Document created: 1 March 06
Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2006

The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush by Dale R. Herspring. University Press of Kansas (http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu), 2502 Westbrooke Circle, Lawrence, Kansas 66045-4444, 2005, 512 pages, $45.00 (hardcover).

In this timely book, Dale Herspring—professor of political science at Kansas State University and a 32-year veteran of the US Navy—attempts to redress what he considers an imbalance in past scholarship on civil-military relations in the United States. As Herspring notes, he intends to examine those relations from the vantage point of individuals who are putatively “controlled”—senior military officers—versus the more common scholarly focus on the “controllers”—civilian policy makers. He offers a relatively simple thesis: “The greater the degree to which presidential leadership style coincides with and respects prevailing service/military culture, the less will be the degree of conflict. Similarly, the greater the degree to which presidential leadership style does not provide leadership and clashes with the prevailing military culture, the greater will be the probability and intensity of conflict” (p. 2). Herspring further proposes that the military prefers a certain type of presidential leadership style, which consists of “strong political leadership” but in consultation with military leaders. He contends that the military will evaluate a president’s leadership based on its concurrence with military culture on four key issues: use of force; roles, missions, and resources; personnel policies; and responsibility and honor (pp. 15–17).

In chapters 2–13, Herspring surveys every presidential administration from that of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the current incumbent, George W. Bush. He devotes a chapter to summarizing and assessing each president’s leadership style (spending considerable time on key officials like the secretary of defense) and then details relevant cases in that administration focusing on conflict, or the lack of it, between the civilian and military leadership. He concludes each of the 12 chapters by noting what “violations” of service/military culture transpired and what changes in service/military culture may have occurred. The last is an important point for the author as he contends that the military has evolved from an apolitical actor prior to World War II to a “bureaucratic interest group” (p. 1), with increasingly important links to Congress and other groups. Nevertheless, Herspring still concludes that the military is a profession with important cultural viewpoints that presidents ignore or insult at their peril. That is a central theme, to which he returns in his concluding chapter where he ranks each administration’s relations comparatively, from “high” to “moderate” to “minimal” levels of conflict (p. 409).

How well does Herspring succeed in establishing his thesis? On the whole, he does an admirable job of encapsulating each administration’s relationship with senior military officers through use of a wide variety of sources, all of which are extensively footnoted. (However, one might question why Herspring relies essentially on secondary sources when personal interviews would seem entirely appropriate and valuable for a book of this scope.) Case studies detailed for each administration logically demonstrate why conflict occurred between civilian and military leaders. In fact, there are really no unusual findings here for anyone familiar with this recent history, from the high-conflict administration of Lyndon Johnson to the minimal conflict found in the Ronald Reagan administration. That senior military leaders would resent civilian interference in perceived internal military matters, or would resent being shown a lack of respect or being lied to, is not surprising.

Since Herspring deals with such a long period of time and so many different administrations and personalities, he is often sketchy and may generalize unfairly at points, such as his labeling Harry Truman an “indecisive” president (p. 52). More troubling, however, is the impression that the author may be conflating his own perspective with that of senior military leaders. To be fair, Herspring does explicitly note that he was inspired to write this book partly because he felt that the perspective of those in uniform, like himself, would be useful (p. xii) and that he derived his thesis from both his own military career and academic studies (p. 432, footnote 24). The question is how much this may color his objectivity—as the chapter on the Johnson administration reveals, with its clear contempt and scorn not only for “an elitist like the know-it-all [Robert] McNamara” (p. 192), but also the civilian “Whiz Kids,” a term Herspring employs deliberately and repeatedly. One also wonders whether his personal views could have blinded him to the logical inconsistencies of castigating Bill Clinton for his failure to accept responsibility and remaining detached from military operations (pp. 344–75), whereas he praises George W. Bush for “remaining above the fray” (p. 404), blaming postinvasion problems in Iraq and the “upheaval” in civil-military relations (p. 378) specifically on Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (p. 405).

In a policy-and-process-centered work such as this one, probably the most important contribution concerns the implications for US military and civilian leaders. In fact, one finds few for the military, as Herspring is determined to provide lessons specifically for the civilian leadership. The book’s conclusion neatly captures those lessons: “By leaving as much responsibility as possible to the Chiefs, listening to them, and showing them as much respect as possible, the president will minimize conflict and improve his relationship with the Chiefs” (p. 426). Yet as Herspring’s own cases demonstrate, the question of what is legitimately a military versus a civilian responsibility is often precisely the issue in dispute. Where is that distinct dividing line between strategic (civilian) and operational (military) levels, particularly in today’s complex environment of terrorism, insurgency, and counterinsurgency? This problem is all too familiar to Airmen, as air operations in the post–Cold War period have demonstrated. Unhappily, it promises to remain a central problem for our times.

Dr. Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.