The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform by James S. Corum University Press of Kansas, 2501 West 15th St., Lawrence, Kansas 660493904, 1992, 274 pages, $29.95.
Corum correctly points out that there are no comprehensive studies on the tactics of the Reichswehr as they developed in the early 1920s and proceeds to provide such a book. By so doing, however, he also provides a good look at a larger question: How do we in the military develop a doctrine and put it into practice? Without explicitly addressing the larger question, he in fact provides a model of how one nation did match, or balance, all (or most all) the elements of tactics and strategy (in the German sense) with training, equipment, leadership philosophies, and so forth.
By so doing, he provides present day America-like Germany in the 1920s presented with a "new world order"- with a challenge that goes beyond the journalistic "Pentagon issues of the day." Two cases that Corum uses can illustrate the point, that of comprehensiveness of a military program and that of personal experience of a military leader.
On the first matter, what is so often seen in the current literature on doctrine (in the US sense) are such issues as, Do we match doctrine to equipment or equipment to doctrine? or, How shall we balance cost and numbers? Corum, by his careful analysis, shows how shallow and unidimensional this kind of thinking is by presenting us with an example of one of the great peacetime military leaders of Europe, Gen Hans von Seeckt. As leader of the Reichswehr from 19201926, General von Seeckt provided an impression on the German military that was to last through World War ll. His contribution was not to just address the above issues, which he in fact did, but further, to ensure that the theory was matched in practice. This, far from being a minor point, is critical.
The lesson that von Seeckt holds for us in the 1990s is not that of the developer of blitzkrieg (Corum accurately points out that this type of war awaited further development but that the combined arms concept that was at the root of blitzkrieg was a key goal and achievement of von Seeckt) but rather as one who saw the comprehensive nature of that which we call military art and science.
Using this language of "comprehensiveness" today might well summon up images of the great "jointness" debates in the US, but von Seeckt went well beyond that type of analysis. Rather, his contribution was to offer an example of military reform from alpha to omega, the whole series of connected actions that constitute a meaningful reforming of a military. Thus, it is important to have a good doctrine, but just as important is the rather mundane question of how one actually implements the new thinking. As Corum points out, "Sound tactical theory aside, it was in training that the Reichswehr surpassed all its contemporary rivals, ensuring the battlefield efficiency and tactical success of the German Army in 193940." (page xvi) He shows in the text, chapter by chapter, how von Seeckt left his Berlin headquarters that had so well developed the new operational doctrines, went to the field and demanded again and again that the troops implement the new concepts of mobile warfare . We might add that among these new concepts was "airland battle," the lessons about which the air sections of the Truppenamt learned from their World War I experience and then codified under von Seeckt's direction. Additionally, Corum emphasizes the fact that the best field training and the best doctrinal development is useless unless link between the two, the middlelevel officers, is of such competence that the doctrine can be executed. This competence did not come about due to traditional German efficiency (although it may have been aided by it). It was built brick by brick by von Seeckt, year by year, using many avenues of officer education and training, many of which he personally oversaw.
Today we must ask ourselves if we have such an officer corps. Our service schools have gone through the throes of addressing the questions of balance between "generalists versus specialists" or of teaching "operations" versus "strategy," but we have not since the Air Corps Tactical School days made an effort to produce middlelevel officers such as Ernst Volckheim (in armor) and Helmut Wilberg (in air combat), who, as Corum describes, did not produce largescale theory but did produce the link between theory and practice that von Seeckt's reformation demanded. Further, for every such thinker, Corum implies, there must be dozens of thinking military officers to bounce ideas off to see, day by day, how the new concepts must be put into practice. One would look in vain in the present US Air Force for an interest in such officers and the kind of truly original thought that they might provide.
Another current lesson that we might learn from this study is the role of personal experience. Corum makes a point of remarking on the importance of the individual in history- in this case, that of a man of vision like von Seeckt, who provided the coherent guidance that the Reichswehr needed in its early years. While recognizing this important point, we can perhaps look further at Corum's data to see that another point needs to be made that is of the utmost relevance today: the importance of the actual military experience of the particular leaders of a reform movement. In World War 1, von Seeckt was assigned to the Third Army Corps in the initial drive through the Low Countries, but as the western front degraded into trench warfare, he was assigned to take part in the Eleventh Army's offensive in Galicia. There, after they had penetrated Russian lines, the Germans did not do as they would have in France-envelop the line. Rather, they executed a deep penetration that resulted in a rout of the Russian army. When von Seeckt later came to power, he came with a particular vision, not one that was abstract; it was one that he had observed on the ground in a world war. On the other hand, the contender with von Seeckt for the position of army commander was Gen Hans Reinhardt, who fought trench warfare in France and saw it as the French did, concluding that the era of mobile warfare was dead. The defense was now supreme. Corum mentions other examples such as the rise of air officers who fought the successful (yes, successful) tactical air war of World War I, as opposed to the bomber pilots (such as those who rose in the United Kingdom and later in the United States) who also influenced the future of their respective services. The result of these particular officers (the list would also include Erwin Rommel, Albert Kesselring, Ewald von Kleist, Erich von Manstein, and Gerd von Rundstedt) rising in the Reichswehr was the dominance of mobile warfare and the use of tactical airpower in coordination with ground armies.
The point is clear: The personal experience of the leader is critical in framing the questions and coloring the way he deals with the options available to him. Today in the US we can see the same thing- a set of leaders who were in their formative years during and after the Vietnam War and who have accepted the limitations of the "Vietnam Syndrome" (the refusal to use force unless success is guaranteed). This is a concept of military power that would have been foreign to the Germans of the interwar period, or to any competent military for that matter.
What experience will our next set of leaders bring to their offices? Will they develop the new doctrine in a comprehensive way as von Seeckt did? A reading of Corum's study of General von Seeckt shows us that these questions may be of equal or greater importance to the future of our country than any specific doctrine that is developed.
Lt Col Douglas Erwin, USAF
Colorado Springs, Colorado
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