Air University Review, January-March 1987
As we rapidly approach the dawn of a new century, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) stands ready to meet the challenges and to exploit the opportunities of the future. Ours is a dynamic command with bright, dedicated people working energetically to provide the necessary combat capability to underwrite deterrence effectively. Exhaustive planning will ensure SAC's invaluable contribution to our nation's security well into the next century. In looking to the future, we have a rich heritage to draw from. In 1946 Gen Carl Spaatz laid out the first mission statement for SAC:
The Strategic Air Command will be prepared to conduct long range offensive operations in any part of the world either independently or in cooperation with land and naval forces; ... to provide combat units capable of intense and sustained combat operations employing the latest and most advanced weapons ... [and] to train units and personnel for the maintenance of the strategic forces in all parts of the world.1
Since that time, SAC's impressive array of nuclear and conventional capabilities has inspired caution and restraint in our principal adversary, the Soviet Union. For more than 40 years, the combat capability embodied in SAC manned bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and Navy sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), has convincingly deterred Soviet nuclear attack. As a backdrop to US-Soviet relations, these robust forces have discouraged direct Soviet aggression against the United States and its allies. The enormous conventional capabilities of SAC long-range bombers, airborne reconnaissance platforms, and aerial refueling tankers have strengthened the US ability to respond flexibly to any attack scenario. Since its creation, SAC has led the way in preserving the peace and protecting America's vital interests.
A realistic look at the future international system reveals the existence of a number of nations with interests contrary to our own. Some of these nations will have sufficient military power and resources to endanger American security. To counter those threats, the United States must maintain highly capable, diverse, and resilient military forces. SAC will continue to play a critical role in that endeavor.
It is reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union will remain the greatest threat to American security in the future. Despite a change in leadership and publicly professed peaceful intentions, the Soviets have never deviated from their ultimate goal of expanding Soviet influence and control around the globe. This goal is buttressed by a Communist ideology committed to the global extension of its principles and a massive military arsenal far in excess of that necessary to defend the Soviet sphere. This massive arsenal has resulted from a relentless Soviet drive to achieve military superiority over the United States. Since the early 1960s, the Soviets have invested tremendous sums in modern weaponry. We fully expect them to continue plowing immense resources into the modernization, readiness, and sustainability of their armed forces; into military research and development; and into their military-industrial capacity.
This prospect is especially worrisome in that an extensive military capability is the Soviet Union's only legitimate claim to superpower status and world influence. The Soviets cannot compete economically with the West since their highly centralized system strangles productivity and prevents economic development. On a political and ideological level, the Soviets have experienced comparable failures. They have had virtually no success in persuading other Communist nations to accept a pure Kremlin ideological line. With these failures, the Soviets are left with only military power to pursue their objectives on the world stage. And the Soviet Union has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to threaten and use force to achieve its objectives (e.g., Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979). We readily expect continued Soviet reliance on force as the principal instrument of its aggressive, expansionist policies. Certainly, the Soviet Union will sustain its ongoing efforts to expand, modernize, and deploy increasingly capable weapon systems designed for the entire spectrum of conventional and nuclear conflict.
In this light, we will rely on our time-tested defense strategy of deterrence "to prevent war by maintaining forces and demonstrating the determination to use them, if necessary, in ways that will persuade our adversaries that the cost of any attack on our vital interests will exceed the benefits they could hope to gain." SAC's primary responsibility in this endeavor will remain constant and unalterable--to maintain the combat capability required to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies or to prevent coercion under threat of attack. Faced with intensive Soviet efforts to modernize, harden, disperse, defend, and make mobile many of their critical warfighting assets, we have wisely laid the foundation for modernizing our strategic nuclear forces. This modernization will assure the vitality of our forces and underwrite credible deterrence well into the next century.
The first and most important modernization step is to deploy the full complement of 100 Peacekeeper missiles. Currently, our greatest shortfall lies in the capability to hold at risk hardened Soviet ICBM sites and command centers with prompt weapons. High confidence deterrence requires that Soviet planners be convinced we have the ability to disrupt an attack promptly and prevent successful follow-on strikes. The only near-term solution to our destabilizing shortfall in prompt, hard-target capability lies in 1,000 Peacekeeper warheads. Their exceptional accuracy offers an extraordinarily effective capability to strike hardened Soviet warfighting assets promptly. Fielding the first 50 Peacekeepers in Minuteman silos is by far the quickest and most economical steppingstone toward achieving the required capability. Deployment at F. E. Warren AFB in Wyoming is off to a good start, and we anticipate the first 50 missiles will be on alert by the end of 1988.
After evaluating several more survivable basing modes for deploying the second increment of 50 Peacekeeper missiles, the Air Force recommended rail garrison basing as the most promising mode. President Reagan agreed and on 19 December 1986 directed development of rail garrison basing for Peacekeeper. This basing mode will provide maximum flexibility at the lowest cost. Peacekeepers on alert in garrisons capable of a prompt response to a Soviet attack will deter the "bolt out of the blue." Dispersal on strategic warning will provide survivability, make the system virtually unattackable, and add stability in a time of increasing tensions. Fifty Peacekeepers in this survivable basing mode will provide increased flexibility to the president in responding to a Soviet attack and will offer a prompt counterforce capability to defeat residual Soviet strategic forces. In the near-term, fielding 100 Peacekeeper missiles is the best foundation for deterrence, no matter what the basing mode.
To complement Peacekeeper, we are developing the small ICBM for deployment in the early nineties. Its single warhead will have comparable accuracy to that of the Peacekeeper. Survivable basing on hardened mobile launchers will further enhance deterrence by complicating Soviet targeting and providing a flexible retaliatory capability against counterforce targets throughout a nuclear conflict.
We are actively pursuing a dual-track modernization program to ensure the continued contribution of the manned penetrating bomber to our deterrent forces well into the next century. Deployment of the B-1B fulfills the need for a penetrating bomber while we proceed with development of the advanced technology bomber (ATB). The B-1B will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses into the 1990s because of its small radar cross section, high speed, adaptive defensive systems, and low-altitude flight. As the ATB enters the inventory the B-1B will begin to assume both a cruise missile carrier and penetration role. Thus, the B-1B will serve as an effective strategic delivery platform for decades to come.
The ATB is the penetrating bomber of the future that will carry us well into the twenty-first century. Development of the ATB is proceeding at a rapid, yet prudent, rate with deployment planned for the early nineties. The ATB will provide the capability to penetrate the most sophisticated Soviet defenses and attack the full spectrum of targets well into the future. It incorporates an effective, highly survivable design, the latest advances in propulsion and airframe technology, and modern sensors and avionics. It promises a long-range, efficient cruise capability with a variety of weapon loads. With low observables (stealth), the ATB will be highly adaptive to the evolving threat and will provide a new dimension in flexibility and capability for both nuclear and conventional operations. A combined force of B1Bs, ATBs, and cruise missiles will place maximum stress on Soviet air defenses, force extensive Soviet spending on improved defenses, and ensure the effectiveness of the bomber leg of the Triad.
As the capabilities of our strategic nuclear forces improve, it is equally important that we have reliable, flexible, and redundant command and control (C2) capabilities to support those forces. Our current C2 network is undergoing an extensive technological update to ensure a robust capability in the face of more capable Soviet forces. This network must be as survivable and enduring as the forces it supports. Completion of our planned C2 programs will greatly enhance deterrence by assuring reliable and timely warning, ambiguous attack assessment, enduring force management, and survivable and enduring communications connectivity from the national command authorities (NCA) to the forces, even under the most stressful conditions.
Strategic offensive nuclear forces will remain the cornerstone of deterrence for many years to come. However, the intense research efforts of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) hold great promise of producing advanced systems to counter ballistic missiles. SDI researchers are examining a number of concepts involving a wide range of technologies. The research is intended to exploit technological evolution and provide a prudent response to aggressive Soviet research and development of ballistic missile defenses. Heavy Soviet reliance on ICBMs and SLBMs makes their nuclear forces particularly susceptible to an effective US ballistic missile defense system. Moreover, such a system would complement rather than replace offensive nuclear forces. Additionally, the result of SDI research will substantially expand the US technology base for application in other areas.
Ongoing arms control negotiations will likely impact SAC's future nuclear role. SAC fully supports efforts to achieve mutually verifiable and equitable arms reductions as an integral part of US efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war. We consider arms control issues in planning for the future, analyze force structure implications of proposals, and evaluate the likely impact of force reductions on our ability to maintain deterrence. Our strategic modernization efforts produce leverage in arms negotiations by demonstrating US resolve and pressuring the Soviets to bargain in good faith. These efforts preclude the Soviets from using arms control to lock in current advantages in force capabilities. Moreover, if negotiations result in agreements that significantly reduce US and Soviet strategic forces, continued modernization will provide the best combat capability possible to underwrite credible deterrence.
Reductions in nuclear forces, if achieved, will increase US reliance on strong, versatile conventional forces to discourage and combat aggression. Thus, it is imperative we maintain and enhance SAC's conventional capabilities. Our current tanker, reconnaissance, and bomber assets contribute immensely to US global force projection and theater combat capabilities. Additionally, we have a number of programs under way to increase SAC's conventional capabilities.
SAC's KC-135 and KC-10 fleet provides critical deployment and employment air refueling to US general purpose and airlift aircraft. Refueling greatly enhances the flexibility of these aircraft by extending their presence in the combat area, increasing their range, enabling them to avoid en route stops and overflight of troubled areas, and reducing their vulnerability to attack. The importance of air refueling was dramatically demonstrated by the successful US raid on Libya in April 1986. Extensive tanker support enabled F-111s to stage out of Britain, strike their targets in Tripoli, and return nonstop to their base in Britain.
To expand our capability to meet the growing demand for aerial refueling, SAC is completing a buy of 60 KC-10s and is continuing the KC-135R conversion program. The R conversion is a comprehensive modernization program for all SAC KC-135s that incorporates new jet engines and replaces or modifies 25 other systems or subsystems. The program increases off-load capability by 50 percent, improves fuel efficiency by 27 percent, significantly enhances reliability, and extends the useful life of the KC-135 far into the next century.
SAC airborne reconnaissance assets provide essential intelligence support to theater commanders. SAC's SR-71, U-2R, RC-135, and TR-1 aircraft offer versatility, timely response, and global coverage. Their missions support peacetime planning, strike preparation, indications and warning of attack, and damage assessment. The TR-1 was developed specifically to satisfy the theater commander's intelligence needs. We have a number of cost effective upgrades under way to improve and sustain the long-term effectiveness, reliability, and survivability of our reconnaissance assets.
SAC is dedicated to supporting the conventional warfighting capability of theater commanders with our long-range bombers. From the historical perspective, strategic conventional air power has proved its efficacy in preventing war and waging it. Our current force of B-52 bombers provides theater commanders with highly responsive platforms able to rapidly deliver large, varied payloads in support of a broad range of missions on land or at sea. Its capability to project tremendous conventional power anywhere in the world is unrivaled by any other weapon system.
The B-52 offers a number of employment options. It is particularly effective in delivering gravity bombs on area targets. The B-52 is an excellent platform for conducting maritime operations in support of the Navy. It is the most capable aircraft in performing aerial minelaying. No other aircraft can deliver such a large payload of mines to such great distances in order to delay or deny enemy movement at sea. To further enhance SAC's maritime capabilities we have modified selected B-52G aircraft to carry the Harpoon antiship missile. Our current operational capability enables us to support the Atlantic and Pacific fleets with the capability to destroy or immobilize enemy surface vessels from standoff range.
The reality of Soviet conventional superiority in Europe and the evolving threat of increasingly capable third world countries makes it essential to increase SAC's conventional capability in the future. Gen John T. Chain, commander of SAC, has directed extensive efforts to
make fuller use of the huge talent capabilities of our bomber force to give the President, Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff more flexibility in military operations . . . In particular, SAC's long-range bombers carrying conventional explosives would help stave off the need to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union's larger conventional ground and air forces.3
To capitalize on SAC's inherent conventional warfighting capability, we intend to fully integrate today's technology into our long-range bomber force. SAC is expanding the delivery capability of our B-52 bombers; improving the delivery accuracy of our systems; implementing a realistic training program to fully qualify all of our flying and maintenance crews in conventional operations; and pursuing a family of conventional weaponry that provides precision strike capability, standoff range, and suppression of enemy air defenses. Our planned conventional enhancements will provide theater commanders an enormous warfighting capability at an affordable price and will increase their flexibility in applying air power in their area of operations. Further, an improved bomber force will provide the NCA a flexible, responsive option that is global in scope and that defuses forward operating base and overflight issues.
Similarly, our modernized bombers will offer exceptional conventional capabilities. Initially, the B-1B will be able to carry up to 84 conventional weapons. This large payload, combined with its long-range and low-level capability, will make the B-1B an effective conventional asset. The ATB will add a new dimension to our conventional capability. Its low observable characteristics will make it an outstanding conventional penetrator against the most robust air defenses. The combination of ATB's inherent survivability and the application of standoff weapons will ensure a precision strike capability across the target spectrum. Theater commanders need a large, long-range, fully capable conventional bomber force that complements their tactical fighter forces in performing theater air missions. Our conventional enhancements and modern bombers will fulfill that need.
As we look to the future, there are two reasons why I remain optimistic that we will continue to deter the Soviets: technology and people. What is unsaid in this unclassified forum are the many improvements that technology will provide between now and the year 2000. As new technologies expand our horizons, the potential benefits are enormous. We will continue to push the limits of the technological envelope to provide capabilities we cannot yet fully envision.
In SAC today you will find a new vitality in our units as the investment we have made in new equipment and facilities achieves fruition. Our people consistently meet or surpass demanding standards and exhibit great pride in turning potential capability into tangible deterrence. We must continue to challenge our dedicated people to find better, more productive ways to perform the daily tasks of building and maintaining SAC's combat capability. The key to success is coupling bright minds with the advanced technological products of a free society. One of our nation's greatest strengths lies in the open and free nature of American society. The free enterprise system encourages diversity, promotes competition, rewards excellence, and engages the creative in the task of advancing technology.
The closed society of the Soviet Union will never be able to compete effectively with our open society. The United States will always operate along the leading edge of technology with the Soviets following in trail, trying to steal what they cannot develop. The key to our advantage will remain our continuing ability to exploit the technological advantage that comes from bright minds employed in a free enterprise system.
Barksdale AFB, Louisiana
Notes
Contributor
Lt Gen James P. McCarthy (BS, Kent State; MS, George Washington University) is the commander of the Eighth Air Force. He has served as deputy chief of staff, Plans, Headquarters Strategic Air Command; as director of legislative liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force; special assistant for MX matters, Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition; commander, 93d and 97th Bombardment Wings; and vice-commandant of cadets, USAF Academy. General McCarthy is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and National War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.