Published: 1 September 2008
Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2008

The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944 by Lt Col Will Irwin, USA, Retired. Public Affairs (http://www.publicaffairsbooks.com), 250 West 57th Street, Suite 1321, New York, New York 10107, 2005, 352 pages, $26.95 (hardcover); 2006, 352 pages, $14.95 (softcover).

Special operations forces have come in for attention since they spearheaded the successful invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Although secrecy stunts any analysis of current operations, historical investigation remains unfettered, as reflected in Will Irwin’s contribution of an account of the Jedburgh operations in France in 1944. The Jedburghs—teams of uniformed specialists dropped into enemy territory to coordinate with resistance groups in advance of major operations—offer ready parallels to Afghanistan, making them an attractive case study. Readers have their choice of new books by Colin Beavan and Roger Ford as well as Irwin’s, the latter offering a straightforward history of the Jedburgh teams from their founding, through recruitment and training, to their deployment in France, starting in June 1944.

The book addresses the establishment of Special Forces Headquarters in the United Kingdom as well as the Special Projects Operations Center (SPOC) for the Mediterranean theater but devotes most of its attention to the combat service of these Franco-Anglo-American teams. Irwin focuses on teams dropped in advance of the landings for Operations Overlord and Dragoon, omitting Dutch operations, and concludes with the termination of Jedburgh activity in Northwest Europe on 13 October as well as the closing of the SPOC on 12 September. Although the author makes extensive use of documents from the Office of Strategic Services and personal testimony, many readers will be disappointed because he raises important questions but then leaves them unanswered. Irwin mentions activities of the British Special Air Service in Normandy and special-operations executive agents but fails to explain their relation to and coordination with the Jedburghs. The insertion of Jedburghs occurred exclusively by air, but the text notes only that 4,000 sorties dropped 6,000 tons of supplies between July and September. One must look elsewhere for the contribution of units like the famous “Carpetbaggers” of the 801st Bomb Group. In general, the book relates the story of the Jedburghs without reference to any of the major or minor controversies in the professional or scholarly fields.

The overwhelming focus of The Jedburghs on the US part in the enterprise and its reliance on American sources further limit the book’s utility. Irwin’s evaluation of the program provides a good example. Based mainly on the praise heaped on special forces by Allied leaders, the author supposes that the Jedburghs did indeed disrupt enemy movements to the beachheads. However, US sources cannot judge the impact on German operations. Only German sources can do this, and they were not consulted. Furthermore, the author’s breezy style, full of asides on the length of the Loire and the soils best suited to the Muscadet grape, will annoy some readers. For deeper insights, historians and military professionals will have to look to the US Army’s official history or collections of published documents. Although the prize for writing the definitive study of the Jedburghs remains unclaimed, this will not prevent interested general readers from enjoying this book, which offers a lively introduction to one the most important ventures of special forces during the Second World War.

Dr. Matthew R. Schwonek
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.