a military target remains clear.

For all the ferocity of the European air war, the incredible losses incurred by both the RAF and USAAF bomber forces, and the accomplishments of the men in those commands, it is a shame that we do not have more excellent books about this area of World War II. John Nichol and Tony Rennell have accomplished what many others have not: they have written a superb book. For years, we have considered authors like Max Hastings and Martin Middlebrook preeminent experts in the field. I think that Nichol and Rennell will soon join them. Although Tail-End Charlies contains 22 photographs, it offers no maps or appendices of bomber and crew losses, bomb tonnages, sorties flown, targets hit, and the like. These would have certainly made an outstanding book much better.

The authors brilliantly confront the controversial issues of Bomber Command’s reprehensible dealing with men who broke under the strain of combat, the debate over daylight versus night bombing, arguments about the efficacy and morality of the bomber offensive, and Churchill’s politically expedient disregard for the command after the war. The authors also tackle the final disgrace of not awarding Bomber Command a campaign ribbon for its five-year war against Germany. Scholarly researched, professional in its presentation, and incredibly enjoyable to read, Tail-End Charlies is definitely a must-have book. Readers interested in the CBO against Germany in World War II, can do no better than Tail-End Charlies. Period!

Lt Col Robert Tate, USAFR
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.