The volume under review meets all of these desirable criteria. It provides an over-the-shoulder look at the working out of strategy by one of its greatest practitioners of the twentieth century, George Catlett Marshall. It shows him dealing with a plethora of strategic issues that significantly influenced the achievement of Allied victory in World War II and the shape of the postwar world. Furthermore, the editors have facilitated comprehension of the material by including a helpful chronology of the major events in Marshall’s professional life during the period, excellent explanatory synopses of major events in which Marshall participated but about which he did not originate substantive documents, and detailed explanatory notes that identify major players and put issues in context.

It is impossible in a short space to do justice either to the breadth of issues Marshall confronted in the two years covered by this volume or to the depth of his painstaking efforts to ensure that strategic design was buttressed by the detailed staff work and coordination necessary to give it the best possible chance of success. Thus, this review will but touch on three critical issues that Marshall dealt with: Army ground-force structure in the closing months of World War II; the creation of a unified military department; and one of the most intractable problems ever to confront American statesmanship—the post–World War II governance of China.

The basic decision on Army ground-force structure had been made in late 1943: cap it at 88 divisions. This was based primarily on Marshall’s judgment that the Army’s service forces and the air forces (particularly the B-29 program) required much more manpower than had been originally estimated and that the efficiency and effectiveness which came from these forces justified taking fairly significant risks in ground-force structure. During the fall of 1944, as the Army in Europe was slugging its way across eastern France and Belgium in its push to the German border and ground units in the Pacific were meeting strong Japanese resistance at Leyte, it seemed to Secretary of War Henry Stimson that there were too few divisions to meet strategic requirements. Stimson’s angst on this issue came to a head during the German Ardennes counteroffensive launched in mid-December 1944. Finally, on 4 January 1945, Stimson could stand it no longer, and he “had it out with Marshall” (p. 9, note 2). But to no avail—Marshall stood his ground and would not yield to Stimson’s entreaties. Although fairly desperate measures had to be taken to find infantrymen, Marshall’s stance was clearly justified by subsequent events. It also represents one of those interesting issues in which the military leader was quite justified in resisting the intrusions of his political master.

Perhaps Marshall’s most enduring commitment made to American postwar security was his firm and unequivocal support for a unified military department. In a memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 10 October 1945, he laid out his argument for such unity with impeccable clarity. He began by noting that postwar peace depended on American involvement in international affairs, that such involvement demanded military capability to back it up, and that such capacity required political acceptance of military expenditure. He further remarked that 

it is, therefore, of especial importance, I believe, to the future peace of the world that whatever we propose for our armed forces be on a sound business-like basis to secure the most economical set-up compatible with requirements. I am strongly convinced that unless there is a single department for the armed forces within which the difficult and numerous complexities can be ironed out prior to a presentation of requirements to the Bureau of the Budget and Congress, there can be little hope for the future of maintaining a military posture that the world will respect, and will respond to our future military overtures accordingly (p. 328).

Such a department would, of course, require separate and equal land, air, and sea components, i.e., it would demand an institutionally independent air force. Although such a development was almost inevitable, the fact that Marshall put the full force of his personality and the full prestige of his office behind the initiative greatly accelerated its adoption. Thus, if it is correct to say that Hap Arnold was the “father of the United States Air Force,” it is probably also accurate to identify George Marshall as its godfather.

Marshall’s mission to China was one of the most thankless tasks ever given to an American soldier. It required reconciling the virtually irreconcilable ideologies of Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist movement and Mao Tse-tung’s communists. Marshall spent 12 massively frustrating months using every ounce of military professionalism and political savoir faire he could muster to achieve some sort of modus vivendi between the two competing factions, ultimately to no avail. But his papers regarding this effort are fascinating in three respects. First, aspiring strategists can learn much from the way Marshall systematically prepared himself for his assignment. Second, they can study the tremendous patience and creativity Marshall displayed in attempting to craft a workable solution to an intractable problem. And finally, they can profit from absorbing the candor and texture of Marshall’s frequent dispatches to President Truman that pithily described and cogently assessed extremely complex political-military situations in concise, compelling prose. Marshall’s life and work truly demonstrate that the making of sound strategy is built on a foundation of clear thinking and effective communication.

Dr. Harold R. Winton
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.