Published Airpower Power Journal - Summer 1998

Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century by Douglas A. Macgregor. Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881, 1997, 283 pages, $65.00 (cloth), $24.95 (paper).

A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.

—Max Planck

Douglas Macgregor’s seminal work attempts to break down just such a generational barrier by proposing a new organizational structure and operational concept for America’s Army of the twenty-first century. He brings a wealth of operational experience to the discussion, having served in Operation Desert Storm and winning the Bronze Star with “V” device for valor. His actions in combat include decisive leadership of his cavalry squadron at the Battle of 73 Easting. He holds a PhD from the University of Virginia, and his accomplishments and ideas have brought him to the center of the debate over the future of Army force structure, military strategy, and service doctrine. Breaking the Phalanx has become a “must read” within the senior Army leadership because it contains a fresh approach to the question of the role of American land forces in the twenty-first century.

During his cavalry squadron’s rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) in California in 1993, Lieutenant Colonel Macgregor’s employment and tactics were so “out of the box” from normal Army tactical doctrine that he went 3-1-1 in his battles, despite the fact that the norm is, at best, one win and a tie. Shortly after his trip to NTC, Macgregor was promoted to full colonel and given a fellowship to one of the more prestigious think tanks in Washington—the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he wrote this book. For some people, this would seem a plum, but in Army circles, not going to higher command is a sign of displeasure from above. Departure from established doctrine is seldom rewarded in our Army.

So what is in this book that the senior Army leadership likes? Simply, it presents a template for a very different US Army than exists today—one that, if allowed to become the standard, would likely result in dramatic shifts away from traditional “heavy,” manpower-intensive, large combat formations that are the Army’s legacy as far back as World War II. This new Army can rapidly dominate the battlefield of the future by being lighter and relying on information technologies, precision, speed, and maneuver. The author offers up everything needed to reshape the Army to make his vision happen.

Macgregor’s case is a simple one: “Land power will be an essential feature of statecraft and deterrence” in the foreseeable future. To achieve this goal, he “suggests reorganizing the Army into mobile combat groups positioned on the frontiers of American security, ready to act quickly and decisively, primed to move with a minimum of preparation.” Macgregor discusses the problem of today’s policy makers overlooking “the importance of the right organization for combat within a coherent doctrinal framework.” The Roman Legion is selected as an example of finding a new method for victory. As Rome sought to expand, she subdued the previously “invincible” Macedonian Phalanx using new tactics and organization against a tried-and-true army formation—not unlike his own efforts in Desert Storm and later at NTC. To make this happen, Army units will need to be restructured to take advantage of new technology and leverage our growing ability to rapidly decide and act, as well as “provide the foundation on land for coherent joint military operations in a new and uncertain strategic environment.”

Breaking the Phalanx is an interesting read, and many of its chapters stand on their own. Macgregor allows outsiders to see how someone in one service views his own service as well as others. His use of history as support for some of his conclusions will no doubt cause airmen to toss the book aside, much as I did several years ago when I read Michael S. Sherry’s 1987 work The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon. We must read things we do not like if we are to understand another point of view. Macgregor is quick to suggest how high technology such as stealth will be overcome and never play as key a role in national defense as land forces do. This is hardly a “joint” point of view—or is it?

Beyond his “boots on the ground” versus “silver bullet” force arguments, he presents a serious discussion of how a land force can be relevant in the wide range of conflicts that our future will likely hold. From actual organization tables to a specific Iranian scenario, Macgregor places his service on the horns of a dilemma: keep today’s status quo and struggle to modernize over decades or get serious about changing the Army to be decisive through “dominant maneuver” at all points on the conflict spectrum. His message is to get light, lethal, information rich, and mobile. J. E. B. Stuart would have been proud.

If we accept the fact that there will be an Army in our national defense, then reforming the Army on information-age principles instead of the current industrial-age formations centered on heavy combat (read “tank”) divisions makes good sense. His groups are task-organized to meet a wide range of operations under the Joint Task Force concept. His new force mix includes heavy combat, air assault, and heavy and light recon/strike groups, all sized for rapid mobility. As students of national defense, we should become concerned when anyone pushes a servicecentric solution at the expense of other service programs.

Macgregor is “fair” with his budget knife, offering up 10 major weapon systems for cuts or elimination, including the Army’s next self-propelled artillery system, the 70-ton Crusader. Unfortunately, six of the systems are airpower-related, including the F-22, joint strike fighter, F/A-18E, and V-22. Space is indirectly cut by substituting unmanned aerial vehicles for satellites, based on the principle that air is more flexible than astrodynamics. Is he devaluing the very forces that allowed him to overwhelm his foe in the deserts of Southwest Asia and California?

There is hope for airmen in Macgregor’s thesis. In his future land force, he clearly has latched on to several recognizable attributes: speed, range, freedom to maneuver, flexibility, firepower, and information superiority. Most of these info-age “grunts” will arrive by air, receive support from air, and attack by air. Macgregor may be a cavalry officer, but he thinks airmen’s thoughts.

What needs to be said in this book is hidden in his design: without the capabilities of the other services, any army becomes very naked in the battle space of the twenty-first century. The real questions are, Who supports and who is supported in future fights? The current field-grade generation is wondering if it can wait for another generation to pass before the Army “sees the light.”

Lt Col William T. Eliason, USAF
Washington, D.C.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.