Published: 23 Apr 2007
Air & Space Power
Journal - Winter 2007
The Age of Total War, 1860–1945 by Jeremy Black. Praeger Security
International, Greenwood Publishing Group (http://www.praeger.com/psi), 88 Post
Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881, 2006, 216 pages, $44.95 (hardcover).
The term total war frequently conjures up mental pictures of intense suffering
and death, mass destruction, widespread conflict, and perhaps a national
commitment to prosecuting war bordering on fanaticism. Jeremy Black, in The Age
of Total War, 1860–1945, does a magnificent job of illustrating the complex ties
to each image and demonstrating why, even within these stark illustrations, wars
may or may not be “total.”
Black’s premise is that one must have a focus of time as well as place to say whether or not a given war is a “total war.” Many factors must come together to culminate in an experience that would inarguably become a total war (summarized on p. 1). He evaluates a block of history, from 1860 to 1945, which provides a wide sampling of conflicts that in many ways reflects some or most of the elements he describes on page 1.
Through the first two chapters, the author walks the reader through examples of total war in a microcosm. This introduction is important to understand why Black states that there is more to the totality of war than simply what the beholder perceives. Each case study, covering conflicts worldwide from 1860 to prior to World War I, sets the stage for the following chapters.
The Age of Total War’s discussions of World Wars I and II positively shine. First, in describing World War I, Black gives the reader examples of the player states’ commitments to the war in terms of treasure, blood, territory, national pride, mobilization, and industrial capability. He discusses the Versailles settlement at length, including the carving up of Germany and Austria; the creation of new states; the number of dead and wounded; and reparations due from Germany. “[The Versailles settlement] was a settlement without compromise. Insofar as total war was a matter of outcomes, this was total war” (p. 100).
Black then turns to World War II. Drawing from several fellow historians’ work and setting the stage by using Versailles, he argues that World War II was a kaleidoscopic conflict of totality, depending on how one views segments of the conflict. For example, the British and Americans preserved the “civilized inhibitions of their societies” in their fighting on the Western Front (p. 144), suggesting a more limited conflict; this contrasts with the level of brutality experienced on the Eastern Front between the Germans and the Soviet Union, which suggests that both parties waged a total war (pp. 146 and 147).
Black sums up this work by saying that “the understanding of war in terms of campaigning—the operational approach to war—is far too narrow. Instead, it is more appropriate to understand war as a cultural process that focuses on the imposition of will. . . . People are beaten when they understand that they have lost” (pp. 169–70).
The extent to which a state commits itself to impose its will on another ultimately defines the totality of a conflict. One could argue that today’s global war on terrorism is a limited conflict from the US/coalition perspective—but a total war from almost any one of the opposing parties’ views, based on their level of commitment and desire to impose their will. I heartily recommend The Age of Total War for planners at all levels, who would do well to reflect on the application of its lessons to adaptive plans for future operations.
Maj Paul Niesen, USAF
Scott AFB, Illinois
Disclaimer
Book Reviews | Home Page |Feedback? Email the Editor