Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force by Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi. Princeton University Press (http://www.pupress.princeton.edu), 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540-5237, 2004, 236 pages, $37.50 (hardcover).
Whenever American leaders decide to use military force, there is usually a great debate within elite leadership circles over how to use that force. One school of thought prefers liberal engagement of the military through a wide range of civil/military operations and with varying degrees of restrictions on the use of that force. Another school reserves the use of force for truly realpolitik uses, then engaging with overwhelming force (the Powell Doctrine). This gap concerning the use of force has and will continue to affect military effectiveness and civil-military cooperation.
Woven throughout this debate is a perception in both schools that the American public will not tolerate American casualties resulting from any American military operation. Our political and military leadership as well as our potential foes view this “casualty phobia” as an Achilles’ heel.
Through 214 pages of text, tables, and graphs, Feaver’s and Gelpi’s Choosing Your Battles gives a solid analysis of 21 different studies—as well as additional research studies and surveys—at the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS). Their analysis thoroughly explores civil-military operations within the elite leadership circles to determine the answers to the questions of when and how America will use force. In what is certainly the book’s cornerstone, they convincingly argue that the casualty-phobia perception is a myth.
A vast majority of the raw data for this book came from a series of TISS surveys that went to three broad categories of the population: civilian elite (prominent Americans across a breadth of categories); military elite (academy students, intermediate and senior service school students, and students from Capstone and the National Defense University); and the general public. The surveys provided several levels of granularity between military elite and civilian elite decision makers—including Reserve component officers, civilians who have attended professional military education, and veterans who presently serve as civilian elite.
The authors plunge into a mind-numbing statistical analysis of the TISS data that would enthuse budding data analysts. It makes for good bedtime reading for the statistically uninitiated. But it’s the revealing results of this analysis that civilian and military planners and decision makers at all levels will be interested in.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this book is that Feaver and Gelpi work hard to dispel the casualty-phobia myth. They succeed not by just looking at their own TISS data but also by exploring public-opinion surveys dating back to the Korean War. In so doing, they break down the American population into four distinct groups: those who would press forward at any human cost; those who weigh human cost against benefits of the military operation (weighed against US security, a “big” war will entail more casualties, whereas an intervention to stabilize a government should see relatively few casualties); those who will support casualties so long as the military is making progress toward a defined end state; and, finally, those who are truly casualty-phobic and will not tolerate casualties resulting from any military operation.
The authors find that generally, the American public is defeat-phobic, not casualty-phobic. They will continue to accept US casualties as long as the civilian and military leadership can show progress toward a defined end state and feel the military mission is in the interest of their security. Public support will erode when the mission bogs down, leaders express a lack of confidence in the mission and/or reaching the end state, or even if the public perceives no progress toward an end despite US payment in blood. Feaver and Gelpi support this conclusion with several compelling case studies, including the first six months of Korea, Vietnam prior to the Tet Offensive, and Somalia before and after the Ranger raid of 3 October 1993.
The implications for civilian and military leaders and planners are staggering. Many know the phrase, “Do not plan to fail.” However, in embracing the casualty-phobia myth, the authors argue that military and civilian planners and leaders are doing just that. To counter this tendency, planners and leaders at all levels must:
Clearly communicate to the American public how the impending use of US military power supports or enhances US security. Certain types of operations will entail casualties. Even operations to shore up a faltering democracy will result in some US deaths, even if not due to enemy fire. The United States cannot provide global security without risking military casualties. It is a mistake to believe that the American public is unwilling to take risks when its leaders are persuasive that the risks are appropriate (p. 210).
Unmistakably state what the desired end state of the operation is and at what point US military forces will be withdrawn from the operation. Once communicated, stick to the phase points and bring the troops home as advertised.
Continually inform the public about the progress of the operation and how it relates to the already stated end state and US security objectives. Feaver and Gelpi clearly show that the majority of Americans will buy into some level of casualties commensurate with the type of operation.
Resist losing faith in the operation. If something bad happens, be honest. But, if at all possible, capitalize on the bad event and use it as a rallying point for public support. Feaver and Gelpi point out that Clinton had a fantastic opportunity to turn the tragic US deaths in October 1993 into a rallying point. US support for the Somalia operation had dwindled from 74 percent in December 2002 to 42 percent in mid-September 2003—dropping to 36 percent after the October 1993 deaths. They argue that Clinton, his closest advisors, and members of Congress embraced casualty phobia. “They all lost whatever political will they had remaining for the Somalia mission after the Ranger raid and made no attempt to frame the casualties as the necessary price for victory and thereby tap into the reservoir of public support that might otherwise have been available” (p. 135).
Feaver and Gelpi concede that there remains much more work to be done regarding casualty sensitivity and US decision and policy making and point to opportunities for future research and/or validation of their own work. On its own, the robust TISS data provides many insights to a large cross-section of America. Choosing Your Battles just begins to scratch the surface but simultaneously blazes a bold trail.
This book should be on the “must read” list for every top government official, military planner and strategist, and field-grade and flag-grade commanders. Feaver and Gelpi were thorough in their analysis. Choosing Your Battles is enlightening, timely, and strongly recommended.
Maj Paul G. Niesen, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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