Published: 1 September 2008
Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2008

Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy by William C. Martel. Cambridge University Press (http://us.cambridge.org), 32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10013-2473, 2006, 432 pages, $35.00 (hardcover).

Fighting and winning the long war against global terrorism are critical priorities of the United States Air Force. We share a stake in this fight with every security-focused agency in the nation and those of our allies. Since this war began, arguably on 9/11, strategies and plans have been written and rewritten at all levels. Through these iterations, however, no one has defined victory. Few need reminding of the significant expenditure of national prestige, treasure, and blood. Given the nature and cost of the long war, why do we have no clear concept of what it means to win?

Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy by William C. Martel, associate professor of international security studies at the Fletcher School of Tufts University, presents an engaging and thoughtful analysis of the concepts and questions encompassing a topic artfully captured in the book’s title. Before turning the first page, one sees on the cover a highly recognizable picture that imaginatively frames Martel’s premise. The image of a large banner prominently displayed on the USS Abraham Lincoln in May 2003 behind President Bush reads “Mission Accomplished.” Since that day, over 2,400 Americans have been killed, and almost 17,500 have been wounded in Iraq alone.

The premise of Victory in War is straightforward. No modern theory of victory exists, yet it should. The author poses pertinent questions and displays keen analytical rigor as he rapidly moves through a review of ancient and modern military strategists and theorists to arrive at chapter 4—the heart of the book. Here Martel develops “four concepts—level of victory, change in status quo, mobilization for war, and post conflict obligations—which jointly provide the foundation for a pretheory of victory” (p. 94). Readers should not be confused since the author successfully explains the definition and rationale for using the social-science term pretheory.

Examining 12 American wars through the lens of his theory, Martel first considers the American theory of victory by using case studies of major wars from 1776 through 1975. His analysis leaves one with a greater understanding of victory in the American psyche. Next, he studies six cases encompassing American armed conflicts from the end of the cold war to the present, determining the extent to which the pretheory presented in chapter 4 develops a proper framework for understanding the concept of victory. Closely tied to the analysis of these six cases is an outstanding discussion of the role of military power and victory. This treatment includes an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of air, land, and maritime forces in producing victory.

Clearly the author fulfills three key tasks: he provides a proper “framework for understanding victory, advances our knowledge of the meaning of victory, and provides a foundation for criticism” (p. 308). Other aspects of the text are exceptionally noteworthy. The two chapters on strategists and theorists offer an excellent, albeit abbreviated, primer on these grand military thinkers. The case studies, particularly those of the last 20 years stand alone as exceptional accounts of American military involvement in those conflicts. Additionally, the book is a classic example of how to conduct a study with analytical rigor and integrity. Without exception, it presents the advantages and disadvantages of all key and controversial arguments and positions. Professor Martel, a former RAND analyst, has produced a superb work that will influence how current and future generations of military and political leaders understand the nature of war and what it means to achieve victory.

Because of the lessons, historical perspective, and inherent knowledge to be gained from Victory in War, I highly recommend that every military officer in the Department of Defense read it. Martel’s study is the timeliest and one of the most important books written on strategy for the profession of arms in the recent past.
 

Lt Col Chris Wrenn, USAF
Air Force Fellow, The Fletcher School
Tufts University 

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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