Published: 1 June 2008
Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2008

Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully. Potomac Books, Inc. (http://www.potomacbooksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2005, 568 pages, $28.00 (hardcover).

Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully have produced a work designed to do nothing less than fundamentally change our understanding of the Battle of Midway. Examining the battle from the Japanese perspective, the authors contend that the reasons for the Japanese defeat lay not in decisions made during the battle but in the doctrinal, technological, and ideological development of the Imperial Japanese Navy and decisions made before the battle that flowed from such development. Along the way, Parshall and Tully dispel several long-standing myths regarding the battle that emerged shortly after the war and hardened in the minds of scholars and laymen alike. They are tremendously successful on both counts.

The authors logically detail the Imperial Japanese Navy and its carrier force’s development prior to World War II. They show various influences from the Royal Navy, to the Russo-Japanese War, to the interwar period and the way they produced a force optimized for hyperoffensive warfare at all levels. Parshall and Tully also explore the technological and doctrinal capabilities of the carrier force—from radar, to search planes, to damage control. They do so not in the vein of “gun boors” who revel in the esoteric minutiae of calibers and muzzle velocity, but by way of explaining what Adm Nagumo Chuichi and his force could do, could not do, and what they were trained to do. The authors also illustrate these issues by exploring the carrier force’s pre-Midway battle record. Doing so allows them to examine the battle in context—judging the Japanese not in light of what Western historians think they should have done, but according to what was reasonable to them, given all of these factors. Their narrative is both enlightening and persuasive.

The authors systematically examine and debunk many of the prevailing myths of the battle, including the “fatal error” of Nagumo’s rearming his strike aircraft during the battle, the “pivotal” role of the Tone’s floatplane no. 4, the “noble sacrifice” of the USS Hornet’s torpedo squadron, and the notion that the Americans were tremendously outnumbered. By doing so, Parshall and Tully substantively discredit Mitsuo Fuchida’s Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan (Naval Institute Press, 1955) and explain why the Japanese version of the battle has been late in coming to the West. Although they believe that the American side of events has been adequately covered in Gordon W. Prange’s Miracle at Midway (McGraw-Hill, 1982) and Walter Lord’s Incredible Victory (Harper & Row, 1967), most portions of those works that rely on Fuchida as a source for Japanese perspective now have to be taken with a grain of salt. Indeed if there is a shortcoming in the work, it is by design. The authors purposely confine their examination to the Japanese side of things; thus, a novice should read their book in conjunction with either Prange’s or Lord’s work.

For even the casual student of the Pacific War, however, Shattered Sword succeeds decisively in changing perceptions of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the role of doctrine and training, and the Battle of Midway. The book exhibits the best uses of both technological and “revisionist” history, fundamentally transforming the historical record in light of new evidence and new techniques—not new social agendas. Shattered Sword will have a significant impact on the historiography of the Battle of Midway and the Pacific War. Hopefully, its success will lead other scholars to look for new perspectives in a theater that many have considered “dead territory.”

Maj Christopher Parrish, USAF
Dyess AFB, Texas

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.