Document created: 25 July 01
Aerospace Power Journal

Waging Modern War by General Wesley K. Clark. Perseus Books Group, 250 West 57^th Street, Suite 1321, New York, New York 10107, 2001, 465 pages, $30.00.

General Clark’s book is primarily a blow-by-blow narrative of his role in both the negotiations resulting in the Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnia Conflict in 1995 and his command of Operation Allied Force in 1999 as SACEUR. From his experiences in both of these events Clark seeks to draw broader lessons about the future of war, the role of the various services, and the future of the U.S. armed forces. Given that Allied Force is arguably the first case where an air campaign was used exclusively to produce a political/diplomatic outcome, this is a book that should be read by those interested in airpower and its application in future conflicts.

Much of the post-war analysis done by airmen on Operation of Allied Force focuses on the flaws in the operation and its lack of conformity with traditional airpower doctrines. The limitations on targeting, the extreme concern for collateral damage, the lack of clear objectives, the political interference, etc. all are cited as things which conflict with the ways that modern airmen are taught to fight wars. Though it was not written with that purpose in mind, Clarke’s book answers the mail on much of the criticism from this perspective. After reading Clark’s account of the enormously complex political negotiations which he had to engage in on a daily basis in order to hold a coalition of 19 nations together to fight a war, one is left with the feeling that it is truly amazing that it held together as long as it did. Clark undoubtedly deserves no small measure of credit for this.

Not only did Clark have to juggle the opinions of 19 Presidents, Prime ministers, Defense Ministers, the Russians, and the State Department, but also the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs were major players and Clark’s criticism of their role is only thinly veiled. The account of Clark’s attempt to bring the Appache Helicopters into the war under Task Force Hawk is particularly fascinating. Clark was forced to wage an ultimately unsuccessful battle to get the Joint Chiefs, and specifically the institutional Army, to approve the employment of the Appaches. For those who say Goldwater-Nichols went to far in ceding authority to the theater CINC’s, Clark’s retort would be that it didn’t do far enough. While the letter of Goldwater-Nichols may have been followed, the spirit was certainly not from Clark’s point of view. Here was a case of a field commander, engaged in combat, unable to employ resources at his disposal because of the objections of those in the Army whose job it was to organize, train, and equip, and those on the JCS who were supposed to serve in advisory capacity. Given the overall impression in both the public mind, and among the military in general, that Task Force Hawk was a fiasco and called into question the future relevance of the Army, the Army may come to regret the decisions they made in this matter.

One area where I felt the book lacked was its recommendations regarding the future of NATO. Clark amply demonstrates how the complex NATO structure was ill suited to decision-making in wartime. Clark himself at times seems unclear if he wearing his SACEUR hat or his EUCOM hat and what his responsibilities were to each. The classic principal of unity of command was nowhere in evidence. This was not only a problem at the strategic level but had tactical significance as well. Clark’s account of his order to General Jackson, the British KFOR Commander, to land helicopters at Pristina Airport in advance of a Russian contingent and Jackson’s response of "I’m not starting World War III for you," is telling. Even field commanders like Jackson were unsure of who gave them orders and what authority they had. The NATO structure, which was designed ultimately to stop the Soviets from charging through the Fulda Gap, is likely too cumbersome to meet the security needs of Europe in the 21^st century. A discussion from Clarke about the future of European security and NATO and the U.S. role in it, would have been helpful.

Overall the lessons in this book for airmen are simple. Firstly, airpower is attractive to the political leadership because of its antiseptic nature, low probability of casualties, and ability to be centrally controlled. As such airpower is likely to be, more often than not, the force of choice for the National Command Authority, and airmen had better be ready for a wide range of conflicts in which we might find ourselves. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly General Clark shows us that while airpower doctrine calls for clearly defined objectives, a relentless strategic bombing campaign, wide latitude in tactical and operational decisions, and a clearly defined end-state and exit strategy, these things may not be available or even desired by those making strategic decisions. Current airpower thinking is a culmination of our history and experience and seems to have achieved its apex in the Gulf War. Waging Modern War cautions us that future conflict may look much more like Allied Force than Desert Storm. Reluctant allies, unclear objectives, the 24-hour CNN barrage, and a host of other concerns not covered in the doctrinal manuals or training are here to stay. Airmen had best prepare for them.

Major Robert Levinson
Wonju ASN, Korea

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.