Contemporary Nuclear Debates: Missile Defenses, Arms Control, and Arms Races in the Twenty-First Century edited by Alexander T. J. Lennon. MIT Press (http://www-mitpress.mit.edu), Five Cambridge Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142-1493, 2002, 344 pages, $24.95 (softcover).
Who cares about nuclear missiles? They’re so eighties. We won the Cold War. Terrorists, suitcase bombs, anthrax, radiological dirty bombs, and improvised explosive devices dominate the new strategic lexicon. We have to worry about terrorists now. Russia isn’t going to attack; we’re allies. China doesn’t have a reason to do so; it’s concentrating on economic reform and embracing capitalism, if not democracy. North Korea? Well, next year our new ground-based missile-defense system will reduce that threat. Right?
On the other hand, although the Cold War is over, thousands of nuclear weapons remain in the depots of several nations. With them lie the seeds for a new crop of deterrence, missile-defense, and arms-control pundits. That’s where Contemporary Nuclear Debates comes in, filling the gap—let’s call it the dialog gap—where advocates for post–Cold War missile defense, arms control, nuclear testing, and their opponents square off.
In reality, the stakes today are a bit different. Cold Warriors remember the air-raid drills in school and the threat of a “nuclear winter” or apocalyptic film and television fantasies like Dr. Strangelove and The Day After. Tomorrow’s leaders will remember the twin towers coming down and terrorist-attack evacuations from school. Yet, the Cold War threats never really went away—they’re just obscured behind the dust of the falling Wall, less likely to occur but potentially much worse if they do. Although terrorists remain the most likely threat, they aren’t necessarily the only “worst case” scenario.
An anthology of essays, pro and con, Contemporary Nuclear Debates helps frame the current nuclear discussion, considering a number of pretty bad scenarios. Its contributors are well known in national-security circles; some are or were high-ranking officials in the US government. The scope and breadth of its analyses make the book worthwhile reading. Its 25 essays fall into four parts: (1) “National Missile Defense: When and How?” (2) “Global Perceptions of Missile Defense,” (3) “Do Arms Races Matter Anymore?” and (4) “Is Arms Control Dead?” Despite the book’s publication date of 2002, the essays were obviously written earlier—some before withdrawal from the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty in May 2002. Consequently, the inclusion of some anachronistic artifacts, such as debates over that treaty, are distracting.
Two essays are particularly striking. In “Toward Missile Defense from the Sea” by Dr. Hans Binnendijk and Dr. George Stewart, we learn that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld changed the missile-defense world in 2002, exchanging the “theater ballistic missile” and “national missile defense” nomenclature and substituting a new philosophy: we defend against a spectrum of missile threats with a multilayer missile defense. This spectrum includes prelaunch, boost, midcourse, and terminal stages.
The authors assert that sea-based defenses are better focused on the boost threat rather than the midcourse and terminal threats (p. 64). Furthermore, sea-based radar provides many advantages, not the least of which is the fact that it is not destabilizing (pp. 58–59). This discussion of missile defense and sea-based radar has importance to Airmen because the joint aspect of missile defense affects the Air Force tremendously. Air Force and selected long-range naval assets such as Tomahawk missiles represent America’s knock-down-the-door force. Furthermore, the prelaunch and boost phases offer the perfect times to hit enemy missiles, so they can blow up on or over enemy territory—not over the heads of friendly troops or allies. (This is precisely the problem with waiting until the midcourse or terminal stages. To be fair, though, a nominal threat of collateral damage may exist, depending upon the missile’s payload and trajectory, as well as the point in the boost phase when it is hit. But that threat seems much more severe if the debris lands on friendlies.) The authors also present well-thought-out pros and cons for sea-based radars, especially as part of a defense system using intercontinental missiles (pp. 50–61).
Another noteworthy essay, “Action-Reaction Metaphysics and Negligence” by Dr. Keith Payne, formerly the assistant secretary of defense for force policy, at first just sounded bad to an old fighter pilot. However, the article gets to the heart of many assumptions thrown around as facts in current defense debates, such as “defense encourages attack” or “missile defense encourages an arms race” (pp. 197–207).
According to Dr. Payne, critics of missile defense would argue that “the Salt I and II negotiations were premised on the assumption that limitations on strategic offensive forces would not be possible without extensive constraints on strategic defenses” (p. 198). However, he points out that President Bush’s “call for both nuclear force reductions and missile defense deployment poses a direct challenge to this foundation of Cold War thinking” (p. 198). This notion remains very important for today’s policy discussions, especially since missile defense will soon become reality.
Dr. Payne offers a short, historical argument on the issue of defense: “From the late 1960s to the present, the first order response to US missile defense initiatives by political opponents has been to assert . . . the ‘inevitable’ superiority of the offense”; Payne calls such a response “nonsense” (p. 202). He’s right; otherwise, why do we even attempt to do defensive counterair or force protection? Why put a losing doctrine in print? Why even try? Dr. Payne supports his assertion with good evidence of defenses that have worked quite well, including Athens’s defensive walls in the Peloponnesian War; Constantinople’s walls, which provided almost a millennium’s worth of security; and British air and naval defenses that prevented Operation Sea Lion in World War II. He even brings up Clausewitz, who considered defense generally stronger than offense. Obviously, each situation is different, but it’s hard to argue that we shouldn’t defend the United States from missile attacks because the task is too difficult or will provoke someone to attack who otherwise would not. Perhaps defense alone won’t win, but that isn’t how we propose to defend our nation; arguments against defense on a historical basis are weak.
Contemporary Nuclear Debates includes many more great essays, a few of which seem a bit dated. Overall, I heartily recommend this book to readers interested in both missile defense and the nuances of Dr. Strangelove. It is also an important book for students of strategy—both current and future decision makers—who want to get their arms around the security dilemma posed by nuclear weapons and their defenses.
Lt Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF
Washington, DC
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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