The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service

The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service edited by Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy, and John T. Warner. Potomac Books, Inc. (formerly Brassey’s, Inc.) (http://www.potomacbooksinc.com/Books/Features.aspx), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2004, 352 pages, $44.00 (hardcover), $21.60 (softcover).

I’ve never been a fan of personnel (faces) or manpower (spaces) issues. I find these subjects about as exciting as watching the grass grow on a hot Kansas afternoon—they are best left to the classic Pattonesque staff officer. In fact, I am still unsure why I decided to review a book on such subject matter. But I’m glad I did.

The All-Volunteer Force is more than just a happy, pat-on-the-back book on the virtues and successes of this force. Almost all of its articles declare the virtues, successes, and hurdles overcome by the all-volunteer force, which President Nixon signed into law in 1973. But many of them also criticize the present course and make recommendations for changes to manpower policies, recruiting practices, end strengths, use of the Reserve and Guard forces, and the structure of the active duty ranks.

The editors have collected papers presented on 16–17 September 2003 at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, adding both introductory commentaries and summaries. Divided into five sections—the all-volunteer force in perspective, recruiting and retention, contributions of the Reserve component, transformation in military manpower and personnel policy, and the next decade—the book focuses on the past 30 years’ experience and explores the question “Why will more young people continue to volunteer for and remain in the US military?”

The list of contributors spans current and former government officials, military officers, business executives, professors and university presidents, and members of Congress, who provide the reader with many perspectives, often from outside the Department of Defense (DOD). Several writers, citing “better business practices,” have recommendations regarding several of the DOD’s “pet rocks,” including the time-honored military pay scale and the retirement system. Others poke at recruiting policies that affect just Reserve forces, basing, and murky issues which in some obscure way relate to manpower or personnel.

I found Martin Anderson’s retelling of how the 1973 drive for an all-volunteer force began (p. 15) both enlightening and compelling. Several contributors mention that the force directly reflects the society from which it comes. However, today’s force skims a large proportion of qualified and highly qualified candidates from the total pool of applicants, most of them possessing a high school diploma. Similarly, today’s force disproportionately reflects America’s growing Hispanic population (which, demographically, is neither as likely to finish high school with a diploma nor to score as well on the aptitude tests). Recruiter challenges today include keeping the pool top-notch while expanding opportunities for more Hispanics to enter the service (p. 155).

Vice Adm Patricia A. Tracey sums up a DOD “to do” list that reaches across several broad areas, covers all services, and looks to the future (p. 321):

• An increased probability of hostile action—preemptive and preventive action, as well as defensive action (as described in an essay by Arthur Cebrowski)—requires a change in terms of service.
• A higher percentage of the force probably needs to be in combat support or combat service-support specialties in order to sustain a higher level of real-world activity (Cebrowski calls these people system administrators).
• The active/Reserve mix needs to change, as do the rules for active/Reserve assignment and utilization.
• The DOD needs new policies to better manage operation tempo—policies that go beyond paying people who stay away from home longer than they would otherwise want to, but that ensure the regeneration of troops as well as equipment.
• Services must better anticipate market effects on recruiting and retention.
• Policy makers and force planners must recognize that military personnel are not free goods. Acquisition, force planning, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures all need examining with an eye toward economy regarding requirements for people.

The “personnel triad” of Ed Dorn, former undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, offers an effective summary: recruit them, train them, and treat them right (p. 344). His bottom line is even simpler, albeit blunter: the DOD needs either a bigger force or a smaller empire. “Bigger force” speaks for itself; “smaller empire” means that the DOD needs to find “new, and perhaps more humble, ways to engage the rest of the international community” (p. 347).

Cong. Heather Wilson counts herself among the many individuals who point out that the country’s armed forces are approaching the limit of their ability to continue to perform missions associated with the global war on terrorism (GWOT). To date, no one outside the administration has argued that the nation can maintain its present commitments, over the long run, with current personnel levels. Specifically, she recommends expanding special forces and Special Operations Command (p. 327). Additionally, she adds her voice to those calling on the DOD not only to increase its authorized strength by as much as 90,000 to 150,000 positions, but also to look outside the military ranks to fulfill some of its requirements for specialized skills.

The contributors also forecast recruiting and retention problems if the DOD maintains the status quo on its personnel and manpower policies while the administration stays the course with the GWOT. Some of these dire predictions have already come to pass. Ed Dorn states that the Defense Department faces an even more basic issue: could it recruit 20,000 to 50,000 additional personnel if authorized to do so, given current recruiting practices, the slowly eroding public support for the war in Iraq, and an economy that continues to generate jobs (p. 346)? Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz succinctly observes,

Today, more than 1.4 million men and women choose to serve on active duty in the armed forces, along with another 1.2 million who serve in the National Guard and reserves. It is a diverse force that reflects the rich culture, tradition, and values of America. Our all-volunteer force is high quality, well trained, and highly skilled. The men and women who serve in our armed forces are motivated, experienced, and compassionate. They are professionals in every sense of the word. They have defended America’s interests and security for three decades and they are clearly prepared to meet the challenges of the war on terrorism (p. 333).

I am a product of the all-volunteer force, as is virtually everyone who wears the uniform today; together, we carry on a more than 200-year-old tradition of the American experience. Only three times did conscription interrupt this stretch—for the Civil War, World War I, and World War II (conscription ending in 1973)—but that didn’t stop people from continuing to volunteer. All of us—active, Guard, or Reserve—joined for our own particular reasons. What’s kept us in is what continues to draw young people into the military ranks and keep them there: a desire to serve the country. The All-Volunteer Force does a fantastic job of keeping this message alive. But other messages are just as clear. America has the best force it has ever had; quality isn’t cheap. Policy decisions in accessions, pay, and retirement will continue to drive that quality. Perhaps the DOD does need to look outside itself occasionally for some specialized, part-time help. Certainly, Guard and Reserve issues need examining with an eye toward redefining what it means to be a member of those forces. We’ve come a long way, but a long road lies ahead.

Much to my relief, The All-Volunteer Force does not read like a book intended for manpower and personnel staffers, although these people would receive the most obvious benefit of its insight. Every military officer and senior noncommissioned officer of any Air Force specialty code or military occupational specialty as well as any DOD civilian with decision authority would do well to read this book, digest its essays, and do what they can to make the most out of the next 30 years of our all-volunteer force. Clearly, we cannot stay the course we set during the 1990s and early 2000s. The All-Volunteer Force has some answers and road maps that, in the hands of the right people, can and will make a difference for the next 30 years.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.