Storm over Iraq: Airpower and the Gulf War by Richard P. Hallion. Smithsonian Institution Press (http://www.si.edu/sipress), 750 Ninth Street NW, Suite 4300, Washington, D.C. 20560-0950, 1992, 383 pages, $19.95 (softcover).

The title of Richard Hallion’s book on the air campaign during the United States’ first war against Iraq is a little misleading. In a volume that runs to 268 pages (not counting appendices or index), only the last 148 have anything to do with the Gulf War. This should not trouble the reader, however, for although just under half the book is about something other than what one might expect, it is all relevant. Hallion’s thesis is that the air war against Saddam Hussein’s forces in the winter of 1991 culminated an almost century-long struggle by airpower advocates to demonstrate what they had always known: that airpower alone could win a war.

As a preeminent airpower historian, Hallion is well qualified to weave the story of the development of airpower—and he does so well, touching on everything from the days of Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet to the revitalization of the Air Force in the wake of Vietnam. All of this leads, of course, to the air component of Operation Desert Storm. Despite the fact that Hallion appears to provide a balanced treatment of airpower’s historical development, one suspects from his enthusiasm that the author is a believer in strategic bombing, even if he falls short of saying so. His lack of perfect objectivity notwithstanding, Hallion does a fair job of discussing the evolution of land-based air forces and their missions, laying the context for his interpretation of the Gulf War air campaign.

Hallion’s consideration of the rebuilding of the Air Force following the war in Vietnam is particularly interesting. Not only were morale and public confidence low, but also the emerging leaders of the service did not believe that the Air Force had the tools it needed to fulfill its missions. The response entailed building those tools—most notably the F-15, F-16, and F-117. For Hallion, Desert Storm served as their proving ground.

Although the overall treatment of the air campaign itself is informative, one notices a number of omissions. First, it is clear that Hallion is not only an airpower devotee, but also a US Air Force devotee. The book is not about “airpower” in the Gulf War, but about the US Air Force in that conflict. He all but ignores the Navy, Marine Corps, and coalition air forces, except to point out how few sorties they contributed relative to Air Force assets. Indeed, he seems relatively immune even to the political value of joint and coalition operations, which Gen Charles A. Horner, the joint force air component commander, had mastered (see, for example, Tom Clancy and Horner’s Every Man a Tiger [1999]).

Second, by failing to notice the contribution of other nations or services, Hallion ignores the major interoperability issues that occurred, especially between Air Force and Navy systems—as Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr. point out in Shield and Sword (2001), their history of naval operations in the Gulf. This would seem to constitute a major point, since a failure to raise such issues leads to sluggishness in their resolution.

Finally, the author appears reluctant to air out the Air Force’s dirty laundry. Specifically, he does not mention the friction between John Warden and Chuck Horner at all and gives the impression that the two worked together on the plan for the air campaign. Horner himself has suggested that he sent Warden packing as soon as the latter finished his briefing; Horner then started planning from scratch, albeit with the help of some of Warden’s junior planners. Furthermore, Hallion fails to provide an analysis of Warden’s plan compared to the one eventually used to win the war. In fact, Warden’s plan proved optimistic in its estimation of the importance of “strategic” targets; it also failed to appreciate the significance of striking troop formations in the field. In the end, the damage inflicted on Iraqi tanks and infantry by coalition air forces stands as one of the biggest contributions they made to eventual victory.

Storm over Iraq is not a perfect book, mostly due to the author’s parochial views regarding airpower and the US Air Force. Nevertheless, it is an engaging, well-written book that remains one of the most accessible treatments of both the rebuilding of the Air Force after Vietnam and its critical role in Operation Desert Storm. As such, one should read it—but should do so with caution.

Robert S. Bolia
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.