Air University Review, January-March 1987
In this edition, we focus on strategic issues. As US Air Force professionals, we have to understand the implications of strategic bombing because destroying the enemy’s vital centers is at the heart of what the Air Force is all about. This is our reason for being.
The US Air Force won its independence because of its contributions to victory in the Second World War, and in large part because the marriage of the B-29 to the atomic bomb meant that air power could, in and of itself, be decisive in war.
History flows like a river and, like a river, is ever changing. There will come a time when events or technology may negate the need for an independent Air Force. The manned bomber, like the horseborne solder, could at some point be a thing of the past. Until then, however, we have to live with the reality of the present and deal with warfare as it is. For the military professional, understanding the awful reality of war is what we are all about.
"Peace Is Our Profession" has long been the motto of the Strategic Air Command. As slogans go, it’s not bad. I am reminded, however, of an old college chum who had served a hitch in the US Marines before finishing his education. Before leaving the Corps, he toured Vietnam as an enlisted aide to a general. He told me that his general gave a pat speech at every stop. When visiting a rifle unit he would say, "Infantry, you ain’t got infantry, you ain’t got squat." At an artillery company he would say, "Guns, you ain’t got guns, you ain’t got squat." And so it went, right on down to transportation and the guards at the disciplinary barracks. The predictable rhetoric rolled out.
War is too serious for rhetoric. To prepare ourselves properly for the awesome responsibilities of war, we have to look beyond the facile and the obvious to question the very substance of our beliefs. The military profession is, because it involves matters of life or death, the most demanding of all callings. If we are to practice our profession properly, we have to escape from the pat answers and saccharine phrases that offend no one and say absolutely nothing.
The changes that are afoot in warfare make this a challenging and dangerous time. The introduction of stealth technologies, for instance, may change the entire nature of aerial warfare. Stealth is more than a dandy engineering breakthrough. It is a departure as significant as that of the submarine, which, if you will recall, radically altered naval warfare, changed the institutional organization of the US Navy, and played no small part in getting the United States involved in two global conflicts. Beyond invisible airplanes, there lies the question of what the Air Force will be like if, either because of advances in technology or the implementation of arms limitation treaties, the manned bomber is relegated to the Air Force Museum. These are not popular questions, but if we fail to address them we assure ourselves of answers that are unpalatable.
From the time of the birth of the Air Force, Air University Review has served as our professional journal. In the past few years it became a truly open forum for presenting ideas and stimulating thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. Hopefully, we enlightened those who sought a wider perspective in their thinking. Undoubtedly, we irritated those who feel that the Air Force must "speak with one voice." Unfortunately, perhaps tragically, far too many officers never bothered to read their professional journal.
Because of a devastating budget cut, you are reading the final edition of Air University Review. There is, however, a flicker of hope in that the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) plans a publication called the Air Power Journal. It will focus on the operational art of war and hopefully reach some of those officers who never read the Review. The Air Power Journal will need our support if it is to overcome what I perceive to be the prevailing anti-intellectualism that dominates our service and which, in my opinion, played a large role in the demise of the Review. I wish Col Keith W. Geiger, the designated editor of Air Power Journal, the very best.
When I became editor, I enthusiastically endorsed the efforts of my two predecessors who worked to make the Review the one Air Force publication that did not hew to the imperatives of policy. In that spirit, let me end by warning that if the current trends in our approach to thinking and writing continue, the elimination of the Air University Review will be only another step toward the Air Force’s unilateral disarmament in the war of ideas.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.