Published: 1 June 2008
Air & Space Power
Journal - Summer 2008
Bombing the European Axis Powers: A Historical Digest of the Combined
Bomber Offensive, 1939–1945 by Richard G. Davis. Air University Press
(http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress), 131 West Shumacher Avenue, Maxwell
AFB, Alabama 36112-5962, 2006, 648 pages, $55.00 (softcover). Available free
from
http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/Davis_B99/Davis_B99.pdf.
In
Bombing the European Axis Powers: A Historical Digest of the Combined Bomber
Offensive, 1939–1945, Dr. Richard Davis demonstrates his talent for extensive
research and analysis, guiding the reader through virtually every conceivable
facet of planning and execution faced by Anglo-American forces in World War II.
His detailed descriptions of missions performed by the Allied command reflect
his extensive use of sources, including original government documents for
verifying all of the bombing statistics. The book includes a CD-ROM containing a
listing of numerous spreadsheets, charts, aircraft diagrams, maps, and historic
photos, the latter two useful in helping the reader visualize the bombing
campaign. The spreadsheets’ and charts’ organization of the information makes
analysis of the bombing operations as simple as comparing numbers on a
screen.
The book begins with a comprehensive overview of the difficulties that attended the organization of Allied forces; it then proceeds with a monthly chronology of the war. Through subsequent chapters, Davis reveals many important points that greatly affected the war effort:
• Reluctance of Allies to admit to city bombing until the end of the war despite dedicating numerous sorties for this purpose.
• Arguments between advocates of the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) night bombing and those who championed the Army Air Forces (AAF) daylight bombing, leading to creation of the Combined Bomber Offensive.
• Gen Carl Spaatz’s and other commanders’ combat-tour policies and their effect on morale and survival of aircrews.
• Radar development and testing on aircraft by the RAF and modifications by the AAF.
• Mine-laying operations and their value.
• Development of long-range fighter escorts as the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces sustained high casualty rates while bombing deep into Germany.
Throughout Bombing the European Axis Powers, Davis cites information available to Allied commanders and then analyzes their decision making. His practice of making available accurate postwar records to facilitate the critiquing of decisions is quite effective, especially when he describes how the original formation of the Allied command structure (particularly the AAF’s) led to disorganization and misinformation.
The portion of the book that addresses the Sicily campaign still has relevance for modern readers. Davis explains the problems that commanders faced while staging air attacks on marshaling yards in Rome, particularly the fact that the Vatican posed a serious political obstacle because of its location only a few hundred yards from a primary target. The attack had a surprising psychological outcome: Mussolini’s overthrow by a coup just six days later. However, Davis quickly notes that, “Italy, as did others, bowed to the will of its enemies because of a complex combination of economic, political, geographic, and military pressure, not from the coercion of air power alone” (p. 150). As for the strategic bombing campaign in the final months of the war, the author observes that “by the beginning of April 1945 the Anglo-American strategic bomber commanders could scarcely find a target in the detritus of the Nazi state that justified the expense of mounting an operation against it” (p. 555).
Although Bombing the European Axis Powers proved incredibly informative and included many interesting conclusions, some readers may struggle with its detail and length, which may have more appeal to academics. However, it is a must-read for anyone looking for an in-depth study of strategic bombing during World War II.
Cadet George H. Van Dyke III
Air Force ROTC,
University of Houston
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.