Published: 1 March 2009
Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2009

Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism by Daniel Byman. Cambridge University Press (http://us.cambridge.org), 32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10013-2473, 2005, 380 pages, $30.00 (hardcover), $18.99 (softcover) (2007).

It is not surprising that one of the nation’s most thoughtful writers on the use of coercion as a ­foreign-policy tool would write a book on terrorism that shifts the focus away from the terrorist and toward the state. This shift is a welcomed change in a field of study that overflows with analyses of nonstate actors while seemingly forgetting that the nation-state remains the primary actor in the international-security environment. Deadly Connections by Daniel Byman, a RAND veteran and Georgetown University professor, is aimed at educating policy makers and strategists on why states support terrorism so that those individuals can develop more effective strategies to halt support. Undoubtedly, this book is a must-read for those interested in deterring terrorism.

Byman’s examination of state-sponsored terrorism flows logically from his definitions and analysis of the nature of state sponsorship, through his detailed post-cold-war case studies, to his recommendations on tools for halting state-supported terrorism. Perhaps his most important addition to the terrorism literature is the taxonomy he develops for examining the wide spectrum of state sponsorship and his subsequent analysis of terrorist motivations and types of support. Readers will gain a new appreciation of the nuances and complex interactions between terrorists and states.

Building on the work of US counterterrorism expert Paul Pillar, Byman classifies state sponsors on a scale that ranges from “strong supporters,” such as Iran’s support of Hizballah, to “passive supporters” and “unwilling hosts,” such as Saudi Arabia and Somalia (p. 15). His schema illustrates the broad spectrum of support that states provide terrorist organizations and serves as the basis for his analysis of why states support terrorism and the types of support they provide.

Given the recent emphasis on ties between political Islam and terrorism, some readers might be surprised that ideology is not necessarily the leading motivator for states to support terrorist activities. Noting that there is no “one” reason, Byman uses a weighted quantitative analysis to illustrate that strategic motivations, such as destabilizing a neighboring state and projecting power, tend to be the most common reasons. He details the impact of the various types of support on terrorist groups’ strength, organization, and operations and then explains how this support impedes counterterrorism efforts against those groups. Calling state support a “devil’s bargain,” Byman explains how state support can actually weaken the terrorist organization when the supporting state’s needs become incongruent with the terrorists’ (p. 78). Consequently, terrorist organizations do not always desire strong state support.

With the exception of one chapter on passive supporters, Deadly Connections focuses on those states that fall into the active-supporter categories. His in-depth case studies on Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and the Taliban’s Afghanistan illustrate the various motivations behind state support along with the consequences. The case studies make it clear how state support changes over time and the important role it plays in realpolitik. These case studies, along with the appendix, which provides a brief summary of major terrorist groups, will prove particularly useful to students studying terrorism.

Byman ends Deadly Connections with recommendations on halting state support and makes it clear that there is no “universal policy or simple response that the United States . . . can take to get state sponsors out of the terrorism business” (pp. 273–74). He examines various instruments of coercion and analyzes the Libyan case to illustrate the multifaceted, long, and arduous road to success. His advice for developing successful strategy is first to understand the motivations and then capitalize on them by using coercive tools such as engagement, political and economic pressure, and force. He cautions that strategies which work with one state might backfire with another, especially when their motivations and type of sponsorship are different.

All readers will find Deadly Connections interesting and informative. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in learning more about terrorism—especially those involved in developing counterterrorism policy.

Col Sean M. Frisbee, USAF
Baghdad, Iraq

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.