Published: 1 September 2008
Air & Space Power
Journal - Fall 2008
Airpower Leadership on the Front Line: Lt Gen George H. Brett and Combat
Command by Lt Col Douglas A. Cox. Air University Press (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress),
131 West Shumacher Avenue, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-5962, 2006, 114 pages,
$10.50 (softcover). Available for downloading at http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/books/cox/cox.pdf.
With his short biography of Lt Gen George H. Brett, Lt Col Douglas Cox has added
to our understanding of a little-known Army Air Forces leader during World War
II. Originally written as the author’s thesis at the School of Advanced Air and
Space Studies at Maxwell AFB, the work offers a brief but thorough examination
of Brett’s career. Though not a complete biography of the general, it provides
background for a perusal and appreciation of his leadership abilities in the
Southwest Pacific during the war—the real focus of the work. In order to
determine the success or failure of Brett’s leadership, Cox applies a cluster of
eight leadership characteristics that historian Forrest Pogue uses to assess Gen
George C. Marshall in his monumental biography of the former US Army chief of
staff. The author also attempts to understand Brett’s knowledge of doctrine and
whether or not he “was able to adapt his doctrinal preconceptions rapidly enough
to maximize his combat effectiveness” (p. 3).
Cox effectively uses primary-source material throughout the book, especially in chapters on Brett’s early life and military career, arguing that this period laid the “foundation for a study of his brief experience in the crucible of combat in World War II’s Pacific theater” (p. 5). The author highlights some of these early formative experiences, including Brett’s work with Billy Mitchell and his various assignments, culminating in his appointment as chief of the Air Corps in 1941, second only to Gen Henry “Hap” Arnold. During this prewar period, however, Brett received mixed performance reviews on an assignment to Panama and had difficulty carrying out his assigned orders.
The main part of this study focuses on the general’s brief experiences in the Southwest Pacific. Cox has done a superb job of using archival sources to analyze Brett’s role as a member of the American, British, Dutch, and Australian Command as well as his stormy and ultimately unsuccessful relationship with Gen Douglas MacArthur and his chief of staff, Gen Richard Sutherland. As Cox points out, Brett had few resources at his command, and he failed to educate MacArthur and Sutherland on the use of airpower as he understood it. A key point in explaining General Brett and his actions appeared in a memorandum that Arnold wrote in December 1941: “He was not given the job to determine ways and means for not doing it. The attached is a cable full of ‘nots.’ I want to find out how to do, not how not to do it” (emphasis in original) (p. 87).
The author concludes his work with a brief chapter dealing with Brett’s career in charge of the Caribbean Defense Command until his retirement in 1946 and an examination of him based on Pogue’s leadership traits and his combat execution. Of the eight leadership traits, Cox gives Brett a pass on four, which include the ability to learn, sense of duty, acceptance of responsibility, and compassion. The general fails to measure up in terms of self-certainty, simplicity of spirit, character, and loyalty (p. 84). The analysis of these leadership criteria as applied to Brett, along with Cox’s examination of the general’s ability to use and understand the “doctrinal applications of airpower” (p. 88), is clear and concise, leading one to believe that Brett’s failings were in his personality rather than his ability.
Although Brett may not have been retained in command in the Southwest Pacific, it is true, as Thomas Hughes states in the foreword, that “only the most cynical and uninformed observer would judge his career a failure” (p. v). Thus, Airpower Leadership on the Front Line is essential reading for anyone who wants to gain a better appreciation of airpower and the history of the Army Air Forces in World War II. It is also useful to students of modern applications of airpower because, much like Brett, today’s commander often finds that “the resources provided will always be less than a conservative military man would array for the task at hand” (p. 92). The Air Force has always asked its leaders to do more with less. Studying how General Brett failed at this will benefit Airmen of today.
If this work has any failing at all, it is that it is too short. One hundred pages are not nearly enough to tell the whole story. One is left with unanswered questions and wishes that the author had undertaken an in-depth look at the relationship among Brett, Marshall, and Arnold. What role did Brett play in the rapid expansion of the Air Corps in 1940 and early 1941, beyond his trip across the Atlantic? What else did he accomplish in the Caribbean? Hopefully the author will have the opportunity to expand on his work in the future and answer such questions. In the meantime, this brief examination of Lt Gen George Brett and Combat Command is well worth reading, not only for its enjoyment but also for the insight it provides into the fragile art of leadership.
Capt Gregory W. Ball, USAFR
Denton, Texas
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