Published: 8 July  05
Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2005

Air Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas That Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II by Stephen Budiansky. Penguin Group (USA), Inc. (http://www.penguin.com), 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, 2004, 528 pages, $29.95 (hardcover).

In the “author’s note” at the beginning of his work, Stephen Budiansky observed that the only way he could tell the story of airpower was to be “quite ruthless” in his decisions on what to omit. While one might take exception to some of Budiansky’s cuts, the remaining material forms a compelling story that incorporates many of the key personalities, technological milestones, and key operations that have shaped airpower as it exists today. His unique and meticulous documentation, coupled with a writing style that is both interesting and entertaining, have combined to produce a work of value for fledgling airpower scholars and enthusiasts alike.

The author begins his story in the era immediately preceding man’s first heavier-than-air flight at Kitty Hawk. He describes the visions of aerial warfare that so riveted the popular reading public of the day and lays out a fascinating chronology of the technological innovations that resulted in the Wrights’ success. The juxtaposition of ideas about aerial warfare with the contemporary technology, through each of the eras he examines, is a strength of Budiansky’s work. One quickly grasps a point, which underscores much of the narrative that—for most of airpower’s history—technology has been incapable of delivering on the promises of its proponents.

As the author proceeds into the post–World War One period, a second major theme emerges that helps explain the proponents’ failure to deliver on their promises. Budiansky challenges the notion that strategic-bombing theory ever offered the quick and relatively bloodless victories promised by its disciples. He contends Airmen were converted to strategic bombing not just because of the advantages it seemed to offer, but also because the limitations of their equipment made them powerless to achieve a decisive impact on the battlefield—in those operations we now label “counterland.” As a result, Airmen overlooked obvious contradictions between their theories of a morale impact and the actual effects of bombing in World War I. They also overlooked the fact that their technology was incapable of meeting the estimates for bombing precision and destructiveness that they used as baselines in creating equipment production requirements and doctrine.

Having outlined these contradictions, Budiansky traces their evolution through the Cold War period to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Throughout this discussion, he introduces his readers to technological, organizational, and doctrinal innovations that were supposed to ameliorate the gap between airpower’s capabilities and its intended decisiveness but somehow always fell short. It is only in the most recent era that Budiansky feels airpower has come of age. Armed with a precision capability, the likes of which early proponents could only dream, and equipped with defensive capabilities such as stealth and electronic countermeasures—to reduce vulnerabilities that restricted air operations in the past—airpower has finally been able to achieve what Budiansky believes is its rightful destiny. Airpower has achieved ascendancy through its decisive impact on the battlefield.

Because of the quality of his arguments and the splendid variety of interesting anecdotes and facts that bolster his narrative, Budiansky’s work is an excellent addition to the literature on airpower history. That said—even should one agree with his view on airpower’s ultimate destiny—one is likely to take exception to some aspects of Budiansky’s approach.

This reviewer was troubled by the virtual exclusion of noncombat applications of airpower from Budiansky’s discussion. In one of airlift’s few appearances in the discussion, he observes that the airlift of 20,000 troops into Spain was “the salvation of the rebellion.” Certainly this points to a strategic effect beyond the battlefield. Was airlift omitted because it did not fit the argument? Reconnaissance and air refueling were given similar short shrift.

More troubling was the author’s tendency to stay focused on the English-speaking nations. In a work entitled Air Power, one expects a broader international view. Certainly there were forays into the international arena, but these routinely came back to a US focus. Budiansky’s description of the dawn of jet propulsion serves as an adequate example. He offered an excellent summation of the technological obstacles that were overcome to produce the first British jet-powered aircraft, and then, after taking readers through the development of Frank Whittle’s Gloster Meteor, he points out “[a]n experimental German jet had flown two years before Whittle’s” (p. 358). There is a similar disconnect in his description of the development of swept wings. After describing the American developments, he adds that the inventor’s “credibility was almost immediately bolstered by the discovery that German scientists had independently arrived at the same conclusion” (p. 361).

These are minor detractions, however, resulting more from the author’s approach to his topic than any shortcoming in the quality of the narrative. There is more than adequate information for the enthused scholar to pursue these various topics to a more satisfying conclusion. On the whole, Budiansky’s book meets the lofty objectives he set for himself. In a little over 400 pages of narrative, he offers a compelling overview of airpower history.

Lt Col Matthew C. Stafford, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama


Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.


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