As of this writing, Anthony Cordesman’s comprehensive volume might be the best place to begin any study of the ongoing War of the Iraqi Succession. It is also a useful encyclopedia of all sorts of information connected with military aspects of the war and a helpful guide to official sources available as of the summer of 2003. The book is likely to remain a standard reference for basic war-related facts for years. It surely will be both the starting point and a baseline for numerous subsequent studies. The work’s focus is entirely consistent with its subtitle: the military strategy of the combatants, the operations and tactics of the coalition campaign, and the military conclusions that one might draw in an admittedly limited and preliminary manner. The volume thus delivers precisely what it promises and does so in a measured, objective, and well-organized manner. Its timely appearance is the source of both its value and, as Cordesman himself readily acknowledges, its limitations.

A brief review of the book’s organization reveals something of its scope and ambition. Following an introductory chapter on the limits of analysis, The Iraq War devotes about 40 pages to the forces involved on both sides, nearly 100 to the course of the war, about 370 to “lessons” of various kinds, and about 50 to “the civilian aspects of nation building and the challenge of winning the peace.” Numerous explanations of various weapons and communications systems, emerging technologies, and operational concepts provide enormously useful clarifications of technical issues that would otherwise bewilder many readers. There is something here for everyone but all too little from everyone, or at least many, who might have had or will have something of value to contribute to fundamental questions. That, of course, raises the question of sources.

The book has an exceptionally solid foundation in the three kinds of sources most readily available at such an early stage in the war’s historiography. Inevitably, Cordesman relies upon the official briefings of the coalition’s aggressive public-relations machine, upon the early “documents” manufactured to summarize points that the various governments wished to present, and, to a lesser degree, upon a variety of journalistic accounts. Extensive quotations from official briefings and published statements provide quite a comprehensive version of the US government’s view of the course of the war. The notes are very clear guides to the locations of transcripts of briefings and other sources summarized in the text. When technical clarification requires further explanation, the notes refer the reader to articles or books helpful in understanding the basis of the author’s discussions. In all these respects, the volume is a model of what can and should be accomplished in such a preliminary study.

Cordesman provides an encyclopedic listing of coalition forces of every kind and of their actions in the course of the campaign to the fall of Baghdad. Iraq had no navy to speak of and an air force incapable of resisting the kind of aerial strength available to the world’s wealthiest, most advanced nation and its allies. As Cordesman notes, on the ground several factors acted to nullify Iraq’s moderate advantage (largely apparent rather than real) in numbers. Technological superiority and airpower combined to give coalition forces overwhelming dominance in combat power far beyond that suggested by any numerical comparison. As the author notes, there may be no way to model the disparities in real strength when the United States faces such an opponent. Iraqi forces could not move in large numbers and could not fight in a coordinated manner, although much battalion-level combat took place.

Even though the march to Baghdad proved relatively easy, Cordesman cautions against an excess of American “triumphalism.” We do not yet know enough about the details of combat to “make sweeping judgments about what forces did or did not contribute to the outcome.” In this area rests the second major value of the volume: an exhaustive examination of the possible lessons and very detailed discussions of questions to be considered in future efforts to estimate strategic situations, judge capabilities, and transform the US military into an even more modern and technologically based force.

The author’s identification of problems, shortcomings, failures, and lessons will find supporters and detractors in every part of the US government. There is something here for almost everyone to like and dislike. His challenging arguments in the military realm touch every aspect of America’s armed forces, from the lowest units of infantry combat to use of space and information technology. Every officer should be interested in what he has to say. Fortunately, Cordesman’s searching probes go far beyond combat and combat support into the broader area of national strategy.

The following are but a sample of these. His warnings relating to conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation building are worthy of consideration and have become even more obviously relevant since the completion of the manuscript. These include the caution that in such circumstances and with such goals, a nation will find implementation of its grand strategy more elusive than achieving success in combat. Cordesman argues that the United States caused many (not all) of the problems that emerged after Saddam’s fall. The range of foreseeable yet unforeseen problems is staggering.

Among the dozens of mistakes that contributed to or even caused these problems, a few seem particularly noteworthy: failure of the National Security Council to perform its mission; failure of the Department of Defense (and others) to create a working interagency approach to planning and executing peacemaking; reliance on civilian officials more expert in ideology than in policy; placement of coalition headquarters in the middle of Baghdad; failure of military leaders to prepare plans for combat termination; failure of the US military culture to look beyond war fighting despite numerous warnings; and so forth.

One does not have to agree with all or even any of this path-breaking book’s conclusions to derive value from it. The tone of The Iraq War, like its subject, is somber and unsettling. Ultimately, waving the bloody shirt is useful for creating popular support for war, but it provides a poor basis for strategy. This would be a good place to start contemplating the problems of such undertakings before we run off to do it again.

 Dr. Daniel J. Hughes
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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