Published: 1 September 2008
Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2008

Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker? by ­Russell A. Hart. Potomac Books (http://www.potomac booksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2006, 160 pages, $17.56 (hardcover), $11.16 (softcover).

In all probability, there will never be another war like Heinz Guderian’s. The clash of truly massive armies equipped with thousands of tanks does not seem likely in the immediate future. Thus, if air warriors are seeking practical lessons at the microlevel, such as the nitty-gritty of how to run a future tactical campaign or support it from the air, they should look elsewhere for guidance. However, if they want some general notions about the pitfalls of developing oneself for military leadership, then Russell Hart’s little book on Guderian might be a worthy read. Hart claims that though Guderian had his strong points as a leader, his fatal flaws included too much commitment to self-promotion and a failure to grasp the principles of grand strategy and strategy.

A professor working in Hawaii, Hart got his undergraduate education in the United Kingdom and did his master’s and PhD degrees at Ohio State. Highly specialized in World War II, especially in the German dimension of it, he has also written a book about the campaign in Normandy and has coauthored several others having to do with armored warfare on the Eastern Front during World War II.

According to Hart, the memory of Guderian is much inflated because he is one of those who survived World War II, living until 1954. An exceedingly industrious man, articulate in both English and French, he had translated some of the British writings on war into German. Reputed to be one of the originators of the German armies’ armored doctrine before the war, Guderian was instrumental in the campaign in France in 1940 as well as in the opening campaigns of the strike on the Soviet Union in 1941.

Guderian had written a book about armored warfare in the 1930s and then wrote one after the war that some, including Hart, considered self-serving. Hart also thinks that Guderian was unduly contemptuous of the German navy and air force and was at fault in not being able to get along with his bosses. Some others at higher levels of the Army thought he was too cozy with the Nazis—especially with Hitler. He did accept a huge gift of money from Hitler in 1942 and then took possession of a large estate in Poland, evicting the family that had owned it. According to Hart, both Guderian’s memoirs and his earlier biographies improve the truth in his favor too much; actually, he was not as deserving as he appeared.

Guderian knew of the plot to kill Hitler in July 1944; although he did not directly participate, he was cagey enough to remain far enough on the outskirts to hide his culpability and escape execution. Hitler may have had his suspicions, but he did use Guderian after that. According to Hart and others, though, Guderian at least was able to openly disagree with Hitler and live to tell about it.

One can hardly deem this short book a comprehensive biography, but it does yield some thought on the dangers of careerism and the pitfalls of “improving the truth” to get ahead or escape blame. It is well written, and the prose is engaging. Readers may want to add it to their reading list to balance out some other books that are too worshipful of the fighting abilities of the German armies during the 1940s.