Document created: 1 March 06
Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2006

Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era by Michael E. O’Hanlon. Brookings Institution Press (http://bookstore.brookings.edu), 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036-2188, 2005, 148 pages, $18.95 (softcover).

This volume is the eighth in a series of analyses of US national security policy by Michael E. O’Hanlon and his fourth regarding the defense budget. He parses out the situation as he sees it, both in terms of ongoing security operations and possible threat scenarios, all within budget projections and constraints. O’Hanlon’s analysis generally supports current administration policy; that is, he likely would not have supported the Iraq intervention as it unfolded but works from where we are presently rather than from where he might want to be at a particular point in time when making policy recommendations. His analysis is interesting because one traditionally links the Brookings Institution to the Democrats as a policy workshop, in contrast to the American Enterprise Institute with its Republican linkages. Civilian national security leadership often comes from institutes such as these, so reading their analyses often provides a glimpse of the future, depending on presidential politics.

O’Hanlon opens with an overview of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, emphasizing the fact that the new method of war much touted in the former arose almost on the fly, with the great successes unanticipated. Regarding Iraq, his view is that one could clearly foresee the US military victory, given the tattered Iraqi military, while postwar planning proved seriously deficient. In fact, O’Hanlon indicates that “shock and awe” had very little impact on the Iraqis, who were punchy from a decade or more of constant air attacks over maintenance of the no-fly zones. Building from that new reality, O’Hanlon argues that the Army needs to add 40,000 personnel to its base force in order to handle the insurgency in Iraq. Interestingly, his rationale for this increase is one that John Kerry had been unable to articulate in the 2004 election. O’Hanlon’s view is that the present situation risks “breaking” the all-volunteer force (p. 50), a concept which he supports. Temporary growth is the price paid to get by a problem that risks the existing force structure and keeps any possible military draft in abeyance indefinitely. O’Hanlon does not support a return to the draft although it might become necessary without a remedy for the present overstretching of regular forces. Whether the Army can increase by 40,000 troops becomes a significant question, given the present difficulties of maintaining current strength through voluntary enlistments.

For the Air Force and Navy, he holds out a future that will present challenges as equipment ages, especially aircraft, with substantial issues arising in terms of future procurement. In order for the Air Force to continue to maintain air superiority, O’Hanlon favors keeping the F-22A, but possibly fewer of them, and buying the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), but reducing the number to around 1,000—sufficient to keep the Marine Corps and international versions of the JSF. As a gap measure, he argues for continued production of the F-16 since it would remain useful in combat against most of the world’s air forces. In his view, the Navy should also continue to buy F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. Both services should add unmanned aerial vehicles to fill the gaps created by buying fewer of each manned-aircraft type.

O’Hanlon bases these numbers on the ongoing revision of the traditional two-war scenario that has dominated US defense planning for the past generation. He observes that this scenario was fine as a planning exercise but that the concept actually morphed into a “1-4-2-1” scenario. That is, “the United States prepared to defend the homeland, maintain strong forward deployments in four main theaters (Europe, the Persian Gulf, northeast Asia, and other parts of the Pacific Rim), defeat two regional aggressors at once if necessary, and overthrow one of them” (p. 97). O’Hanlon argues that the new scenario in reality should be a “1-4-1-1-1,” which refers to defending the homeland (“1”) and including forward deployments as well as limited counterterrorism strikes (“4”). The “1-1-1” refers to “one large-scale stabilization mission (presently in Iraq, of course, but perhaps someday in South or Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or Africa), one high intensity air-ground war (for example, in Korea), and one major naval-air engagement (such as in the Taiwan Strait or Persian Gulf)” (p. 98). If accurate, his analysis foresees a very active future for the Air Force and the need for quick response and a flexible organization.

From O’Hanlon’s perspective, the concept of the air and space expeditionary force will be greatly stretched, especially if deferment of procurement purchases continues while new and more expensive systems are brought online, increasing the pressures on existing aircraft inventory. The US military has a well-deserved reputation for its “can do” approach to solving problems, but that attitude will encounter severe obstacles over the next two decades, regardless of who is elected president in 2008. The United States has achieved a position of unparalleled military effectiveness relative to possible state foes, but sustaining that edge remains a challenge, given the growing turbulence in the world. Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era should be of interest to most Air Force professionals because the author presents a view of the situation that differs from what one might hear through official channels but supports the directions the military has taken in pursuing the next stage in the revolution in military affairs.

Dr. Roger Handberg
Orlando, Florida

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.