Document created: 1 December 03
Air & Space Power Journal - Winter 2003

Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History by Colin S. Gray. Frank Cass Publishers (http://www.frankcass. com), 5824 NE Hassalo Street, Portland, Oregon 97213-3644, 2002, 310 pages, $52.50 (hardcover).

In his foreword to this text, Williamson Murray lays bare one of the central problems in today’s academic studies—the gap between political scientists and historians in their dealings with strategy, war, and military institutions. One group studies war only as a period set piece, while the other—I am willing to theorize—uses preestablished formulas. Colin Gray is one of the leading neo-Clausewitzian theorists who believes that, although warfare has changed, war—as long as humans wage it—has not. He uses three historical case studies—Napoléon, World War I, and nuclear war—to explore revolutions in military affairs (RMA) and their effect on war. The possibility of revolutionary change in warfare first appeared in Soviet military writings when, by the late 1970s, the Soviet General Staff realized that American and Western technological innovations would make the USSR’s weapons, doctrine, and tactics obsolete. The writings of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov stressed the RMA in the “reconnaissance strike complexes” being developed by the United States. In conjunction with these developments, the nonlinearity of events—or the fog of war, as Clausewitz refers to it—made a comeback in the form of chaos theory. According to Gray, the problem lies in determining how much of this transformation is technology-based and how much is driven by humans.

Strategy for Chaos is the first book that examines all elements—history, strategy, and policy making—in laying out what the RMA is and when one achieves it. The most dramatic conclusion, one that most military officers will recognize, is that change always brings about a reaction by the enemy or competitor. (Yes, even the sole remaining superpower in the world has competitors.) Equally important is the strategic framework that Gray uses to relate the RMA to the world. In his examination of RMA theories, Gray argues against the waves of historical transformation sweeping the world. RMA life cycles come in nine steps: preparation, recognition of the challenge, parentage, enabling spark, strategic moment, institutional agency, instrument, execution and evolving maturity, and, finally, feedback and adjustment. The RMA is a strategic behavior, a theme that the book clearly develops throughout. This is also important since a great many policy makers in Washington, D.C., having focused on the technical promises of the RMA, have overlooked or minimized the effect of strategy on the RMA.

The three case studies speak for themselves, but the chapter on nuclear RMA, with its recent history and strategic analysis, is especially good. The conclusion examines the tensions between the idea of strategy as purposeful direction/plan of action and as a zone of complexity. Strategy and war are technically chaotic in that they do not neatly progress in a linear fashion. Ultimately, to be strategically successful, one needs to be better than one’s foe. In the final analysis, the RMA is strategic behavior.

The value of this book lies in its synthesis of past and current strategic thinkers and their concepts, presented against the backdrop of the RMA. Gray has done a great service to both the history and public-policy communities since his strategic analysis demonstrates that the RMA is a vital part of a nation-state’s strategic development. The framework for analysis and thinking developed within this text will prove helpful to laymen, military personnel, and policy makers. The bibliography and extensive chapter footnotes allow the reader to follow the logic and reasoning the author used in laying out these arguments. Strategy for Chaos is a must- read for any student of strategy, and war colleges would do well to include it in their strategy curriculum.

Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired
Fairfax, Virginia

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.