Published: 1 December 2008
Air & Space Power Journal - Winter 2008
Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd by Frans
P. B. Osinga. Routledge (http://www.routledge.com), Taylor and Francis Group, 2
Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxford OX14 4RN, United Kingdom, 2006, 336
pages, $125.00 (hardcover).
In Science, Strategy and War, Frans P. B. Osinga explains the thinking,
motivation, and creation behind military strategist John Boyd’s theories. He
explores how Boyd arrived at conclusions and theorems that have defined American
military tradecraft in the twentieth century and that will undoubtedly continue
to motivate military thinking at all levels—tactical, operational, and
strategic—in the twenty-first century. Examining the papers and texts that Boyd
read either as an Air Force officer or, later, as a defense consultant, Osinga
assembles a near-complete picture of how his subject created processes, models,
and, ultimately, such complex designs as the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA)
loop. By studying the lists that John Boyd recommended to his audiences and the
notes he left behind, the author allows readers to trace Boyd’s creation of such
theories as fourth-generation warfare and network-centric warfare.
Osinga organizes his text into four areas: (1) Boyd’s professional background,
(2) strategic and political settings in the United States, (3) Boyd’s study of
military theory and history, and (4) his evolving interest and study in
scientific developments and theories. Since the English language falls short in
describing some intellectual pursuits, the author uses the German word Zeitgeist throughout to explain how societal and scientific theorems influenced Boyd’s
thinking on a wide variety of matters. He also shows that Boyd used a
multidisciplined approach in his work, borrowing from such fields as the
psychology of human cognition, political science, systems theory, cybernetics,
anthropology, economics, quantum mechanics, and chaos theory.
This elaborate book demands disciplined reading if one wishes to understand how
Boyd constructed his arguments, formulated his strategic discourse, and
incorporated various scientific and philosophical concepts from biology and
social discourse. Osinga concludes with an examination of how themes, debates,
and insights of the day influenced or molded Boyd’s strategic thinking. Since
Boyd developed the OODA loop and other concepts in what historians have called
the postmodern world, cross-references to other events of the day help provide
perspective on ideas and motivations that he labored so hard to develop.
This outstanding text suffers from one flaw that has become pervasive in the
literature: the use of endnotes rather than footnotes, which requires the reader
to look up explanations to the text by flipping between pages—a tiresome
exercise. In this time of computer-aided capabilities, this book’s design can
use some improvement. Nonetheless, any fan of John Boyd should own Science,
Strategy and War—not a biography but truly a scholarly, in-depth examination of
this Airman’s thoughts, research, and concepts. Any modern strategist will want
a copy.
Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired
Centreville, Virginia
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