The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940 by Henry G. Gole. Naval Institute Press (http://www.usni.org/press/press.html), 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402, 2003, 256 pages, $34.95 (hardcover).
Pearl Harbor proved that American strategy makers were pygmies when the Japanese decimated the US battle fleet. North Africa proved that American strategy makers were hayseeds who had to learn their trade from the British. Hogwash! Henry Gole’s fine little book works to undermine those myths.
Dr. Gole is certainly qualified to issue a definitive judgment on such issues. He fought in Korea as an infantryman, served in the special forces, and did five overseas tours. Starting as an enlisted man, he retired as a colonel with more than 30 years of service. Gole also served in Vietnam, as an attaché in Germany, and on the Pentagon staff in Washington. Moreover, he had teaching tours at West Point and the Army War College in Pennsylvania. He also has fine academic credentials, as attested by his PhD from Temple University; a good writing style; and a record of book reviews and articles that demonstrates his willingness to “tell it like it is.”
Colonel Gole’s research for this book focused on documentation found in the archives of the American Military Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, especially that available in previously unused sources from the classes of 1934–40 at the Army War College, then in Washington, DC. One of his major points maintains that an intimate connection existed between the War College and the Army General Staff, especially with the latter’s War Plans Division. Frequent written and personal contacts occurred between members of the college and the staff, the greater part of the college graduates going on to serve with that staff both then and later. Gole argues that this relationship produced huge benefits, including fine strategists and combat leaders for the United States during World War II and well beyond.
The nexus between college and staff guaranteed that the students would remain connected with the “real world” instead of isolating themselves in the academic ivory tower. Yet, the War Plans Division necessarily immersed itself in the “here and now,” which inhibited the projection of its planning far into the future. The students, on the other hand, could consider strategies involving the huge potential forces that the United States could ultimately generate; thus, their planning exercises laid the groundwork for what would come. The classes of about 80 officers were divided into groups and assigned different scenarios for their planning exercises. Usually, some addressed one-on-one wars with potential (and not so potential) enemies. From 1934 onward, one of the groups worked on a plan for fighting as a member of a coalition against an enemy coalition.
The seven groups that studied the problems of fighting in the company of allies did so with some remarkable foresight—which stood them in good stead when the war with the Axis came to pass. Yet, others assigned to the one-on-one wars that did not materialize also gained enormous benefits. One group often drew an assignment to plan a war against “Red” (Britain) even though the notion of a British invasion of North America seemed preposterous. Yet, the various assumptions and studies made in connection with that scenario indoctrinated the participants in the research, planning, and necessity of thinking at the national-strategy level. That, too, proved vital.
Everyone involved was aware of the old axiom that no scheme survives the first contact with the enemy, yet they considered the planning process valuable. Gole declares that one of the most important lessons of World War I taught the United States about the complex and time-consuming process of mobilizing for total war. An assumption running through all the planning at the War College held that the huge US economic base would allow America to prevail if a war lasted long enough—even against the formidable coalition of Germany, Japan, and Italy in a two-ocean context. Thus, US vulnerability to defeat would exist almost exclusively in the first months of a war. Once the mobilization began to bear fruit, the victorious outcome became inevitable.
Even though the French-British combination was not as effective at holding off the Axis as the War College had assumed, America had more than two years of grace for building a great armed force and preparing giant industrial plants. Between Munich and Pearl Harbor, the US Army grew from about 150,000 men (including its Air Corps) to a million and a half. The students of the War College who had planned for mobilization in their many exercises assumed the role of decision makers who brought all that about.
Why should air warriors trouble themselves to add The Road to Rainbow to an already long reading list? Well, all of our wars have demonstrated that airpower is but one part of the national strength. Airmen must understand the context in which it exists, including the economic, political, psychological, naval, and ground factors, as well as public opinion and domestic political concerns. Colonel Gole’s book provides an excellent vehicle for examining that context and for enhancing one’s understanding of the importance of strategic planning and the kinds of knowledge and assumptions one needs to achieve excellence in that work. True, Gole’s story has high praise for the Army War College, but his other writings on leadership and his many book reviews demonstrate that he is no company man. His work will help build a worldview that more closely approximates reality than it otherwise might. Airmen should read it soon.
Dr. David R. Mets
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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