It’s difficult to review a book titled Challenging Conventional Wisdom; after all, isn’t it our job to challenge conventional wisdom? Shouldn’t we applaud those who do, or risk being considered Luddites, who hate progress? I almost feel as if I should relaunch the inquisition of Galileo before reviewing such a book. (Galileo, you’re safe. I’ll tackle the book and the authors.)

The conventional wisdom the title refers to is hardly conventional. The book critiques the rather esoteric subculture of wannabe reformers of arms exporting—those people in government, defense industries, and, yes, the military, who feel that the United States needs to reform export controls. The editors’ premise is that “reform” actually means “loosen restrictions” and that this is unequivocally bad. Come to think of it, that is their conventional wisdom.

Challenging Conventional Wisdom includes articles by people in academia, government, think tanks with at least a passing liberal bias, journalism, and the military. Some of the pieces are thoughtful, raising important points that lay people can understand and appreciate. Others are strident, attacking the very premise that the United States should involve itself in foreign military sales (FMS), decrying the profits made by defense corporations, and belittling those who think the system too restrictive. Furthermore, these articles can be too esoteric, targeting a very narrow audience well versed in the arcane world of arms control, and beyond the grasp of general readers unfamiliar either with FMS or the oversight and limitations currently in place.

The opening and closing chapters, both written by the editors, offer summaries of each essay. Readers who want to target specific areas of interest should find them very useful. Part 1 of the book “examines the myths perpetuated by export control reformers” (p. 17): (1) the defense industry is in trouble and needs US government subsidies and a relaxation of export controls to compete internationally; (2) current controls damage US national security by preventing interoperability with foreign forces and stymie the development of “cutting edge” US military technologies; (3) arms exports allow the US government to influence other nations’ domestic and foreign policies; and (4) without radical changes, our allies will start to look elsewhere for arms (p. 16). In general this part of the book is uneven, repeatedly arguing that economics overrides security concerns. This notion is not true of the system currently in place, although I suppose in the context of examining what some reformers are proposing, one may accurately say that, for them, economics remains the most important issue.

Some chapters are alarmist and biased, appearing to attack not only the reformers but also the current arms-export system. For example, the second chapter, John Feffer’s “Supporting the Arms Industry: U.S. Government Subsidies of the Arms Trade,” slams the US government for promoting arms sales. Yet, it fails to explain why the government should not support arms sales, accepting as axiomatic (or perhaps the author’s “conventional wisdom”) that this support is intrinsically bad or evil. For this material to be useful, the author should state the government’s arguments for supporting the arms trade and then counter them. The United States advocates, markets, and promotes sales of weapons with the goal of increased access to, interoperability with, and influence upon the customer country. Our government also supports business interests because jobs are important to the US economy. The author needs to explain why the government pursues these goals and then, if appropriate, address why the goals and economic interests are inappropriate or the means not successful.

Some of the better chapters come later. In chapter 4, “U.S. Arms Exports and Interoperability: Fighting with Each Other,” Col Daniel M. Smith, USA, retired, points out that the “softer” side of military capability can be more important than advanced hardware. That is, if the US government wants to help a country improve its capabilities, then it should look at improving that nation’s training, organization, doctrine, and tactics. All the shiny new equipment in the world is useless without trained operators, but too often in the past the United States has pushed the equipment without pushing the support. This policy is changing. Although those in the US FMS community know that the problem exists, it still happens, partially because customer countries sometimes fail to heed our government’s advice.

Part 2 of the book is more balanced, providing arguments on the benefits of proposed export reforms as well as examining their potential risks. The most important of these very real risks involves undermining US security interests by allowing the proliferation of weapons in countries that either should not have them or cannot safeguard them. Exporting weapons to nations that fail to guarantee they will not transfer them to another state or nonstate actor is almost as bad as putting them on the open market for any terrorist to purchase. At times this section is also alarmist: in “Risky Business: The Security Implications of Arms Export Reforms,” Jason Meyers contends that terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction is “the almost certain outcome of implementing the proposals” (p. 126). At other times, however, when the sky is not about to fall down on us, part 2 is exceedingly cogent and reasonable. “Policy reform should precede process reform,” according to Joseph P. Smaldone, who shows the dangers of exporting weapons to strife-torn regions in “Foreign Policy Risks of Arms Exports Reforms” (p. 132). He is exactly right.

The final part of the book looks at alternative proposals for reform and provides good summaries of existing arms-control regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It also examines evolving trends, such as exports of unmanned aerial vehicles, which have become increasingly popular following their success in Afghanistan and Iraq. I recommend this part to readers seeking general knowledge of the MTCR and other arms-control regimes.

Although Challenging Conventional Wisdom offers some interesting essays, it is too specific and biased for a broad Air Force audience. At the beginning, the editors observe that “US security and foreign policy interests should always come before economic concerns” (p. 22). This statement is true. Unfortunately, the book tries to show that any economic gain by a defense contractor is automatically bad for our security interests. This is not the case. Because export controls are essential, those of us in the arms-trade field need to take them seriously and protect US security interests. The book focuses on the desire of defense-industry leaders, who feel that relaxation of export controls is in our best interest. But this is not conventional wisdom for those of us who review export licenses; who deal with our allies, friends, and customers around the world; and who are responsible not for supporting the US arms industry but for promoting American interests. For us, national security always comes first.

Lt Col Steven Payson, USAF
Washington, DC

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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