Document created: 20 July 06
Air & Space Power Journal Book Review - Spring 2007

Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. Pantheon Books (http://www.randomhouse.com/pantheon), 1745 Broadway, New York, New York 10019, 2006, 640 pages, $27.95 (hardcover). 

Since books about Operation Iraqi Freedom began appearing sometime in late 2003, over 200 different accounts of the war have been published. Everyone from L. Paul Bremer, director of the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq from 2003 to 2004, to airpower advocate Col Walter Boyne, USAF, retired, has opined on the invasion, the occupation, what went right, what went wrong, and what’s still going on in Iraq. Drawing on interviews with the soldiers, sailors, marines, and Airmen who were there; top defense officials; and declassified interrogation reports of captured Iraqi officials and generals, authors Michael Gordon, chief military correspondent for the New York Times, and Bernard Trainor, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general and former director of the National Security Program at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, deliver the most authoritative, accurate, and readable book that I have seen on the war to date. If you read one book on the war in Iraq, let it be Cobra II.

Cobra II pulls no punches. If someone made a mistake in the planning or execution of the Iraq campaign, this book reveals it. No one is spared the authors’ scrutiny, whether Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld or lieutenant colonels at the tactical level of execution. That said, Gordon and Trainor do an excellent balancing act as they trace the origins of the war through buildup and execution. One finds enough strategic-/operational-/tactical-level discussion to gain an overall view of the war from multiple levels and satisfy the desires of amateur tacticians and strategic thinkers alike. From Operation Plan 1003 through both generated and running-start concepts, the authors analyze the force that conducted the invasion. The reading never becomes turgid even though early on the book essentially deals with troop-level numbers and deployments. The book offers more than enough animated discussion between the Department of Defense (DOD) and US Central Command (CENTCOM) as to who and what will actually make up the force to keep the reader interested. It also presents a good strategic-level look at DOD transformation, which emphasizes lighter and leaner operations. Air Force members will appreciate how transformation has trickled down to all of their departments.

Cobra II’s description of the contributions that airpower (or for that matter, sea power and special operations) brought to the fight leaves something to be desired, however. For example, Lt Gen T. Michael Moseley, the combined force air component commander, receives half the coverage of Lt Gen David McKiernan, the combined force land component commander. The book also depicts the early “decapitation strike” against the Dora Farms complex, told in thrilling detail from the perspective of the F-117 operators who executed it, as a failure since Saddam Hussein wasn’t there. Regarding other air strikes, the authors make clear what they think of airpower and, for that matter, intelligence: “As the war waged, allied planes would carry out strikes against other time sensitive targets. But not one of the top 200 figures in the regime was killed by an air strike. [Air] attacks are only as good as the intelligence they are based on. . . . That intelligence was often not reliable” (p. 177). Despite the factual nature of this statement, it overlooks any psychological effects of the air portion of the overall campaign on Iraqi leadership, and since many key Iraqi leaders fled for survival at first opportunity, one cannot say that the air campaign did not successfully separate them from the battlespace.

Airpower does come off better than maritime contributions: Cobra II portrays US Navy forces as somewhat of an auxiliary air force. It also paints an inaccurate picture of special operators as shadowy warriors operating under their own guidelines and by their own plans. The book simply doesn’t give adequate emphasis to the contributions of sister services; indeed, it seems to promote a somewhat land-centric view of war—a prevalent theme in books, newspapers, and journals today.

Finally, I believe it is important to discuss the issue of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Two schools of thought predominate: either Saddam had WMDs and we haven’t found them, or he did not have them. If Cobra II is to be believed, the Iraqi dictator walked a delicate tightrope of deception. It seems he attempted to play both sides of the issue. On the one hand, he wanted to make countries in the region, most notably Iran, believe he had the capability to produce WMDs. On the other hand, he led the United Nations to believe that he was complying with the spirit of its Security Council resolutions, thus keeping the United States outside his borders. Iraqi officials called it “deterrence by doubt.”

The book offers a particularly interesting dissection of Saddam’s megalomania and paranoia. As officials in Washington and the military at Headquarters CENTCOM wrangle over exactly when the force will be ready, Gordon and Trainor flash to Iraq and meetings between Saddam and his top officials. Saddam did not greatly fear an American invasion. In fact, the possibility of his having to fight to save his regime from the American military rated a relatively low priority. Rather, Saddam seems to have feared internal revolutions and the Iranians much more than any action by American forces.

Cobra II would make a good addition to the Air Force chief of staff’s reading list. No work gives a more comprehensive picture of the Iraq war. Hopefully, though, General Moseley will take a lesson from Gen Charles Horner, USAF, retired, and write his own account of Iraqi Freedom. We have enough land-centric accounts of the war already—this book and American Soldier by Gen Tommy Franks, USA, retired, for example. It is time that someone told the air component’s story. Who better than the man who led it? But until that happens, buy and read Cobra II.

Capt Brian D. Laslie, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.