Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare by Robert M. Citino. University Press of Kansas (http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu), 2501 West 15th Street, Lawrence, Kansas 66049-3905, 2004, 424 pages, $39.95 (hardcover).
Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, June 2001, defines operational warfare as “the level at which campaigns and major operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. . . . [It] determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces are employed to influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives” (2-2 through 2-4). Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm examines warfare in the mid to late twentieth century through the prism of this definition (even though Robert Citino, the author, does not say as much) to determine how modern armies attempt to produce decisive results—the elusive goal of operational warfare.
Citino builds on his previous works on this subject—The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–1939 (1999) and Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899–1940 (2002)—to illustrate the essentials of operational success in warfare. He examines the operational level of warfare in World War II, the Korean conflict, the Arab-Israeli wars, the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, the Vietnam War, the Iran-Iraq War, and the first Gulf War as examples of armies shaping the battlefield and exerting their will upon the enemy rather than merely aiming the army in enemy’s general direction, as happens more often than not in warfare.
Military leaders should read this book closely to ensure that they don’t fall into the usual trap of looking for formulas of success that fail to reveal the nature of the operational art. The author points out the ease of developing an arrangement for decisive victory, but attaining such results is a rarity. Citino eschews the use of magic words that tend to find their way into the military lexicon only to be overused by less thoughtful leaders and academicians as if the mere mention of them grants legitimacy to one’s position. He points out that the now commonly used German terms such as Auftragstaktik are actually the creation of non-German observers attempting to explain the early German successes in World War II. Now we have several American concepts such as information warfare and asymmetrical warfare that have crept into modern thinking on the subject of conflict. Like some antibiotics, these terms can lose their effectiveness from overuse.
Advising against the pursuit of concrete theories of war, Citino favors a continuing study of warfare that contributes to the planning process. He touts the importance of applying fire and maneuver equally in combined-arms operations to put pressure on the enemy from all directions. The skillful execution of such operations tends to blur the distinctions between mobility and firepower.
Using examples from the Iran-Iraq War, Citino cautions against giving too much credence to the pronouncements of pundits and analysts who populate the 24-hour news cycle. Observers of the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan should find this advice useful during the current deluge of reporting on every minuscule event. News alerts purporting to inform and educate are posted virtually every hour on the all-news networks. Such notices are based on the flimsiest of information, resulting in shallow analysis that goes unexplained, unexamined, or uncorrected and has a shelf life lasting only until the release of the next big story—sometimes only minutes away. Such reporting tends to degrade a viewer’s understanding of the operational level of warfare, replacing it with an insatiable taste for sound bites and film clips, taking all who indulge in them down a path of snap judgments and decisions based on opinion polls.
Citino questions the wisdom of the current US Army approach to transformation, which seems to replace firepower with speed. He warns against substituting a robust Army with one that is smaller, lighter, and cheaper. Although such transformation may seem wise during relatively peaceful times interrupted by small, limited wars, the author suggests that we may find ourselves in the same boat as the British at the outset of World War II when their small “tankettes” could not stand up to German armor. He points out that the best reason for maintaining a heavy force is that it can better deal with an unpredictable future. Successful armies do not lock themselves into limited courses of action; rather, they keep their options open and available so that they can respond to threats decisively. As reasonable as that sounds, the fact that Citino does not offer any analysis that compares the pre–World War II political/military situation with today’s environment makes his concerns seem a bit speculative at best. There are few significant threats on the horizon that we cannot oppose with airpower and deep fires—options that didn’t exist for the British in 1940. When one considers today’s improved capabilities, the author’s comparisons of the current military transformation with pre–World War II armies may not stand up.
Citino concludes that operational success depends upon a commitment to four elements that have proven so useful in the past. Training, doctrine, weaponry, and military history are more important than technology and the various buzzwords of warfare. Ever since Russell Weigley wrote The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (1973), soldiers and scholars have struggled with identifying an American way of war. Some individuals believe that it is actually only an American way of battle. Citino’s book continues the exploration of this concept—one that might allow armies to translate operational conquests to strategic victories. In perhaps his most insightful statement, he observes that “there is only one law regarding operational doctrine; in the end, each army must work out its own doctrine for itself, based on its national values, traditions, and culture” (p. 96). Our challenge today lies in discovering those elements and applying them to operational warfare. Readers of Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm will be rewarded by an informative and interesting review of recent military history that will inspire thoughtful consideration of the future.
Command Sgt Maj James H. Clifford, USA
Fort Gillem, Georgia
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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