Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America by John A. Lynn. Westview Press (http://www.westviewpress.com), 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301, 2003, 432 pages, $27.50 (hardcover).
Whether or not they agree with it, Battle will cause readers to reexamine long-held beliefs and conventional wisdom. John Lynn, a professor of history at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, examines societies and the armies they produce, describing the interrelationship between a military’s and a society’s values, beliefs, assumptions, expectations, and preconceptions. This relationship, he believes, influences war and victory more than any other factor. Although the book is thought provoking, readers should know that it is not for the armchair general or history buff. At times, the author’s rich, complicated ideas bog down this work, which is gaining acceptance in academic circles.
Battle provides a fascinating interpretation of why different people armed with similar technologies and weapons choose to fight differently. For instance, between 1600 and the late 1700s, armies followed linear tactics: men lined up in distinctly colored uniforms, marched to within a few yards of the enemy, and blazed away. Conventional wisdom argues that the smoothbore musket’s range and accuracy demanded densely packed formations, while battlefield smoke and communication limitations demanded unique uniforms, enabling generals to discern friend from foe. Yet, these reasons do not provide the complete answer since armies could have utilized more open tactics, save for the prejudice of officers and aristocrats against lower-class soldiers. With the advent of the French Revolution and civic militarism, Napoléon showed that free men, defending a system in which they believed, would fight more independently. Thus, we see more skirmishers, attacks by columns, and advances along parallel axes.
Two of the more interesting chapters concern the US war with Japan during World War II and Egypt’s October (Yom Kippur) War. Lynn challenges recent scholarship that asserts that US racism caused the former conflict, shaped combat operations, and motivated men to fight. If racism caused the war, it was Japanese racism against Westerners—not vice versa. The United States grounded its strategy and doctrine not on preconceived racist ideas but on technology and geography, all the while respecting Japan’s fighting ability and equipment.
As for the Yom Kippur War, Lynn capitalizes on Kenneth Pollack’s excellent Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (2002) to claim that the Egyptians successfully modified their doctrine to conform to their culture. Simply put, the Egyptian military prior to 1967 had suffered two decades of military defeat at the hands of the Israelis. After the Six-Day War, Egyptians looked honestly at their strengths and weaknesses, tailoring their tactics to maximize assets and minimize their failings. The result was the tactically brilliant Suez crossing. As long as the Israelis reacted according to plan, the Egyptian army held its gains. Problems arose when President Anwar Sadat forced the army to deviate from the script and when the Israelis developed solutions to the new Egyptian tactics.
Unfortunately, what promised to be an excellent study is flawed by Lynn’s fratricidal attack on classics professor Victor Davis Hanson. Hanson’s Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (2001) posits that Western culture—with its concept of shock infantry that seeks to close with and destroy the enemy, together with its relative freedom, capitalism, self-criticism, scientific inquiry, and civic militarism—has been responsible for the West’s dominance for the last 2,500 years. Lynn takes umbrage with Hanson’s assertions of 25 centuries of unbroken supremacy and with the idea that the West’s military culture is unique.
Lynn’s attack is misguided on three counts. First, his comparison of Battle with Carnage and Culture is faulty because the former examines conflicts pitting East versus East, West versus West, and West versus East while the latter deals exclusively with West versus East. Second, Lynn claims that the West did not always fight like the Greeks—seeking decisive battle with brute force against brute force—but often avoided battles. He fails to recognize that battle avoidance was frequently part of an overall strategy designed to discredit the enemy in the eyes of the people, reduce his resources, and draw him out of his fortifications to fight decisive battles. Finally, Lynn somehow has Hanson maintaining that attrition is one of the ingredients of the Western way of war. Disregarding Hanson’s contention that the West repeatedly fights with fewer men and weapons, Lynn goes to great lengths to argue the opposite: "Attrition warfare depends on superiority in manpower and material to batter an enemy into submission, and is usually costly. In contrast, maneuver warfare maximizes effect by movement with the goal of achieving greater results at far less sacrifice in blood" (p. 285). Having constructed this straw man, he then maintains that the West habitually selects maneuver, the practice of the US Marine Corps: "Rather than wearing down an enemy’s defense, maneuver warfare attempts to bypass these defenses in order to penetrate the enemy system and tear it apart" (p. 305). Amazingly, he even contends that Egypt’s (Eastern army) Yom Kippur attrition offensive more closely resembles Hanson’s thesis than does Israel’s (Western army).
At this point it becomes clear that Lynn has completely missed the essence of Carnage, a close reading of which reveals that a key Western characteristic is not attrition but a willingness to close with the enemy—through attrition or maneuver—in order to crush him. In this light, one clearly sees that Israel more closely resembles the Hanson model. One also has to question Lynn’s reading of Marine doctrine since that service’s latest doctrine actually argues against Lynn: "Firepower and attrition are essential elements of warfare by maneuver. In fact . . . where strength has been focused against enemy vulnerability, attrition may be extreme and may involve the outright annihilation of enemy elements. . . . The object of such local attrition is . . . to eliminate a key element which incapacitates the enemy systemically" (Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1, Warfighting, June 1997, p. 46, emphasis added).
Battle is an interesting, thought provoking, but flawed study. Although Lynn’s examination of society’s interrelationship with the military provides a number of valuable insights, his misconceptions about and misrepresentation of a fellow historian’s work call into question his overall argument. A difficult book, Battle is not for the casual reader. (Interestingly, however, during a recent meeting of the American Historical Association, Lynn argued for more readable histories: "We really have to talk to a bigger audience" [Washington Post, 12 January 2004].) Nevertheless, I recommend Battle because military members must think critically about our society and the way we fight.
Lt Col James P. Gates, USAF
Washington, DC
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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