Document created: 1 June 03
Air & S pace Power Journal - Summer 2003

Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy by Russell A. Hart. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. (http://www.rienner.com), 1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, Colorado 80301, 2001, 469 pages, $79.95 (hardcover).

Occasionally a book comes along that breaks new ground. Russell Hart has written a masterful account of the effectiveness of the Anglo-Canadian, American, and German forces, not only in Normandy in 1944 but also throughout the interwar and early war periods. His basic premise is that although God is still on the side of the big battalions, sound doctrine, coupled with the ability to adapt, is also key to victory. Airmen should read and study this book.

Hart begins by examining the problems each nation faced after World War I, whether it was rapid demobilization, isolationism, or fiscal or treaty constraints. Germany studied its war experiences, developed realistic doctrine, and planned for a quick and decisive war. Britain, almost bankrupt and plagued by class and service parochialism, simply drew a deep sigh of relief and pretended another war could not happen. The US Army studied its war experiences and developed a doctrine that, with few changes, helped it become the most dynamic and effective of all the Western Allies. The basis of American victory was innovation, as two examples illustrate.

First, doctrine prior to D day stressed armor concentration to break through enemy defenses and attack the rear and flanks. However, D day planners failed to anticipate the difficulties of the Normandy bocage. Tanks became easy prey for Germans on the hedgerow-constricted roads. Americans adapted by blasting breaches through hedgerows with demolition charges, allowing armor to move cross-country. Later, several divisions developed near-simultaneous solutions to this problem by welding jagged steel "teeth" to the fronts of tanks. The Shermans could then "bite" into hedgerows, creating breaches and restoring mobility to the battlefield. Moreover, innovations were not confined to individual units. The Army institutionalized its "lessons learned" to examine what worked and what did not and to circulate these lessons throughout its ranks.

Second, the parts of the Army’s infantry divisions during World War II were interchangeable- identical to those of every other division- a fact that facilitated training and standardization. Superfluous organizations such as tank and tank-destroyer battalions were not organic but "pooled" at the corps and army levels, to be attached when needed. In theory this approach made sense for industrialized warfare but made little sense in combined-arms warfare. Gen Omar Bradley realized that units which fought together should stick together, so he adopted the policy of permanently attaching these battalions to divisions. Additionally, Hart argues that because Bradley realized that his divisions lacked the firepower to break through the German defenses, he devised a plan (Cobra) to supplement his firepower with airpower to stun, demoralize, and destroy the Germans on a narrow front. His plan exceeded all expectations and brought about the final collapse of German arms in France.

Great Britain either refused to study or drew the wrong conclusions from its World War I experience. Hindered by a regimental system that promoted loyalty above honesty and a class system that viewed change as coming only from the top, coupled with the horrendous bloodletting of Flanders, Great Britain turned its back on intellectual study and developed fundamentally flawed doctrine that stressed massed firepower and attrition. Canada shackled itself to Britain for almost all of its armaments and doctrine. The result was caution, casualty aversion, and lack of initiative and innovation. The Anglo-Canadians adapted much more slowly to combat than did the Americans and never fully solved the problem of overcoming German defenses.

The Germans studied World War I and developed a comprehensive combined-arms doctrine that stressed initiative, speed, and shock. When war broke out in September 1939, Germany was years ahead of its rivals in terms of doctrine. Moreover, Germany looked objectively at its campaigns, discovered what did not work well, and made corrections. Germany’s weaknesses existed outside its doctrine- in Nazi ideology and lack of both material resources and logistical support.

Unfortunately, a book of this magnitude usually suffers from a few problems. The maps are very poor, and Hart’s style is incredibly repetitious. Many chapters could have done with a complete rewrite because the repetition detracts from the message. Furthermore, the author stumbles when he discusses airpower. Specifically, he attributes the reason for the command overhaul of February 1943 in North Africa, in which all air assets were finally centralized under one air commander, to the American defeat at Kasserine Pass. This is simply not the case. The overhaul decision had been made in January at the Casablanca Conference.

However, for the most part Hart gives good credit to airpower, explaining and understanding that the first prerequisite is air superiority, followed by interdiction and finally close air support. In fact, he believes that airpower directly contributed to victory in Normandy by slowly starving the Germans and was the indirect catalyst for the breakout. Ten days prior to Operation Cobra, aircraft destroyed the Tours bridge, causing major supply disruptions. When the Americans punched through at Saint-Lô, the Germans literally had neither gasoline nor ammunition.

Make no mistake, Clash of Arms is a difficult book but a fascinating one for readers interested in how organizations plan to fight and actually fight. One can learn much from it. As Hart states,

This study demonstrates . . . that militaries whose peacetime doctrines are not fundamentally flawed can adapt effectively, given sufficient combat exposure, as long as they do not suffer decisive defeat. Where an army’s basic doctrine is fundamentally flawed, however, not only is effective adaptation unlikely, but defeat may follow. Without correction of fundamental doctrinal flaws, other areas of innovation- organizational and training reforms or better weaponry- can only marginally improve an army’s combat capabilities (p. 416).

Airmen should keep this passage in mind as they enter a new kind of warfare, one between states and nonstates. They should substitute air force for army in the above quotation and then ask, Do we have flawed doctrine? Can we adapt it to changing situations? Are we willing to examine our operations honestly and make changes?

Maj James P. Gates, USAF
Washington, D.C.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.