Published: 12 November 2008
Air & Space Power Journal-Summer 1998

Lt Col Douglas Macgregor’s book Breaking the Phalanx lays out a framework to reshape US land forces for the twenty-first century. Although his ideas for the Army are visionary, his views on airpower are of some concern. Airmen need to be aware of Macgregor’s positions because he has the potential to be the “Army’s John Warden.”

Macgregor’s prevailing criticism of airpower advocates is their “silver bullet” approach to war. He criticizes America’s and Great Britain’s fascination with aviation in the pre-World War II era as a shortsighted attempt at deterrence. In his opinion, the fascination with and subsequent diversion of resources are (mostly) responsible for the ill state of allied ground forces during the 1930s. However, one of the motivating factors for advancing the use of airpower was to avoid the slaughter of the trenches during World War I. Isolationist sentiment, reinforced by the Army’s great losses in World War I, was prevalent throughout the United States during the 1930s and did not end until the attack on Pearl Harbor.

He also ignores America’s long-standing resentment of large standing armies and the effect the Depression had on the West’s ability to support such armies. Macgregor acknowledges FDR’s hope that airpower (and sea power) could avoid the large-scale use of troops. He states that “President Roosevelt’s strategy to exert political influence through the exclusive reliance of seapower and later airpower did nothing to dissuade Germany, Japan, Italy, and Soviet Russia from aggressive action between 1938 and 1942.” This failure to deter aggression cannot be blamed solely on the reliance on sea power and airpower. Also, even if there had been numerous US forces deployed overseas, deterring the aggressive acts of Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo would not have been a forgone conclusion.

Regarding the Vietnam conflict, Lieutenant Colonel Macgregor cites how airpower was ill prepared for anything but a full-scale nuclear war with the USSR. However, he glosses over the fact that the Army’s training at that time was primarily focused on a Warsaw Pact versus NATO scenario. The Air Force, Navy, and Army did not foresee a prolonged war in the jungles of Southeast Asia (SEA). Subsequently, the Department of Defense had very little doctrine or preparation for a drawn-out guerrilla campaign. When airpower was allowed to operate freely, it did achieve the desired results (Khe Sanh and Linebacker II). The complex politics and policies of the SEA conflict hamstrung all US forces, including airpower.

For the Gulf War, Macgregor criticizes airpower advocates for selectively using TV news to advance their themes. He also quotes several surveys that highlight the inefficiency of airpower during Desert Storm. He believes that the strategic bombing campaign’s effects on Iraq were overrated and that the force-on-force engagement during the “100 hour war” was decisive. He believes that Operation Desert Storm was a four-day land war with 38 days of battlefield preparation, not a 42-day full-spectrum campaign. However, during a taped interview with novelist Tom Clancy, Macgregor (unintentionally) describes the effects of constant bombardment on enemy forces. In reviewing the tank battle of “73 Easting” (a reference to map coordinates in Iraq), Macgregor stated that “the Iraqis initially thought it [the US tank attack] was an air strike-some of them jumped out of their tanks.” Evidently, airpower had devastated that Iraqi tank unit’s combat effectiveness and morale.

Lieutenant Colonel Macgregor is not totally anti-airpower. He even wants the Army Tactical Missile System and Apaches to be under the control of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) during the initial phase of a theater campaign. However, he later states that “control of the air in contemporary concepts of future warfare has become synonymous with centralization of control over all land-based and sea-based deep strike assets in the hands of the JFACC. This approach does not admit the possibility that the success of future operations may depend on more in the [battle space] preparatory phase outlined earlier or that aircraft will ‘not always get through.’” He later states that “centralization of control [of airpower] may be the answer at the outset or at the end, but not throughout the conduct of operations in future war.” This implies a return to “penny packets” of airpower. Early failure in World War II and the relearned lessons of the Vietnam War prove that airpower must be orchestrated by one conductor. Centralized control prevents fratricide and the wasting of weapons. The cascading effects that properly applied airpower can deliver upon an enemy must not be parceled away by a landcentric point of view.

Breaking the Phalanx is a thought-provoking book. Macgregor’s ideas for modernizing the Army are truly revolutionary. The author may not fully appreciate the strategic effects of airpower, but his book is worth reading by military officers.

Maj Kevin J. Cole, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.