Published: 22 October 2009
Air & Space Power Journal

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NATO’s Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998–1999 by Dag Henriksen. Naval Institute Press (http://www.usni.org/navalinstitutepress/index.asp), 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5034, 2007, 304 pages, $24.00 (softcover).

NATO’s Gamble examines the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) strategy for Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. More precisely, author Dag Henriksen argues that NATO had no strategy prior to or during the initial stages of the conflict and that history, rather than events, guided its actions. In outlining matters relating to the operation, he highlights the transatlantic differences in philosophy regarding the crisis, illustrates how they affected NATO’s actions, and points to them as the underlying reason for the lack of a unified strategy on Kosovo. Henriksen concludes that NATO stumbled into war in order to protect its credibility without any overall strategy—and that was NATO’s gamble.

Using a case-study format, the author begins his analysis with the opening days of Allied Force by recounting the struggle between the military and NATO politicians over the conduct of the war. He paints a picture of disagreement and confusion over all of its aspects—targets, objectives, and pace of the war—and observes how the military would often hear of changes through press conferences instead of NATO channels. By focusing on the ideological differences between the military and diplomats, the remainder of the book reveals how NATO arrived at such a point. Establishing a foundation for his argument, Dr. Henriksen uses the development of airpower theory and history to show the “shock and awe” mind-set prevalent in the Air Force and then employs a similar historical line of reasoning to demonstrate the US political leadership’s beliefs regarding the linkage of force to diplomacy. Finally, starting with the origins of the Bosnia conflict in the early 1990s, he establishes a pattern of political and military events that created only minimal connection between the use of force and diplomacy as Allied Force began.

In addition to noting NATO’s lack of coherent strategy, Dr. Henriksen examines principles of coercion to emphasize the necessity of a link between the use of force and diplomacy. Harkening back to Alexander George and his concept of coercive diplomacy, the author demonstrates how NATO’s lack of an overall strategy caused the failure of coercion prior to the conflict. Although not fully developed, the discussion on coercion presents a strong reminder to military professionals and diplomats of the need to keep political goals in mind when designing military strategy and to establish links to those goals—precisely the sort of connection missing for NATO.

An airpower lecturer at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy and a captain in the Royal Norwegian Air Force, Henriksen used his doctoral thesis as the basis for NATO’s Gamble. His study not only offers an interesting argument but also presents perspectives from multiple NATO members, even during discussion of the bipolar transatlantic divide. Furthermore, it considers the views of military officers and diplomats from many NATO nationalities, including some often missing from or minimized in other books on the subject. This sort of inclusiveness provides a well-rounded account from which even a reader quite familiar with Kosovo will likely learn something new.

Although aspects of this topic hold little mystery for many members of the Air Force community, NATO’s Gamble is nevertheless worthwhile. In light of current events, conceptualizing military operations as supporting political strategy should have a familiar ring for most readers. However, harmonizing both of these elements in a coercive operation within the framework of a standing alliance presents complications that every military professional must understand. This book provides a case study of just such an instance.

Maj Lisa Nemeth, USAF
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Hans-Joachim Marseille: An Illustrated Tribute to the Luftwaffe’s “Star of Africa” by Robert Tate. Schiffer Publishing (http://www.schifferbooks.com/newschiffer), 4880 Lower Valley Road, Atglen, Pennsylvania 19310, 2008, 224 pages, $49.95 (hardcover).

Luftwaffe fighter ace Hans-Joachim Marseille is by any measure a compelling figure. In a combat career lasting barely two years, he was credited with shooting down 158 British and Commonwealth aircraft. Marseille’s reputation was enhanced by his legendary skill: his victories required an average of only 15 rounds of ammunition, and on many occasions he scored multiple “kills” in a single sortie. All who saw him in combat agree that he was a phenomenal marksman, a uniquely gifted pilot, and a genuine “character.” He achieved most of his success in the desert campaign in North Africa, in many ways a “clean” war far removed from the atrocities of the Eastern Front. By some accounts, Marseille fought his war with chivalry, personally delivering word of the fate of downed Allied pilots to enemy airfields and refusing to fire at enemy aviators floating helplessly in their parachutes. He also seemed to care little for National Socialist ideology, a fact reflected in his taste for swing music and his befriending a black man. Finally, he died unbeaten by the enemy—while bailing out of a malfunctioning aircraft, he was struck by the tailplane.

Robert Tate, a retired Air Force officer and current airline pilot, has drawn upon a lifelong fascination with Marseille to produce this lavishly illustrated volume. Tate does not duplicate the narrative information contained in previous Marseille biographies and offers little treatment of the ace’s early life or family history. Rather, he concentrates on Marseille’s North African service with fighter wing Jagdgeschwader 27—his tactics, aerial victories, personal and professional qualities, and the assessments of those who flew with and against him.

The book’s graphic and production values are a major part of its appeal. The photograph selection and reproduction are outstanding. Tate has tracked down items from public and private collections worldwide, using them to document thoroughly Marseille’s brief and spectacular career in North Africa. Especially striking are photos of a combat-stressed, prematurely aged 22-year-old Marseille, taken the day before his death. Newspaper and magazine items, as well as vintage postcards, demonstrate how the German propaganda machine elevated aces like Marseille to celebrity status.

With regard to faults, the book is not based on any major new documentary evidence. In fairness to Tate, some of this is unavoidable—Marseille himself seems to have left no writings. This consummate aerial tactician evidently never penned a tactics manual or set of rules along the lines of the “Dicta,” by World War I ace Oswald Boelcke. In addition, the surviving Luftwaffe records related to Marseille are fragmentary. The author does draw interesting information from some of Marseille’s comrades and acquaintances although much of it comes from a comprehensive review of English-language accounts and memoirs. More focused editing of the book would have removed some of the repetitive, verbatim use of quoted material from these sources. More surprisingly, Tate does not refer to some of the standard sources on the subject, most notably Karl Gundelach’s classic history of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean. Neither does he seem to have consulted British or American official sources, published or unpublished. It would be interesting to see what (for example) Royal Air Force air intelligence reported about Marseille’s accomplishments.

These criticisms aside, this book has much to interest students of aerial warfare. Tate offers a cogent commentary on fighter tactics, some of which have changed little since Marseille’s day. Although the treatment of Marseille is generally positive, Tate brings some critical analysis to bear on subjects ranging from the veracity of Marseille’s victory tally to the lack of strategic success that accompanied the ace’s tactical exploits. He rejects the notion that Marseille’s successes were the result of his being pitted against inferior adversaries. The author also makes some judicious and intriguing observations about Marseille’s association with the Berlin “counterculture” (such as it was) that enjoyed jazz music and flouted authority. On the whole, Hans-Joachim Marseille is a well-constructed book that will interest students of the Luftwaffe, fighter tactics, and World War II.

Dr. Richard R. Muller
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

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The War Managers, 30th anniversary edition, by Douglas Kinnard. Naval Institute Press (http://www.usni.org/navalinstitutepress/index.asp), 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5034, 2007, 228 pages, $19.95 (softcover).

Even in the short time between the US withdrawal from Vietnam and the fall of the South to Northern forces, attempts to understand what went wrong had already begun. Among the more notable examinations of the way the war unfolded was Brig Gen Douglas Kinnard’s 1974 survey of US general officers who served in Vietnam, the findings of which are the basis for The War Managers. Now reissued in paperback by the Naval Institute Press, the work deserves examination by all who would lead forces into war.

The author retired in 1970 as a brigadier general after a final tour as chief of staff to a major command in Vietnam. The work rests on a questionnaire he sent to all 173 generals active in the US effort there, 70 percent of whom responded. Not surprising in hindsight, the results are remarkably on target, given the nearness to the event. Most dismaying is the finding that the generals overwhelmingly agree that they had little grasp of their purpose and that their troops had even less. The war was not so much mishandled—most of the questions about military aspects elicited reasonably favorable responses—as it was micromanaged and directionless. Even the caliber of the forces went unchallenged, an assessment that soon gave way to the hollow force and a long, expensive effort to rebuild a military capable of avoiding the catastrophic collapse that the late-war Army suffered.

Chapters deal with war aims, conduct of the war, advisory and pacification efforts, composition of the American force, ending of the war, and the survey. Within these headings lie sections on strategy and tactics, rules of engagement, command and control, mobilization of the reserves, relations with the media, the Vietnamese military, and more. The work also contains a short section on the implications of this narrow study for a broader world. Appendices include the questionnaire, along with a breakout of results; a statistical analysis designed to determine whether the author confirmed his hypotheses; and a listing of all commanding generals between 1965 and 1972. The short preface to the new edition contains a sampling of reactions that the original volume generated.

Kinnard does not merely reproduce the survey findings although the work contains the complete questionnaire and tabulated results for each answer. He also provides a good political and military narrative of the war itself—an overview that holds up reasonably well in competition with works generated by the subsequent 30 years of additional research and analysis on the topic. Moreover, for a study of the failure in Vietnam, it has the virtue of being relatively short. Kinnard places the questionnaire answers squarely into context, fleshing out the percentages with pertinent remarks from the generals who chose to go beyond the simple multiple-choice answer.

As an interesting sidelight, Kinnard’s profile of the generals is quite revealing. All of them belonged to the same generation, born between 1910 and 1926. Most, but not all, graduated from college—about half from the US Military Academy at West Point. Almost all were married, averaging 25 years in the service. And, naturally, they were all white, male, and predominantly Protestant. About half had qualified for airborne duty, 60 percent having infantry backgrounds. Service in Vietnam earned a promotion for each of them. Given the marked similarity of backgrounds, their divergences on the nature of the war are remarkable. More remarkable is how the homogeneity of the 1970s, nonreflective of the military of the era, has given way to diversity in the current officer corps, including the generals—diversity that matches that of the enlisted men and women.

Readers will find The War Managers accessible and easy to navigate—almost hard to put down. Granted, it is a snapshot of another time, but insofar as it dispels the myth that leaders are of one mind and voice, it is both timeless and timely. The 30th anniversary edition adds little to the original, but the new preface does offer a nice touch to an interesting book.

Dr. John H. Barnhill
Houston, Texas

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The Star Wars Enigma: Behind the Scenes of the Cold War Race for Missile Defense by Nigel Hey. Potomac Books (http://www.potomacbooksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2006, 288 pages, $22.36 (hardcover), $15.16 (softcover.)

In today’s international struggle against terrorism and insurgency, the Cold War can sometimes feel like ancient history. It was a completely different conflict of near-perfect symmetry that locked the globe in a strategic stalemate—a stalemate threatened by Pres. Ronald Reagan’s announcement of a plan to protect the United States and its allies against a Soviet nuclear attack without having to rely on the deterrent of a counterstrike. In The Star Wars Enigma, Nigel Hey provides a vivid historical account of the politics and science that fueled President Reagan’s vision of a world free from the threat of nuclear war. He traces the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) from scientific theory and debate to its crescendo as one of the defining political issues at the end of the Cold War.

The Star Wars Enigma attempts to illuminate two key questions surrounding President Reagan’s SDI: (1) Was a space-based shield from nuclear attack technologically possible? (2) Did it really matter if it would work or not, or was the threat of “Star Wars” enough to attain US political objectives? Hey cites scores of scientists and administrative officials from both the United States and Soviet Union who believed that such a system was not possible in our generation. He also reveals that the Soviets had such high regard for American ingenuity and technology, demonstrated in the Manhattan and Apollo projects, that they could not risk ignoring the threat of an impenetrable nuclear shield over their enemies. The book rightly does not attempt to answer the first question; it simply shares the thoughts of scientists and leaders who were there. The book answers the second question in context. Many of the author’s sources thought that the United States intended the SDI as a political tool to pressure the Soviet economy into collapse; others saw it as a legitimate technology program aimed at defending the nation. In the end, it did not really matter. The book reveals that Soviet leaders considered the SDI a vivid threat to the balance of power, adding another layer of complexity to their mounting domestic troubles.

In The Star Wars Enigma, Hey does not attempt to challenge any of the conventional wisdom surrounding the SDI or its impact on the Cold War. He does, however, walk the reader through the history of space-based missile defense in an entertaining and nontechnical manner. The book focuses on the blurry line between politics and technology, but Hey manages to throw in some cloak-and-dagger vignettes (e.g., murder and bombings of SDI contractors in Europe, p. 181) that highlight the SDI as more than simply a technical challenge. Further insights into the people and personalities involved add a human context to the SDI, reminding the reader that the fear of nuclear war was omnipresent in the 1980s. In telling the story, Hey draws on his associations with many of the key scientific players in the SDI from his time as a senior administrator at Sandia National Laboratories. He fills in the rest of the details by means of thorough research of the literature and media as well as one-on-one interviews with scientists and decision makers from the United States and former Soviet Union.

Today, one finds the remnants of the SDI in the Missile Defense Agency and its systems for national missile defense (NMD). Although space-based lasers no longer represent the central technology, much of the current developmental system has its roots in the SDI. The Star Wars Enigma is a worthwhile read for anyone in the Air Force or NMD community who seeks a concise, entertaining, and accessible account of the SDI saga and its contributions to our current effort.

Maj Eric J. Kolb, USAF
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues by Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson. RAND Corporation (http://www.rand.org/publications/index.html), 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138, 2007, 276 pages, $31.50 (softcover). Available free from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG646.pdf.

The United States overthrew the Taliban and Baathist regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, believing that the populations of both countries would smoothly transition to democratic governments. Misconceptions and missteps in the aftermath of those successful military operations allowed for the creation of environments conducive to the growth of insurgencies and the introduction of terrorist activities against the populations and military forces alike. We found it tough going to stabilize both countries so their people could build functioning governments.

By 2004 the US government had begun a comprehensive study of the stabilization process. For its part, the Army engaged RAND’s Arroyo Center to examine the issue. The report of that study, Preparing the Army for Stability Operations, explains the construct of such operations as a US government effort in which the Army has a significant, perhaps the most significant, part—but only a part, nonetheless. It shows that the Department of State has regulatory responsibility as the lead government agency in stability operations and recognizes that the Army cannot simply assume that State or any other agency can or will rise to the requirements inherent in that responsibility. Since the Army is the preeminent element of US land power (operating on the medium where forces establish stability) in an environment in which failure is not acceptable, the Army must proceed as if it will have sole responsibility for establishing stability after the completion of military operations.

After an in-depth explanation of the study construct, the book dissects the requirements for interagency cooperation in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations, including a look at Army doctrine. That examination reveals three main insights regarding tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); gaps and seams in the current doctrine; adjustments required in the Army Universal Task List (AUTL) and in definitions of Army tactical tasks (ATT). (Like this paragraph, the book is full of acronyms that will quickly confuse all but the most studious readers. Fortunately, the authors include a list of abbreviations for easy reference.)

The study offers 56 specific recommendations in three categories: (1) that the Army serve as the medium in defining the roles and missions of various agencies engaged in stabilization missions; (2) that the Army use its experience with provincial reconstruction teams to advise other agencies in the establishment of advance civilian teams; and (3) that decision makers consult the study’s list of Army doctrinal recommendations.

Preparing the Army for Stability Operations serves as an excellent adjunct to the recently published (October 2008) Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, and other doctrinal publications. However, unlike the actual doctrinal manuals, this is not a how-to book on stability operations but a breakdown of those operations as a system. Non-Army readers many find themselves feeling left out, given the study’s unabashedly Army-centric slant. However, considering that every soldier, no matter what service, may one day pursue the stability mission as part of a joint/combined team, this book should find a wide audience.

CSM James Clifford, USA, Retired
McDonough, Georgia

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Educing Information: Interrogation—Science and Art: Foundations for the Future, Phase 1 Report, by the Intelligence Science Board. Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence College Press (http://www.dia.mil/college/press.htm), Washington, DC 20340-5100, 2006, 339 pages. Available free from http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf.

Everybody agrees that information is power. In the global war on terror, a particularly passionate, continuing debate concerns a specific form of information gathering: the interrogation. One can express the essence of that debate with the question, What means of securing important, time-sensitive information from an uncooperative individual is both effective and acceptable? (Indeed, the single, subconscious theme found throughout the book deals with what must be done to prevent another Abu Ghraib.) More a call to action for the organized accumulation of vital data than a repository of concrete answers, Educing Information begins a laborious process to address that question.

The book consists of a series of 10 essays by nine authors, loosely organized into three subject areas: an overview of interrogation techniques and procedures, the status of current interrogation training, and recommendations for future research. Each author, handpicked by the Intelligence Science Board for his or her particular expertise on the subject, boasts considerable doctoral-level experience in behavioral science, psychology, neuroscience, and negotiation theory. The individual essays not only add substantial value to the collection as a whole but also can stand alone as a source of detailed information on their particular subjects.

Two messages clearly resonate in each piece. First, using torture to procure information is ineffective, often produces erroneous data, and is not worth the political price paid by a democratic government. Second, we need much more research to discover efficient, accurate, and morally acceptable means of interrogation.

Despite the existence of an Army manual that addresses interrogation tactics, techniques, and procedures, the book’s authors believe that most interrogation specialists learn predominantly from anecdotal advice and personal experience—one of the major criticisms of current interrogation operations. Two essays explore training programs of domestic police forces as well as programs in the United Kingdom, the latter described as anemic and of dubious worth to professionals responsible for questioning criminal suspects. Clearly, such a program does not hold the answer to the question under study.

The most interesting part of this collection deals with the incorporation of negotiation theory within the process of interrogation. Viewing such questioning as a series of complex negotiations opens up a robust and effective line of research. This may represent the most promising avenue of approach for further improvement.

Designed specifically for intelligence professionals, Educing Information has little value in and of itself to Air Force readers unless they have direct responsibility for interrogation operations. Politically, the book is very interesting because it offers a glimpse into the intelligence community’s first reaction to the Abu Ghraib crisis. An excellent first attempt at addressing the much-debated interrogation question, it proceeds not so much by providing guidance as by setting the table for answers.

Lt Col Christopher D. Harness, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

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The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It by David M. Toczek. Naval Institute Press (http://www.usni.org/navalinstitutepress/index.asp), 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5034, 2007, 224 pages, $19.95 (softcover).

Situated southwest of Saigon, the hamlet of Ap Bac in Tien Giang province is the site of a single-day encounter between a regiment of the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) (North Vietnam) and a division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) (South Vietnam) and its American advisors on 2 January 1963. The battle ended in an allied defeat because of the PLAF’s ability to counter the firepower of armored personnel carriers and helicopters fielded in the operation. The fact that political factors constrained the ARVN’s leadership also contributed to the outcome.

First published in 2001, 38 years after the operation, The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam is surely the definitive account of the fight. US Army major David Toczek, a professor of history at the US Military Academy (West Point), provides the reader an operational, historical narrative and tactical analysis of the battle. Divided into five chapters, arranged chronologically, the book includes a foreword by Gen William B. Rosson, former deputy commander of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The first two chapters are notable, the author providing historical background of the US Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina; the Vietnamese National Army; and the PLAF. Here, Toczek describes both the organizational and historical development, as well as political factors influencing the two opposing forces, and details the operational aspects (air mobility) in the ARVN and the role of the advisory system. Moreover, he thoroughly discusses the strategic and political framework from which the PLAF waged war.

Focusing on the battle itself, the third chapter addresses the preparations, strategic planning, cooperation, frustrations, shortcomings, and decision making under fire on both sides, followed in chapter four by an account of reactions to the battle’s aftermath by the senior officers and advisory group involved. The penultimate chapter also considers the PLAF’s notion of the battle as its victory as well as media articles and releases that followed.

Rather than treating the battle as a small-scale encounter, the fifth chapter offers the author’s conclusion about the defeat at Ap Bac, placing it in the larger context of the Vietnam conflict. He notes that the battle provided a window that could have changed America’s policy or plan for the war.

This paperback edition from Naval Institute Press coincides with the 45th anniversary of the battle. Major Toczek highlights not only its outcome and effect on the conflict in general, but also the essence of the lessons learned that have relevance to contemporary issues concerning national-security decision making and counterinsurgency—factors of interest to currently serving officers and personnel, especially those deployed in counterinsurgency operations and advisory roles. Extraordinarily researched and well written, the book includes an extensive pictorial account of key persons during the period, notes for each chapter, appendices, a substantial bibliography, and an index.

The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam will make a valuable addition to the libraries of all officers; senior noncommissioned officers; ambassadors; diplomats; historians; professors; defense, air, and naval attachés; and enthusiasts of leadership and counterinsurgency warfare. It is a commendable contribution and significant addition to the literature of the Vietnam War.

Cdr Mark R. Condeno, Philippine Coast Guard
Manila, Philippines

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Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, Volume II: 1946–2006, rev. ed., by Norman Polmar in collaboration with Minoru Genda et al. Potomac Books (http://www.potomacbooksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2008, 560 pages, $39.96 (hardcover).

Few ships are as awe inspiring as the aircraft carrier. To say “it’s big” does not do the carrier justice. The vast amount of military might contained in this one ship, let alone its size, is simply staggering. It is only appropriate that an author with a reputation as impressive as that of the aircraft carrier take on the task of revising and updating the previous edition of this book. After reading Aircraft Carriers, I can say that Norman Polmar was the right man for the job. An internationally known specialist in naval, aviation, and technical intelligence issues, with over 40 books to his credit and service as a consultant or adviser to three secretaries of the Navy and two chiefs of naval operations, Polmar comes well prepared for the task.

I found this book a very interesting coffee-table-sized historical reference with insightful analysis woven into the text. Like the ship, this soup-to-nuts compilation of aircraft carrier information is beyond “big.” Polmar has clearly done his research and performs yeoman’s work, bringing relevance to each phase of carrier operations he discusses. He ends most of the chapters with a summary that captures the major points in a few concise paragraphs.

The author’s narrative begins just after World War II ends, when US leadership begins to debate the future of the aircraft carrier in light of atomic (and, later, nuclear) weapons, the jet age, and, eventually, space technology. Polmar describes this ongoing debate over relevancy through Korea and Vietnam, well into the Reagan presidency. Not surprisingly, each time a crisis flares up, the American leadership first asks, “Where are the carriers?”

Especially interesting are the chapters on foreign navies’ carrier investments and ventures, including an entire section on the Falklands War, which summarizes very well the British experience with expeditionary war in the late twentieth century. Also insightful was the extended chapter on the Soviet Navy during the tenure of the Soviet Union.

The second volume of Aircraft Carriers is a magnificent piece of research. The chapters guide readers through naval history by putting the aircraft carrier into context with the crises of the times. As a historical text, this is a good read, with the tables and pictures providing color commentary that accompanies the text. The summaries offer a concise wrap-up of the chapters, leading the reader smoothly into the following chapter. In all, I highly recommend this book to Airmen—if for no other reason than to gain a professional awareness of our flying brethren in the Navy.

Maj Paul Niesen, USAF, Retired
Scott AFB, Illinois

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Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century by P. W. Singer. Penguin Press (http://us.penguingroup.com), 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014-3657, 2009, 400 pages, $29.95 (hardcover).

Wired for War is a world away from P. W. Singer’s previous book Children at War, in which he proposed ways to halt such a horrible practice. This latest venture, a study into the use of robotics in combat, could be taken as futuristic, with Singer enticing his readers to be swept up by the excitement of using advanced technology on and over the battlefield—or on and under water. The author points out early on that many robot systems are already working the battlefields of today’s conflicts. Filling a market need, they appear in ever-growing numbers that could equal those operating in domestic service and industry.

It would be wrong to say that this is a book purely for the military reader although this audience will benefit from the knowledge contained within its pages. The text is written for a far wider readership, raising many important moral and ethical conundrums that need to be addressed and solved. For younger servicemen and -women, who as children played with Transformers, this book amplifies what they already know—that robotic platforms will play an increasingly important part in future military operations. More senior military readers may well learn that a new facet of war is already fast approaching, removing preconceived ideas of how soldiers should close with and kill the enemy.

My only criticism concerns Singer’s propensity to concentrate on just a few commercial members of the military-robotics community. Those experienced in this field understand that no robot can complete all of the required missions. We currently have in service many different robotic platforms, made by a range of producers, that perform unsung, important duties each and every day. To be fair, Singer correctly states that his named robotic platforms have already kept servicemen out of harm’s way and have undoubtedly saved many lives.

Unlike Isaac Asimov, whose rules for robots prevented them from causing harm to humans, Singer confirms that real robotic platforms of the near future have a vast array of missions, many of which can inflict great damage upon an adversary. Singer points out that changing who fights at the fundamental level transforms the very agent of war (p. 156). No one can deny that posthuman warfare is an intriguing thought. The psychology of war may also change, and Singer examines the effect of losing moral considerations, when robotic warriors in contact with the enemy and their distanced operators no longer experience fear, shock, or anger (p. 262). Without these moral inputs, how do we halt an advance? Or how do entrenched forces conclude that to fight on is beyond reckless? How, indeed, can we win battles?

Singer broadens his discussion a few pages further on (p. 268). If technology aids overconfidence and if nations have gone to war because of overconfidence, then unmanned warfare could become a favored, regular option for those intent on conflict. We could see an increase in the number of tactical engagements between technologically capable nations. Terrorist organizations could also buy and use their own robotic machines, and any military planner will have to factor in such use against our forces in the future.

Singer describes a range of robot capabilities, from those totally controlled by an operator to preprogrammed systems that operate by means of artificial intelligence. What are the moral implications when technologically advanced nations use such systems to fight the enemy? A “sense of mutuality” (p. 365) helps commanders consider moral issues. As man and machine become more separated by distance and as robot systems are programmed to function autonomously, a danger exists that associated moral considerations will not get the attention they need. Singer alludes to this (p. 366) but does not really develop his argument any further although it merits greater discussion. If we can accept the notion that robot versus man is on course to happen, then we should be ready to debate the implications of such confrontations in order to probe and understand the associated moral implications.

When machines kill, what is the supporting legality behind such actions? Singer tackles this aspect well (chap. 22), exposing the need for lawyers to become an increasingly integral part of military operations (p. 327). The presence of lawyers in forward operating locations is now a fact of life in current operations. Increasing the use of unmanned lethal platforms may well demand space for lawyers alongside the distanced cubicle warriors.

As the supporting technology of robotics expands and we make increasing use of artificial intelligence, the conflicting ethics of using these platforms needs critical deliberation and assessment. Maybe we need to program robotic systems with rules of engagement that reflect the Law of Armed Conflict. Perhaps, Singer muses, we need to introduce a “human impact statement” (p. 361) that addresses this new class of “killing machine,” with its associated ethics and potential for social infringements.

Wired for War is not just about the effect of using robots in conflict. It paints a far broader canvas of how technology will cause us to question and ultimately change our operating procedures. The book highlights the need to understand the moral and ethical implications of using such weapons. Given that the use of robotic systems is already upon us, Singer raises a myriad of associated concerns that military, political, and legal minds need to address.

Wing Cdr John M. Shackell, RAF, Retired
San Antonio, Texas

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Astronautics: A Historical Perspective of Mankind’s Efforts to Conquer the Cosmos, Book 1; Dawn of the Space Age, Book 2, To the Moon and Towards the Future by Ted Spitzmiller. Apogee Books / Collectors Guide Publishing (http://www.apogeebooks.com), 1440 Graham’s Lane, Unit no. 2, Burlington, Ontario L7S 1W3, Canada, 2006/2007, 232/336 pages, $24.95/$25.95 (softcover).

The tally for publications in Apogee Books’ Space Series now amounts to several dozen, including Ted Spitzmiller’s two-volume set titled Astronautics. To celebrate the 50th anniversary of Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite, Spitzmiller has attempted to synthesize a concise, encyclopedic history of rocketry and spaceflight. In 39 chapters, each one designed to give readers “a relatively complete understanding of a special interest area without the need to ferret information from multiple chapters” (p. 9), he chronicles humankind’s exploration of space from Copernicus in the early sixteenth century to exotic new forms of spacecraft propulsion for interplanetary voyages in the twenty-first century. The chapters in book 1 cover individual pioneers, early rocket societies, Peenemünde and the V-2, rocket planes, planning for an Earth satellite, military spy satellites, harnessing liquid hydrogen, piloted spaceflight, planetary exploration, and more. Chapters in book 2 include the race to the moon, the space shuttle, space stations, expendable booster development, the search for extraterrestrial life, deep-space missions, and competitive partnering in space.

Spitzmiller eschews primary documentation, except for a few memoirs, and relies almost exclusively on biographies, histories, and Web sites as source material. He characterizes his sources as typically sacrificing scope and presenting an overwhelming level of technical detail. Consequently, he seeks in Astronautics “to simplify and clarify technology, politics, and events to make them easier to comprehend” (p. 9). His goal is commendable and, grammatically and stylistically, he achieves it. The word picture he paints of Russia’s Sputnik launch will grip most readers, and his telling of the Apollo 13 saga will captivate them.

Unfortunately, in an attempt to significantly broaden the scope of his narrative, Spitzmiller too often sacrifices scientific, technical, and historical accuracy or completeness. The most surprising example of scientific inaccuracy in Astronautics is his apparent misunderstanding of Newton’s third law of motion: for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. He explains that “the action-reaction of the exhaust gases was pushing against the inside of the rocket motor to provide the propulsive force” (p. 19). Toward the end of book 2, Spitzmiller perpetuates this inaccuracy when he says that “expanding combustion” in a ramjet engine “ ‘pushes’ (Newton’s third law) against the ‘wall’ of incoming air to provide thrust” (p. 472) and, again, that a spacecraft powered by a mass driver would have “to have a significant quantity of some material to react against” (p. 473).

Historical accuracy also suffers in these volumes. Spitzmiller describes the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory’s successful solid-propellant jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) experimentation under Air Corps contract in 1941, explaining that “it would be two more years before a liquid-propellant rocket engine, constructed by the Aerojet General Corporation, was tested in a Consolidated Aircraft Co. flying boat on San Diego Bay” (p. 33). He never mentions that the liquid-propellant JATO units resulted from US Navy experimentation led by Robert C. Truax and Robert H. Goddard. Similarly, he acknowledges the contribution of the Army Air Forces and Project RAND in early 1946, which studied the feasibility of an Earth-circling spaceship, without once mentioning the manned spacecraft proposal by US Navy lieutenant Robert Haviland and Cdr Harvey Hall in August 1945 or the Navy’s subsequent establishment in October 1945 of a Committee for Evaluating the Feasibility of Space Rocketry. As for the history of military communication satellites, Spitzmiller credits the US Army Signal Corps, explaining that “Courier was a prototype for a more advanced military satellite communications project known as Advent which placed much larger satellites in geosynchronous orbits several years later” (p. 155). Apparently, he does not understand that the Army’s Advent program failed and, consequently, that the Air Force launched the world’s first dedicated military communication satellite—operationally known as the Initial Defense Satellite Communications System—in 1968. Other misstatements, incomplete explanations, or oversights occur throughout Astronautics.

These volumes might disappoint readers, even those with only a basic knowledge of space history, because blatant errors in spelling mar the narrative from beginning to end. From “mils” instead of “miles” (p. 37) to “essentailly” instead of “essentially” (p. 408), the errors detract from the quality of Spitzmiller’s presentation. Furthermore, seeing “Maxime Faggot” instead of “Maxime Faget” (p. 335), “Neal Armstrong” instead of “Neil Armstrong” (p. 348), “Robinson Caruso” instead of “Robinson Crusoe” (p. 476), and “Caiden, Martin” instead of “Caidin, Martin” (p. 481, bibliography) might prompt readers to question how much attention the author, or his copy editor, paid to factual details.

As much as one might try to focus on positive attributes and overlook shortfalls in Astronautics, obstacles ranging from typographical errors to substantive inaccuracies tend to obscure the brilliance of Spitzmiller’s narrative style. Perhaps a reprinted version—with errors corrected, inaccuracies clarified, and oversights covered—might render these volumes worthy of consideration for classroom use or a prominent place on collectors’ bookshelves.

Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant
Peterson AFB, Colorado

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America’s Army: A Model for Interagency Effectiveness by Brig Gen Zeb B. Bradford Jr., USA, Retired, and Lt Gen Frederic J. Brown, USA, Retired, PhD. Praeger Security International, Greenwood Publishing Group (http://psi.praeger.com), 88 Post Road West, P.O. Box 5007, Westport, Connecticut 06881-5007, 2008, 268 pages, $49.95 (hardcover).

America’s Army presents an argument for utilizing the US Army as a model of effectiveness for improving the interagency process among all levels of government, allies and coalitions, and nongovernmental organizations and industry. The authors use the Army’s current organizational transition and evolution to suggest “lessons learned” to develop policy both vertically and horizontally, candidly admitting a land-power perspective as they develop their thesis. They spend considerable time detailing major tenets of the Army Game Plan for the future and advocate increased attention and expansion of resources to meet the Army’s needs.

Generals Bradford and Brown bring much expertise to their subject, having authored an earlier work, The U.S. Army in Transition (1973)—a post-Vietnam review of Army organization and culture. Both have extensive command-and-staff experience through virtually all levels of the military establishment.

The book details the composition of the Total Army (active and reserve components as well as civilian), describing the history and relationship of the Army and the citizenry of the country. Making substantial use of jargon and acronyms that may give the casual reader difficulty, the volume examines in depth the concept of the Long War, as well as ways the Army has adapted, and proposes how it should evolve in the future. The authors present strong arguments for expansion of the Army’s leadership-and-development model for building teams of leaders. In addition to the Army Game Plan and its imperatives, they closely examine the Army Force Generation Model and expend considerable effort in describing Army Knowledge Management Efforts, including the Battle Command Knowledge System, which integrates structured professional forums, knowledge nets, and action teams. Generals Bradford and Brown not only cover defense of the homeland throughout their book but also devote an entire chapter to the subject. Furthermore, they emphasize the Army’s history and linkage to state and local authorities, most notably with the Army National Guard and Reserve forces, and discuss responses to weapons of mass destruction as well as disaster scenarios.

Emphasizing the success of the Army’s evolution to meet the national-security challenges of the Long War and rapid globalization, America’s Army does not spend much time on failures and less-than-effective accomplishments. When the authors do discuss clear failures, they attribute these misfortunes to a lack of leadership within the Army (e.g., Walter Reed, p. 234, note 1) or a combination of inadequate training and a failure of leadership (e.g., Abu Ghraib, pp. 122–24). In the less-than-effective category (e.g., difficulties with nation building and occupation following the liberation of Iraq), the generals lay the bulk of responsibility on the decisions of civilian leadership (p. 202) and incorrect planning assumptions.

They assert that, ultimately, land power is the decisive component in virtually any national-security challenge, recognizing the need for jointness in most operations but relegating air and sea power to supporting or transitory roles. Declaring that “history is replete with examples of overestimating the effects of bombardment and air strikes on an enemy’s will to resist” (p. 34), Generals Bradford and Brown cite the failure of the Israeli Defense Forces to break the power and will of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon as the latest example of this overestimation. Curiously, they make no mention of Operation Allied Force until much later in the book, there asserting that “America’s Army has been under-resourced for years by two consecutive administrations mesmerized by the lure of high technology permitting quick, cheap victory—Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq—through top-down net-centric use of firepower—commonly air power” (p. 180). Additionally, in the preface, the authors refer to James Locher’s leadership in the bipartisan Project on National Security but don’t tie any of their propositions to the project’s call for national-security reform.

America’s Army is relevant to the Air Force community insofar as it details, in great depth, the perspective of land-power advocates in the national-security arena. It is important that airpower advocates understand such a perspective in the competition for resources and ideas.  

Col Ken Backes, USAF
Hoover Institution, Stanford, California

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Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities by Terrence K. Kelly, Ellen E. Tunstall, Thomas S. Szayna, and Deanna Weber Prine. RAND Corporation (http://www.rand.org/publications/index.html), 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138, 2008, 130 pages, $29.00 (softcover). Available free from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG580.pdf.

How should the US government handle civilian staffing for reconstruction operations? The authors seek to answer this question in light of US involvement in contingency operations in the recent past, utilizing the example of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq. Two of the book’s authors, who served as members of the CPA, draw on personal experience in their assessments and recommendations. In light of their experience and research, the authors do not believe that the US government’s current human-resources infrastructure enables effective civilian staffing.

Composing this work as part of a RAND Corporation research project, the authors seek to analyze how civilian staffing has occurred in the past as well as develop a road map for more effective staffing in future stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. They contend that the methods used for civilian staffing proved less than effective and did not create a so-called A-Team in Iraq, a team comprised of first-rate talent and experience.

The authors see a variety of problems at the root of the failure to field such a team. One fundamental issue lies in the stereotypically slow speed of the federal government to hire civilian employees, both from within its ranks (internal applicants) and from outside the federal pool (external applicants). However, institutional inertia vis-à-vis civilian hiring does not act as the sole villain. They cite a number of other interrelated problems, including differences in compensation from agency to agency, home agencies blocking deployments of their employees to support their own operations, unwillingness or reluctance (on the part of both the employee and the home agency) to have employees deploy for extended periods of time, and the difficulty of finding employees to fill particular niche positions demanding expertise as well as a suitable background in language and culture.

There lies a way ahead. The authors see several possibilities for better results in future operations, while acknowledging the frustration of trying to slice through the proverbial red tape. One suggestion with possible merit concerns creation of a by-name civilian reserve—a pool of employees sortable by skills and expertise. Administered within the US State Department, since it would likely serve as the lead agency for SSTR operations, the list would stand as a ready supply of willing participants to fill needed vacancies. The authors also surmise that centralizing the administration of deployed civilians within one agency could generate more enthusiasm for deployment insofar as it could possibly create equities in compensation and reduce cross-agency idiosyncrasies. Finally, promoting deployment as a positive career step could likely attract more and better talent. Although the authors don’t see any one step as a magic bullet, they predict that institutional change could foster improvement.

Overall, Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing has fairly narrow utility. It serves neither as a primer on civilian staffing in any sense of the word nor as any kind of assessment of operations in the global war on terror, from either a military or civil standpoint. Readers will find this work useful if they are interested in research within the civil service. Though readable, it is brief and written from a fairly technical human-resources perspective.

David J. Schepp, Seventh Air Force Historian
Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea

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Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.