The Influence of Air Power upon History by Walter J. Boyne. Pelican Publishing Company (http://www.pelicanpub.com), P.O. Box 3110, Gretna, Louisiana 70054, 2003, 448 pages, $29.95 (hardcover).
Walter Boyne, a retired US Air Force officer and accomplished aviation author, surveys airpower in a manner intentionally reminiscent of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s nineteenth-century classic The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783. Much as Mahan posits six conditions that affect national sea power, Boyne offers five factors—"an analogous set of factors that molds air-power theory and determines its success or failure." They include (1) the air force’s budget size and share of the total military budget, (2) the nation’s perception of the security threat, (3) the level of aviation technology, (4) the politics of national leaders, and (5) the key people who influence air force affairs (pp. 124–26). According to Boyne, these factors remained valid until the mid-1950s when nuclear-strategy concepts such as massive retaliation superseded them. The author sometimes describes the five factors as "immutable" (p. 141) but notes that they did not apply to the USSR during the interwar era (p. 165). He deems airpower a strong influence upon history when applied correctly in relation to the factors.
Boyne does not mirror every aspect of Mahan’s book or compare sea power to airpower. Instead, he says that his book "is intended to look into the development of air-power philosophy over its history by examining the theory and practice of air power as demonstrated not only in war, but also in politics, diplomacy, technology, and mass culture" (p. 11). He defines airpower broadly as "the ability to conduct military, commercial, or humanitarian operations at a chosen place, but not necessarily at all places nor at all times" (p. 18). Although his definition includes air and space activities by military and civilian organizations, the book emphasizes air and military topics. Boyne’s remarks about mass culture encompass radio, motion pictures, and other mass-media technologies that developed in parallel with airpower during the twentieth century. Psychological elements—often the fear of airpower’s destructive potential—underlie all the factors he discusses. He says less about how airpower may have inspired the popular imagination or encouraged positive attitudes towards advanced technology.
The book uses appropriate references—mostly secondary sources and memoirs—and, for the most part, follows a chronological scheme of organization. Chapter 1 begins in the late nineteenth century, and subsequent chapters extend the narrative through the present day. The only departure from this order occurs in an appendix on military ballooning during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Boyne treats this subject in an appendix "for editorial purposes" (p. 17), but readers who prefer to trace the airpower story chronologically may wish to read the appendix before perusing chapter 1.
The author applies several analytical methods. The five factors usually remain in the background, tending to govern the way he organizes his narrative. He consistently seeks to depict airpower’s influence but avoids the perennial question of its "decisiveness." Key "personalities," central to the discussion, include theorists like Giulio Douhet and practitioners like Gen Curtis LeMay. Boyne also notes that academics and military officers such as Mark Clodfelter, Ben Lambeth, and John Warden have served as influential airpower "philosophers" during recent years (pp. 354–55). Boyne analyzes airpower’s influence on at least two levels, the simpler one examining how airpower affects the outcome of battles or related events and the other addressing how it influences history in a broader sense. To justify which events exerted truly significant historical influence, the author often uses "what if" reasoning. For example, he defends the use of atomic bombs against Japan, saying that the bombs saved lives by ending World War II sooner than an invasion could have. He also argues that in Vietnam "if airpower had been applied with a stronger political will from the start . . . it might have actually won the war" (p. 320). Historians might wince at Boyne’s frequent recourse to counterfactual arguments, but other readers are apt to find these controversial speculations intriguing. His analytical methods change over the course of the book. Early chapters systematically cover aeronautical developments in various countries, but later ones focus more on the US perspective. The increasing predominance of US airpower during recent decades may help explain this shift in emphasis.
The book devotes more pages to World War II and earlier events than to subsequent periods. Including the appendix on early ballooning, the author spends about 280 pages on the years through 1945 but only about 80 pages on subsequent events. The reason for the heavy emphasis on airpower’s early years is not clear. Although Boyne characterizes the combination of the B-29 and atomic bombs used against Japan as "ultimate airpower" (p. 280), he does not claim that airpower’s influence upon history declined after 1945. Perhaps the author simply devotes more room to describing airpower events in various countries and combat theaters in chapters on the world wars than he does in chapters about more recent events. For example, the section on the Battle of Britain is longer than the one on the entire Korean War.
Readers should be aware of a few scattered errors, such as Boyne’s citing 1968 (actually 1958) as the year NASA came into being (p. 96). Furthermore, the US Navy—not Billy Mitchell’s followers—developed the Norden bombsight (p. 149). The text also mistakenly says that the Vietcong were largely imported from North Korea (p. 323) and that Operation Allied Force followed Deliberate Force by two years rather than four (p. 362). However, these errors—mostly of a typographical nature—are only minor detractions from a fine book. Aside from such typos, the endnotes, bibliography, and index are useful, but the study lacks illustrations. Readers would welcome a few pictures.
The Influence of Air Power upon History skillfully conveys a vision that highlights the strength of airpower’s influence rather than its supposedly inherent limitations. Not a history of airpower, the book is a highly readable and somewhat controversial interpretation of airpower written for a popular audience. Readers already acquainted with airpower history will likely gain the most from reading it. Timing its publication to coincide with the centennial of the Wright brothers’ first flight is appropriate because Boyne’s study places airpower in a broad historical context.
Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
Book Reviews | Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor