The Future Security Environment in the Middle East: Conflict, Stability, and Political Change edited by Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman. RAND Corporation (http://www.rand.org/ publications), 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138, 2004, 365 pages, $30.00 (softcover). http://www.rand.org/ publications/MR/MR1640/MR1640.pdf.
This important, insightful book systematically examines Middle Eastern governments and societies to reveal current trends, forecast future threats, and assess the impact on US interests and policies in the region. Written by seven different policy experts commissioned by RAND’s Project Air Force, the chapters cover distinct topics: political reform, economic reform, civil-military relations, leadership change, energy security, information distribution, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A typical chapter frames the issue, examines broad themes for the region, provides case studies for individual nations, and then discusses policy implications for the United States. Each provides clear logic, definite findings, and firm policy recommendations. The writing style is crisp and direct; the research is commendable, consistently exhibiting both breadth and depth; the topics are complementary; and key items are repeatedly cross-referenced. Editors Bensahel and Byman effectively tie the text together: the introduction clearly outlines themes and approaches, and the conclusion neatly summarizes key issues, findings, and—most noteworthy—regional uncertainties (oil prices, Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the influence of Russia and China, and regime changes). Major points of this work can be grouped as instruments of national power, so central points can be discussed briefly.
Politically, the United States faces “contradictory interests”—to promote either regional stability or political reform. The first is safer, but the second is necessary: “The conundrum facing U.S. policy-makers is that political reform is essential for long-term regional stability but may increase regional instability and anti-American sentiment in the short run” (p. 19). Middle Eastern regimes have survived through “cooption and coercion” (p. 54). They will liberalize (increase civil and political rights) but only in slow, measured, calculated steps. For most regional leaders, domestic issues outweigh foreign affairs. Thus, the United States should follow a policy of “shaping and hedging” by actively seeking redundant bases, quietly advocating political reform, and carefully cultivating nonregime figures (p. 194).
Informationally, a “revolution” has swept the region and now complicates US policies. “Mid-tech” tools (videocassettes, photocopiers, and satellite television) are prevalent, allowing distribution of a single message quickly and cheaply (p. 227). Regimes’ inability to direct or even monitor the information conveyed poses public-relations challenges for the United States, for “we cannot control what they think, but we can compete for their attention” (p. 251).
Militarily, the nations’ forces have a “dual mandate”: to control both internal and external threats (p. 142). The first has priority. Political leaders retain command of compliant military leaders with inducements and safeguards that inhibit professionalism, detract from performance, and weaken integration into coalitions. Ian O. Lesser’s chapter on WMDs presents very troubling information. These weapons, broadly defined here, are attractive in that they offset conventional weaknesses, convey prestige, appease domestic pressure groups, and conform operationally with the tight centralized control so prevalent in the region. Because the Middle East will face “sustained insecurity,” US policy should have as a core aim the prevention of transfers of WMDs and ballistic missiles to states in the region (p. 276).
Economically, the entire region confronts severe stress. Since 1970 the urban population has grown by 100 million, and half the populace now resides in the few major cities. In real terms, personal incomes and state budgets have declined significantly in the same period. Overcrowding, unemployment, poverty, youth demographics, and limited resources have produced a situation “highly toxic” for regional governments (p. 72). Furthermore, Islamists are routinely the most organized opposition groups. The region will maintain its dominant position in the energy trade since prices depend largely on Middle Eastern production of oil and natural gas. The resulting revenue has produced “rentier states” that survive on income provided by fossil fuel (p. 20). This “mono-crop” export is state controlled, largely independent of the citizens, and highly volatile (p. 107). The separate nations and the entire region will continue to face “grave economic challenges” (p. 128).
The book contains a few minor flaws, most dealing with structure and the publication timeline. Research began before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and largely ended before the Iraq War (p. 12). Thereafter, the authors updated their chapters, but somewhat inconsistently. The most current bibliographical entry dates from June 2003, the year before publication. Some referenced periodicals date from 1999 to 2001, despite the availability of subsequent editions (pp. 317ff.). The national security strategy discussed dates from 2000 (p. 18). The complexity of coordinating separate authors and a long publication period do detract from the work, for recent events in Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Palestine have since altered the security environment. Additionally, the table formats provide no help and convey little information. Readers would also benefit from brief biographies of the contributing authors. Overall, though, these are small matters.
I highly recommend The Future Security Environment to organizations concerned with national security—US Central Command as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Agency, and National Security Council, among others. Policy makers and implementers as well as operators and desk officers will all benefit greatly from the thorough discussions and clear recommendations. The authors conclude that the Middle East will remain prominent and challenging and that American military power should more fully integrate with the other instruments of national power. The text ends on a somber note: “Unless it pursues a multidimensional and coordinated policy approach, the United States will be confined to reacting to crises rather than preventing and managing them” (p. 315).
Lt Col Kurt W. Schake, PhD, USAF
University of Illinois–Champaign
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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