Document created: 4 September 03
Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2003

The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers by Ryan C. Hendrickson. Vanderbilt University Press (http://www.vanderbilt. edu/vupress/index.html), VU Station B 351813, Nashville, Tennessee 37235-1813, 2002, 240 pages, $49.95 (hardcover), $24.95 (softcover).

Ryan Hendrickson’s The Clinton Wars provides outstanding information about presidential versus congressional war powers. Every president from Truman on has claimed constitutional authority as commander in chief to unilaterally deploy (and employ) America’s armed forces. To stem the growing threat of an imperial president, the House and Senate passed the War Powers Act of 1973: Joint Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President- also known as the War Powers Resolution (WPR).

By means of the WPR, Congress intended to reclaim the constitutionally provided war-making authority. The resolution spelled out specific requirements the president needed to meet in order to deploy American armed forces. Included were limitations on the length of deployment (subject to congressional approval) and mandatory consultation with Congress prior to deployment. Despite the passage of the WPR, presidents have continued to unilaterally deploy American armed forces, frequently with minimal (or no) consultation with Congress.

By examining six case studies, Hendrickson addresses the president’s unilateral exercise of war powers during the two terms of the Clinton presidency. The studies range from American involvement in Somalia to Operation Noble Anvil over Kosovo. They cover not only President Clinton’s perspective as commander in chief, but also the views of Congress and the framers of the Constitution. Hendrickson skillfully incorporates relevant readings that bear on whether or not WPR requirements were met.

The author’s research reveals several threads common to presidential administrations. First, public opinion about the impending conflict plays a major role- Congress just can’t seem to say no to a president who wants to deploy forces for a looming conflict that the public supports. Second, a president’s willingness to consult with Congress seems to depend upon the circumstances at hand. As was true of presidents during the 50 years preceding his administration, Clinton frequently paid little more than lip service to Congress regarding consultation. Only when the political chips were down did he earnestly build his case with congressional leaders well prior to a strike. Hendrickson effectively illustrates their willingness to cooperate with Clinton when he included them in advance discussions versus their attitude when either the president or his representatives “consulted” them mere hours before or after a strike.

The author proposes some measures to help put teeth back into the WPR but readily concedes that a Congress unwilling to put constitutional law before politics will defer to a president in the question of the execution of war powers. That said, The Clinton Wars is a great read for people who desire a better understanding of the political process behind presidential commitment of forces in low intensity conflict. It is a must-read for those who wish to closely examine the execution of war powers during the Clinton years.

Maj Paul Niesen, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.